
















The Dissertation Committee for Ian Wyatt Gerg certifies that this is the approved 
version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
The Virtual Observing Agent in Music: 














The Virtual Observing Agent in Music: 









Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 









I would like express my gratitude to the many teachers, friends, and family 
members whose mentorship and support have enabled the completion of this dissertation. 
First and foremost, I must thank my advisor, Robert S. Hatten, for his guidance, 
encouragement, and patience during our weekly meetings over the past number of years. 
The value of his insights is only rivaled by the depth of his kindness. The music theory 
and musicology faculties should also know my appreciation for my time with them. Their 
effectiveness as pedagogues and mentors is something to be emulated. I owe gratitude to 
my fellow graduate students who have been unselfish with their encouragement and 
friendship. I am further thankful for the generosity of the Kent Kennan Endowed 
Graduate Fellowship in Music Theory (2008-2009; 2012-2013). 
A number of others played a significant role in this project long before its 
inception. My earliest music teachers, Ray Knight and Joe Sensor, let me know the value 
of personal expression. Mary Lou Cartwright and Mary Steele taught me the art of 
language. I owe a debt of gratitude to Mark Lusk and Eric McKee for opening my mind 
as a musician, a scholar, and a person. I am also appreciative of the inspiration and 
encouragement from Jeff Vollmer, who first showed me a different way to approach 
music and gave me something to reach for as an undergraduate. 
 The members of my family, particularly Lois and Dick Sadley, have provided me 
with a tremendous amount of support. Their interest in my work has made it easy to walk 
this uncommon path. I must also express my appreciation for my brother, Isaac. Through 
his example and mentorship, I learned the value of curiosity and diligence at an early age. 
Finally, and above all, I am grateful for the love and guidance selflessly offered 
by my parents. They made this project possible each and every day. This is for them.   
 vi 
The Virtual Observing Agent in Music: 
A Theory of Agential Perspective as Implied by Indexical Gesture 
 
 
Ian Wyatt Gerg, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Robert S. Hatten 
 
The human body is inseparable from our understanding of music. Through 
embodied cognition, listeners conceptualize music as performed action. We find evidence 
of this in our most fundamental musical language. “High” pitches resonate high in a 
singer’s head, while “fast” rhythms resemble fast bodily movement. Scholars have 
followed the entailments of these metaphors in recent decades, developing theories of 
bodily gesture (Hatten 2004, Lidov 2005) and physical mimesis (Cox 2011). These hold 
that the bodily movement that we hear in music can imitate the physical gestures that we 
use in everyday communication (e.g., waving, nodding, bowing, or sighing). This has its 
own entailments; most fundamentally, it implies the presence of a virtual, human-like 
agent within music that is similar to the “virtual persona” theorized by Edward T. Cone 
(1974). In other words, in perceiving musical sounds as imitative of physical movement 
and gesture, we infer the presence of a virtual agent who enacts them.  
This dissertation extends these theories, demonstrating that musical gestures can 
be mimetic of indexical somatic movements—that is, bodily movements of pointing, 
 vii 
looking, striving, and reaching. These indexical gestures suggest the presence of a virtual 
observing agent. The virtual observing agent acts a lens through which we, the listener, 
can experience the interior world (diegesis) of a work. This leads us to embody a single 
and more individualized perspective on the musical representation. I explore the 
implications of indexical gesture and perspective with an examination of music from the 
common practice period. Moreover, I bring the theory of virtual observing agency 
together with theories of musical narrative and emotion. 
 viii 
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TOWARD A THEORY OF THE VIRTUAL OBSERVING AGENT 
 
An Introduction to Gesture 
 The opening motive of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 in C minor is perhaps the 
best-known musical gesture in all of Western classical music. The urgency of the rhythm 
and the intensity of its sequential repetition that is set in the minor mode depict both an 
unprecedented potency and dire inevitability. In Beethoven as I Knew Him, Anton 
Schindler recalls: 
The composer himself provided the key to these depths 
when one day, in this author’s presence, he pointed to the 
beginning of the first movement and expressed in these 
words the fundamental idea of his work: ‘Thus Fate knocks 
at the door!’ (1966 [1840, 1860]: 147) 
Of course, given Schindler’s known mendacious tendencies, this anecdote is likely a 
romantic fabrication. Regardless, it takes no interpretive leap to imagine the music 
representing what Schindler describes. We hear the first four pitches of the motive sound 
as a forceful hand rapping against a large door, while its repeat at a lower pitch level 
suggests its urgency. After a brief pause, the knocking proceeds with reckless abandon as 
the impetuousness of Fate develops throughout the movement. 
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 In hearing the motive as knocking, we are describing musical sounds as though 
they comprise a physical gesture—a real bodily movement. This leads to two important 
implications. First, the knocking gesture implies that the action is that of a human agent, 
in this case an anthropomorphized Fate; our understanding of a physical action assumes 
the existence of an entity that performs this action. However, because the gesture and the 
agent who performs it only exist in our conceptualization of the music, not in reality, we 
additionally infer the existence of a diegesis—a virtual world distinct from the real, 
material space in which we, as listeners, exist. Although we might take these three 
inferences for granted, their entailments prove to be valuable to interpretation. 
 Before proper definitions of a musical gesture, an agent, and the diegesis can be 
offered, it is necessary first to understand the components of a physical gesture since the 
latter is the source of the musical metaphor.  
 
From Physical Gesture to Musical Gesture 
 As humans we engage in physical somatic gestures daily because they exist as 
significant components of communication. For example, when greeting someone whom 
we have not recently seen, we extend a hand to invite a handshake. While in traffic, we 
may wave with gratitude to a driver who has let us proceed first at an intersection. Other 
human gestures are less voluntary, such as when we yelp in pain after stubbing a toe. 
Similarly, upsetting news may bring us to tears, causing us to breathe irregularly, 
whimper, and even fall to our knees. 
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 David Lidov (2005) describes a bodily gesture as “a molar unit of motion, 
initiated by a single impulse and accomplishing nothing other than an expression or 
communication” (132). Bowing to an audience after a performance is a clear example of 
what Lidov describes. This bowing gesture involves bending downward at the waist and 
reversing the motion to return to an upright position. This action is molar in that its 
meaning is not an aggregate of the meanings of each of the individual component parts. It 
is indivisible in that the meaning of this “thank you” gesture is not atomistic; it is not 
partly found in the downward motion of the upper body and partly found in the upward 
motion. Instead, we understand the individual actions as coming together through a single 
impulse to create a unitary gestalt—a single somatic gesture.  
 Lidov’s definition of the physical gesture appropriately describes the bowing; 
however, it becomes more useful if we expand it slightly, first by recognizing the 
importance of the gestural performer, namely, the person enacting the gesture. Although 
we may take it for granted that a performer is necessary for the realization of a gesture, 
this element should not be considered unremarkable. It is a gesture’s implication of 
embodiment that distinguishes it from other signs. For example, the green glow of a 
traffic light is a sign but not a gesture because it is not produced by a sentient being—a 
gesturer. The traffic light lacks the “impulse” that Lidov requires and, furthermore, does 
not have an attachment to a volitional entity, which is an essential component of a 
gesture.  
 Gestures may also be static bodily positions in which movement is more or less 
absent. For example, I may stick my fingers in my ears to indicate that I do not want to 
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hear what someone is saying. Of course, it is necessary to move my hands up to my ears 
to enact the gesture; however, the gesture itself is in the static pose, not the motion 
toward my ears. In adding to Lidov’s definition, we might better describe a physical 
gesture as an expressive sign that is produced by a sentient performer through indivisible 
acts of bodily movement or positioning.  
 
 Having established a clear definition of physical gesture, we are ready to explore 
gestures that we hear in music. To be sure, “gesture” has been used to describe musical 
units long before the existence of a developed theory of musical gesture. For instance, the 
harmonic progression V – vi is sometimes referred to as a deceptive harmonic gesture. 
Yet without further description of its physical derivation, this progression might better be 
considered a metaphor for a gesture in the same way that picking up the check while 
dining with close friends is metaphorically a gesture of kindness. Unpacking these 
metaphors likely reveals a connection to physical gestures; however, the gestures 
examined in this dissertation are limited to those which have clear physical basis with 
interpretive consequences. 
 Robert S. Hatten (2004: 95) succinctly characterizes a physical gesture as a 
“significant energetic shaping through time,” and holds that the sonic analogue—the 
musical gesture—is achieved through intermodal listening (97). In other words, we 
imagine that music represents the corporeality of an enacted gesture or the visual 
appearance of a gesture. Through this process of multisensory integration, these distinct 
sensory modalities are linked, enabling us to hear a musical gesture that sounds like a 
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particular physical gesture. We might hear the repetition of a short series of fast notes as 
implying emphatic knocking, pointing, or some other agitated physical gesture because 
the music—both its mode of production and our conceptualization of the sound—shares 
the same urgency that is present in enacting and observing the analogous physical 
gesture. 
 
Scholarly Precedents to a Theory of Gesture 
 In what immediately follows, I provide a brief review of the literature from the 
second half of the twentieth century to the beginning of the twenty-first century that 
positions us to discuss a theory of gesture. Because my theory of gesture relies on 
agency, narrative, metaphor, and embodiment, I trace the development of these areas as 
they contribute to gestural approaches to music. My characterization of the development 
of gesture theory begins with speech-action theory of the 1960s, which leads to the 
development of agency in music. Once the agent has been theorized and established as a 
sort of character within a musical work, theorists further explore the way in which these 
agents interact throughout the unfolding of a piece, paving the path for narrative theories 
to enter the discourse. At the same, theories of embodiment and metaphor are developed 
in linguistics and psychology, most notably by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff 
1987, Johnson 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). This orientation suggests that the 
affordances of the physical human body directly affect our thinking, including the way in 
which we understand music. By hearing music as bodily movement, scholars such as 
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David Lidov and Robert S. Hatten have been able to develop theories of musical gesture, 
that is, hearing music as imitative of physical human movement. 
 J. L. Austin explores the entailments of human speech as it relates to performative 
action in his highly influential How to Do Things with Words (1962). In this work, he 
divides speech into two categories: constative utterances and performative utterances. 
Constatives are those statements which are descriptive in that they serve to relay facts 
from the speaker to his or her audience. For instance, “Nicholas Sarkozy was the 
president of France in 2010.” Such a statement is constative because it reports to the 
reader something factual. We can judge this statement as being “true” because Sarkozy 
was the president of France in 2010; it is a verifiable fact. If I had claimed that Barack 
Obama was president of France in 2010, we would most certainly describe the statement 
as “false” because we know that Obama has never held this office. 
 Performatives differ in that they “are doing something as opposed to just saying 
something” (Austin 1962: 133). For instance, when the chairperson says to the board, 
“This meeting is adjourned,” he or she does not describe or report information. Instead, 
this utterance performs the action of bringing the meeting to a conclusion. Moreover, we 
do not describe this statement in terms of its truth or falseness as we do when evaluating 
the above statement about President Sarkozy. We analyze performatives in terms of their 
appropriateness or felicity based on the context of the speaker and the conditions 
surrounding the utterance. If a low-level associate were to stand up and declare the 
meeting adjourned in the same way, we would not be inclined to evaluate the statement 
as true or false as much as we would deem it infelicitous or unfitting. 
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 The connection between speech and action is important to a theory of gesture 
because the source of musical expression is often unclear. Where do the expression and 
emotion in a piece of music come from? To whom do they belong? At one level, the 
composer is considered the source of the music and its impact on the social and cultural 
milieu. At another level, the performer is the source. Additionally, we have the 
conductor, editor, and publisher to consider as well. Edward T. Cone helps to solve this 
problem in his text, The Composer’s Voice (1974). Cone explores the relationship 
between the composer and the unfolding of a musical work. More exactly he suggests 
that in music the composer takes on a virtual musical persona, a sort of character that he 
or she enacts while presenting the music to the listener. As Cone argues, we cannot 
divorce the piece from its compositional source any more than we can remove the 
speaker from the utterance in everyday speech. The two are inextricably bound together. 
 Cone’s composer, however, differs from the types of speakers that J. L. Austin 
explores in his speech-action theory. For Cone, art seems to place a sort of mask between 
the composer and the work. This mask creates a degree of separation that prohibits a 
work from being “simple autobiography” (1974: 2). Cone sees the relation to literature: 
The hypothesis underlying this point of view is an 
appealing one: that a basic act of dramatic impersonation 
underlies all poetry, all fiction, indeed all literature 
worth the name. (2) 
This “impersonation” in works of fiction is the basis of the persona that the composer 
takes on in a piece of music. Because all utterances—linguistic, musical, or otherwise—
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imply an utterer, Cone’s theoretical persona permits us to hear a unified entity as 
directing the piece and its unfolding.1 
 Cone also discusses virtual characters that can exist within the work itself. He 
terms these “virtual agents” (1974: 89), a concept that is paramount to a theory of 
embodied gesture. These virtual agents are embodied through voiceless instruments, 
acting much like the characters in an opera or oratorio. Cone differentiates the persona—
the composer’s voice—from the virtual agent in that the former can contain multiple 
forms of the latter. He writes: 
Often a single instrument—whether a solo or a member 
of a group—is responsible for a number of melodic lines 
or musical components. In this case, the unitary agent’s 
part, like that of a complex instrumental persona, 
embraces a number of subsidiary roles. Each of these 
can be construed as implying its own agent. (98) 
With this, Cone implies that there is a nesting of virtual entities.2 The persona that we 
associate with the mask-wearing composer reveals virtual agents, essentially characters 
within the musical discourse. 
                                                 
1 Seth Monahan (2013: 329) uses the term “fictional composer” to describe “the person postulated by the 
analyst as the controlling, intending author of the musical text.” For Robert S. Hatten (2004: 231) this agent 
possesses “super-subjectivity” akin to that of a narrator who presents the musical discourse to the listener in 
sequence. It is as though this composer agent (or persona) uses the music strategically to tell a story, 
perhaps one filled with suspense, all the while knowing the outcome. I discuss this further in Chapter 4. 
2 Monahan describes these as “individuated elements” (2013). 
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 The unitary cohesion of Cone’s agents is essential to his theory. Above, we read 
that Cone differentiates permanent agents that persist throughout the work and temporary 
agents that appear only briefly before being diffused (1974: 89). He also allows for 
multiple agents to coexist in the same way that multiple actors exist within a drama (98). 
These two elements of his theory bring about questions of agential cohesion and agential 
delineation. Put more plainly, they have us asking, “Which musical elements hold agents 
together, and which elements delineate agents, keeping them as distinct entities?” 
 Leonard B. Meyer writes about the “strength of perceived conformance” in his 
Explaining Music (1973: 44-79). Meyer devises a provisional equation to determine 
which musical elements contribute to the cohesion of a musical idea and which detract 
from it (Figure 1.1). Having distinct virtual agents within the musical discourse enables a 
clearer division of gestures and gesturers to be understood. Elements that strengthen the 
development of a unitary agent are “regularity of pattern,” “individuality of profile,” and 
“similarity of patterning” (49). Features that detract from this cohesion and contribute to 
the dilution of agency are the “variety of intervening events” and the “temporal distance 
between events” (49). This makes sense because it requires that an agent have a 
differentiated identity that persists over time. When this identity is not preserved for a 
long duration, we are less likely to hear the connection across the temporal gap.3 
                                                 
3 Michelle Clater (2009: 67) has developed Meyer’s formula to track agential growth throughout a work.  
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Figure 1.1. Meyer’s equation for strength of perceived conformance (1973: 49) 
 
 Fred Everett Maus’s oft-cited article “Music as Narrative” (1991) advances 
agency a step further. He equates the way in which an agent develops over time (i.e., 
throughout a piece of music) with the development of a character within a drama or a 
novel. He writes:  
Instrumental music consists of a series of events, and the 
easiest anthropomorphism is to treat these events as 
behaviors, as actions. Once one begins thinking of 
musical sounds as actions, rather than just events, the 
notion of plot or narrative is close at hand. (7) 
With this, Maus suggests that agents are not simply discrete units of musical sounds that 
are lumped together in the mind. We instead hear them as living beings that undergo 
changes similar to humans. Imbued with a degree of permanence (identity), change, and 
volition, Maus is poised to develop a theory in which music has a pervasive narrative 
thread.  
 Carolyn Abbate’s Unsung Voices (1991) echoes many of Maus’s assertions about 
agency. She challenges Cone’s top-down approach in which the composer injects himself 
or herself into the music, acting as a puppet master who controls the actions of the 
agents. Abbate writes: 
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To Cone’s monologic and controlling “composer’s voice,” 
I prefer an aural vision of music animated by multiple, 
decentered voices localized in several invisible bodies. This 
vision proposes an interpretation of music shaped by 
prosopopoeia [or putting faces on and ascribing human 
qualities to nonhuman forms]. (13) 
Abbate’s bottom-up approach places emphasis on the human-like agents rather than the 
composer. This has the consequence of privileging the role of the body in music, thus 
contributing to a gestural approach. From this we can understand virtual agents as not just 
acting and thinking like humans, but possessing virtual bodies with the same affordances 
as our own human bodies. 
 It is certainly no coincidence that this bodily approach to music emerges around 
the same time that George Lakoff and Mark Johnson begin making a significant impact in 
cognitive linguistics. Their seminal collaboration, Metaphors We Live By (1980), 
examines the relationship between our language and the way that we perceive the world. 
In one revealing passage, Lakoff and Johnson write: 
[M]ost of the conceptual structure of a natural language is 
metaphorical in nature. The conceptual structure is 
grounded in physical and cultural experience, as are the 
conventional metaphors. Meaning, therefore, is never 
disembodied or objective and is always grounded in the 
acquisition and use of a conceptual system. (196-97) 
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With this, Lakoff and Johnson contend that our conceptualization of the world occurs 
only through the channels of our bodily systems of sensation. We do not understand our 
environment objectively but rather through the body in which we live. In Philosophy in 
the Flesh they state their approach even more clearly: “The mind is inherently embodied” 
(1999: 3). 
 David Lidov’s work proceeds directly from this notion of embodied experience. 
In his article, “Mind and Body in Music,” Lidov notes the relationship between the words 
we use to describe music and human bodily movement.4 He cites “swing” and Allegro as 
musical descriptors that are borrowed from language used to describe physical movement 
(2005: 145). Lidov highlights these associations to draw out the physicality that is 
essential to both the composition and conceptualization of music. More specifically, 
Lidov interprets most musical movement as a metaphor for physical human movement. 
Robert S. Hatten furthers this theory by presenting a rich theory of musical gesture in 
Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes (2004). Hatten describes a musical 
gesture as a “significant energetic shaping through time” (95). In offering such a succinct 
and inclusive definition, it is clear that Hatten hears gestures, thus human movement, 
almost everywhere in music. Hatten deeply explores the entailments of such a 
perspective, discussing the ways in which gestures contribute to agency and narrative. In 
his more recent work on agency, Hatten (2012) explores inferences that can be drawn 
from the interaction of agential gestures and virtual forces in music. He examines how 
                                                 
4 “Mind and Body in Music” was originally published in 1987 in Semiotica 66, no. 1/3: 69-97. It was later 
published as Chapter 8 (pp. 145-64) of Lidov’s Is Language a Music? Writings on Musical Form and 
Signification (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
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the constraints of a virtual environment shape the gestures of an agent, thus influencing 
its identity and its relationship to the musical discourse. The relationship between 
Hatten’s virtual agent and the discourse can vary widely; an agent can exist as a character 
within the discourse, a narrator that sequences events, or as an observer that provides 
commentary about the on-going narrative. With this, Hatten seamlessly sews together 
theories of gesture, agency, narrative, and emotion, which comprise decades of 
speculative models of musical expression.  
 
 In this section, I have discussed some of the scholarly literature that has led us to 
a theory of gesture. Below, I review the most current scholarship in gesture theory and 
discuss some of the gaps that my theory of indexical gestures seeks to fill.  
 
 
The Present State of Gesture Theory 
 The connection between musical movement and real movement is so often taken 
for granted that we sometimes forget that in using the word movement, we are 
metaphorically ascribing both motion and materiality to an otherwise psycho-acoustic 
phenomenon. Sound, after all, is merely composed of pulsations of air that are received in 
the ear and transmitted to the brain, where it organizes the aural signals and interprets 
them within a musical system. In this way, music is an emergent phenomenon. This 
would seem to suggest that music exists only within the mind and that it is understood 
metaphorically as motion only for the purposes of verbalized description. However, 
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Arnie Cox (2001, 2011) proposes a “mimetic hypothesis,” whereby our conception of 
music as physical movement is not just a creative conceit but rather a consequence of an 
unconscious imitation. Cox writes: 
The initial premise of the hypothesis is that part of how we 
comprehend music is by way of a kind of physical empathy 
that involves imagining making the sounds we are listening 
to. This is a special case of the general human proclivity to 
understand one another via imitation, which we can refer to 
as mimetic cognition or mimetic comprehension [. . .]; 
hence, the “mimetic hypothesis.” (2011: [3]) 
 Cox goes on to discuss mirror neurons—a neuron that emits a neural impulse 
both when an action is performed and when it is merely observed (2011: [13]). Although 
this neural mimesis (imitation) has been primarily observed in monkeys, a recent study 
has found the much anticipated and predicted evidence of their existence in humans 
(Mukamel, et. al. 2010: 750-56). This provides an empirical basis for the mimetic 
hypothesis; not only are we inclined to conceptualize music that we hear as though we 
are imitating its production, but we actually cannot avoid it. 
 Steve Larson has also explored our understanding of music as physical motion. 
He presents a theory of “musical forces” in his aptly titled book, Musical Forces: Motion, 
Metaphor, and Meaning in Music (2012). This publication follows a series of articles 
over the course of his career (most notably 1997-97, 2002, 2004) that discuss metaphors 
that we use to describe musical motion and predict melodic patterns. In Musical Forces, 
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Larson focuses on three forces whose effects are heard in melodic motion: gravity, 
magnetism, and inertia. We use gravity to describe the reason that a melody descends; 
magnetism explains the attraction of a melody to a stable pitch; and inertia is the property 
of a melody that resists a change in direction and speed (2012: 83-100). These, of course, 
are not forces in a real sense, because a melody lacks physical substance. Instead, 
Larson’s forces are metaphors for the influences that appear to affect the way in which a 
melody progresses.  
 Larson’s theory of forces provides us with an understanding of musical motion by 
drawing a connection between the way in which forces act upon objects that we observe 
and our own bodies. He stands behind a firmly embodied conception of music, writing, 
“Music moves. And something in the way it moves moves us” (2012: 61).  However, his 
theory of embodied experience is largely focused on passive movement, in that it 
primarily concerns itself with the way we are moved, not the way we move ourselves. 
His theory seems to be void of agency in the manner that we typically understand it. If 
gravity, magnetism, and inertia possess agency, it is a type of non-sentient agency in 
which these forces act in predictable, prescribed ways. Gravity always causes objects to 
descend at a predictable rate; the magnetism of the tonic always draws a melodic line 
toward it, or at least slows its departure from it. 
 Hatten (2004, 2012) characterizes gravity, magnetism, and inertia as 
“environmental forces” and notes that they cannot explain melodic leaps or other melodic 
movements that act contrary to the musical forces. Hatten writes: 
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If, as I have suggested, we imagine a virtual environment in 
which Larson’s three forces constitute environmental 
constraints, then such a leap would require additional 
energy, and the requisite energy cannot be provided by the 
three musical forces if it contradicts each of them. (2012 [5]) 
Hatten’s argument seems appropriate when we consider the motion of a large musical 
work. Like a freely bouncing ball, the melodic motion of a piano sonata should stop after 
a few moments because of the pull of gravity and the diffusion of its energy. Hatten, 
however, contends that melodic leaps and other motions that result from non-
environmental forces imply an agent who continually infuses the music with energy. 
Thus, we can see Larson’s forces and Hatten’s virtual agency as complementary. 
Whichever motions environmental forces cannot explain, the energy of an agent can, and 
vice versa. 
 Theories of forces and gestures fit together well with Cox’s mimetic hypothesis 
because of intermodality, which Hatten describes as “the capacity for analogous 
representation across all the senses and motor systems” (2004: 97). According to the 
mimetic hypothesis, when we encounter a melody, we imagine ourselves enacting a 
physical gesture with the same gestural contours. An intermodal competency permits us 
to hear a musical gesture as an embodied physical gesture, and furthermore, we can sense 




 Having reviewed the scholarly context within which gesture theory is positioned, 
we are ready to further explore the entailments briefly described above. 
 
How Agency is Implied 
 I define an agent as a unified sentient entity with the capacity for gesture 
(significant, communicative action). Hatten claims that an agent is indispensable for the 
musical gesture, writing: 
When musical events are heard as gestural, then the 
implication of agency is inescapable. (2004: 224) 
The inference that Hatten draws reflects the notion that gestures are fundamentally 
embodied signs. Therefore, the mere presence of a communication is enough to imply a 
communicator, and similarly, the presence of a gesture implies the existence of a 
gesturer.  
 It would at first seem easy to find the communicator or gesturer in a piece of 
music, since the performer is enacting a gesture that communicates something to the real 
listener. For instance, when we observe a violinist bowing, we necessarily see someone 
engaging in a performance gesture—pushing and pulling the bow across the strings. It is 
impossible visually to observe the gesture of bowing without simultaneously observing 
the performer of that gesture because the two are co-material. But as interpreters, this is 
not the gesture of inquiry. Instead of the actual gesture of a performer, we are after the 
virtual physical gesture that is presented by the performer in the (audible) musical 
gesture. Consider again the first bars of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5. Because the 
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musical gesture is enacted through the physical performance gestures of string players, 
we see that the performance gestures imply the presence of these performers. In the very 
same way, the virtual physical gesture (i.e., knocking) that we hear in the music implies a 
virtual agent (i.e., Fate). I will further define the virtual agent as a unified sentient entity 
with the capacity for virtual gesture. (I will simply refer to an “agent” when the 
distinction between a virtual and non-virtual agent is not relevant, or when the more 
general term is warranted.) 
 Positing agency within a work is one way to hear the boundaries and unity of a 
musical idea, such as a motive. Lawrence Zbikowski describes the way in which several 
characteristics of a motive come together to create a unified, molar identity (2002: 
42-48). In his own exploration of Symphony No. 5, he details how some characteristics 
of the first iteration of the motif change in subsequent entrances while others are 
preserved. The characteristics that remain constant are those that are most fundamental to 
the motive’s identity, namely the short-short-short-long rhythmic figure. In preserving 
the characteristic elements of the figure, we are able to hear subsequent iterations as 




The Implication of the Diegesis 
 The recognition of gestures “within” music implies the existence of an interior 
virtual world, and it is in this space that virtual agents enact the movements that listeners 
outside this virtual world identify as gestures. Philosopher and playwright Denis Diderot 
describes the distinct separation between the characters of a theatrical drama and the 
audience sitting in the playhouse. He suggests that these two elements are divided by an 
invisible barrier or “a vast wall” (un grand mur). In an oft-quoted passage from Discours 
sur la poésie dramatique (1771), Diderot writes: 
Imaginez sur le bord du théâtre un grand mur qui vous 
sépare du parterre. Jouez comme si la toile ne se levoit pas.  
(Imagine, at the edge of the stage, a vast wall that separates 
you [the actor] from the audience. Perform as though the 
curtain did not rise. (259, translation mine) 
This virtual barrier between the audience and the actors has become known as the fourth 
wall, in reference to the three walls that comprise a typical box set. The fourth wall acts 
as an implied boundary; however, unlike the other three, the fourth wall is transparent, 
allowing the audience to spy on the virtual (fictional) world that the play depicts. 
 Music is similar to theatre in that it, too, has the potential to represent an interior 
world that is distinct from the real world occupied by the audience. We consider this 
virtual world to be the diegesis and its characters and events to be diegetic. For example, 
in Dukas’s The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, music is used to construct a virtual world 
containing the sorcerer, his apprentice, and an enchanted broom, all of which are 
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diegetic.5 These characters are virtual agents in that they exhibit sentience, as conveyed 
by in the actions and gestures that they perform. As noted above, Hatten (2004: 115-16; 
2012) describes this diegetic space as a virtual environment, observing that it contains 
virtual agents, virtual forces (Larson 2012), and a virtual terrain. In Dukas’s symphonic 
poem, the virtual environment includes the pails of water that the broom carries and the 
implied physical space that contains the characters. Although the music does not 
articulately describe this space, spatial relationships among the three agents are clearly 
represented. The presence and absence of the sorcerer’s musical motif implies his 
presence and absence within the local space of the work and his distance from his self-
aggrandizing apprentice. 
 By contrast, the elements that lie outside the diegetic virtual world that the work 
depicts are considered non-diegetic or extradiegetic. This space is best described in 
negative terms as anything that is not part of the diegetic space depicted by the work. The 
most obvious example of the non-diegetic space associated with a theatrical production is 
the area surrounding the boxed theatre, which most notably includes the audience. In a 
concert performance of The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, we would also consider the musicians 
to be part of the non-diegetic space because they are detached from that which the music 
represents. They occupy a different conceptual space that is further distinguished by the 
differences between their performance gestures (e.g., moving the bow) and those implied 
by the music (e.g., knocking at the door). 
                                                 
5 Abbate (1991) analyzes this work with respect to “voice” and potential narrativity.  
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 It is worthy of note that music can also be non-diegetic, with respect to another 
diegesis comprised of actual actors in a fictional drama; in fact, its role in cinema and 
staged musicals regularly switches between these two spatial modes. In film, the audience 
often hears music that the characters within the diegesis cannot hear and are not intended 
to hear. Although the music plays an essential part of the cinematic production, shading 
the mood of the scene, it is not always part of diegetic space in which the characters exist. 
Theatrical characters can also switch their spatial occupancy and often do so in marked 
contexts, such as in an aside where a character “breaks the fourth wall” and speaks 
directly to the audience. However, in the repertoire that we examine in this dissertation, it 
is not necessary to consider such exceptional cases, because the distinction between 
diegetic and non-diegetic is generally clear. 
 It is also prudent to clarify that the use of the term diegesis in this theory is 
distinct from its use by classical philosophers. In the Republic, Plato—speaking through a 
Socratic dialogue—places diegesis in opposition with mimesis when describing narrative 
modes (Bk. 3, 392c-394c). For Plato, diegesis refers to a narrator that mediates the space 
between the exterior world of the audience and the interior world of the drama. This 
narrator acts as a conduit through which information from within the interior sphere of 
the works is passed along to the audience. Mimesis, by contrast, occurs when the 
narrative voice assumes the role of a character. In this mode, the narrator portrays the 
actions of the virtual world by imitating them, becoming one with a character or number 
of characters. This conception of mimesis aligns with our understanding of the term, 
particularly with regard to the mimetic hypothesis put forth by Arnie Cox (2011). But 
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confusingly, Plato’s understanding of diegetic narrative is almost oppositional to our 
definition above. He describes the diegetic narrative mode as placing a distance between 
the narrator and the virtual environment; whereas the modern use of the term would 
typically describe this narrator as non-diegetic in that it observes from the outside, at a 
remove from the characters. 
 To summarize, the theory developed in this dissertation does not structure 
diegesis and mimesis as oppositions. Instead, I reserve “diegesis” for describing the 
virtual world constructed through musical representation that is distinct from the world of 
the listener. I use “mimesis” in discussing the way in which music represents physical 
gestures through listener-perceived similarity with sonic gestures. 
 
A New Theory of Gesture and Agential Perspective 
 It is interesting that while the embodied musical experience promotes subjectivity, 
Larson’s theory of forces is largely an objectivist one. He describes the predictable 
influences of his musical forces, implying that they are constants in both the virtual 
environment he creates and in the way in which we perceive them (2012: 113). But what 
role does perspective play? What happens when a virtual agent observes the motion of 
another entity (a virtual agent or virtual object) within the diegesis? 
I first considered this while playing a game of catch with my father during a 
recent summer visit. As the ball left my father’s hand, I noticed that it did not appear to 
move very quickly; however, as it approached me, it seemed to speed up and required me 
to rapidly make last-second adjustments to catch it. In doing so, I made quick movements 
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with my arm, hand, head, neck, and eyes so that I could see the ball go into my glove. I 
did this because the ball’s movement in my field of vision increased as it approached. 
Objectively, the force of the ball on its near-linear path remained more or less constant, 
but from my vantage point, it appeared to increase in speed upon arrival. In other words, 
although the influence of forces on the ball remained the same, their indirect influence on 
my sensorimotor system was unique to my perspective. Just as perspective causes a 
change in the apparent influence of real forces on an object, we can say that agential 
perspective causes a change in the way musical forces are perceived. This is better 
understood for music with the causation reversed—a change in the apparent influence of 
musical forces can lead us to infer a virtual agent who views an object from a fixed 
perspective. 
 Embodying an agential perspective suggests that we are embodying an agent, not 
an insentient object. In imagining ourselves catching a ball, we take on the perspective of 
the catcher and mentally simulate the necessary movements to receive the ball efficiently. 
According to the mimetic hypothesis, listeners are given to interpret musical gestures as 
somatic gestures—movements of a humanoid agent. Thus, hearing and mentally 
simulating gestures in music implies that we are taking on the perspective of an agent, not 
of some insensate object. 
 That we do not embody the object (e.g., the ball) when imagining a game of catch 
does not present a problem for interpretation because the object is present through 
inferences drawn from motor movements; that is, it can be inferred from the gestures of 
an agent. The well-known “hidden ball trick” in baseball is evidence of this. With a 
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runner on first base, the pitcher throws the ball to the first baseman in an attempt to catch 
the runner before he can retreat from his lead-off. The trickery comes when the first 
baseman feigns a throw to the pitcher who pretends to catch the ball. With his eyes 
trained on the pitcher, the runner believes the ball has been returned to the mound. He is 
summarily tagged out by the first baseman as he steps away from the base to take a lead-
off. In this situation, the runner assumes that the pitcher has the ball because his gestures 
implied that he has caught it. Music in the same way can imply a virtual object, which I 
define as an insensate diegetic entity inferred through the gestures of an agent which are 
unique to its perspective. 
 
 Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 6 offers us an example in which a 
melody depicts physical motion that implies an observer’s perspective.6 This short work 
is one of the composer’s more dour settings in the genre. A notable feature of the Prelude 
is the inverted melody-and-accompaniment texture, shown in Example 1.1; the primary 
melodic line is situated beneath the accompanimental figuration of the right hand. Hans 
von Bülow described the right-hand ostinato as imitative of “tolling bells,” and its alleged 
performance at Chopin’s own funeral provides evidence of this contemporaneous 
interpretation (Schonberg 1963: 127). 
                                                 
6 Throughout this dissertation, I expound my theory by drawing primarily on music from the nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries because this repertoire has been the focus of much scholarship in gesture and 
agency. This strong scholarly foundation allows me to develop a new theory of gesture and agency that 
engages with and complements that of others. 
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 Marion Guck proposes that this work is a depiction of labored breathing (1981: 
37-50).  The melodic ascent depicts a quick and deep inward breath; it is held for 
moment; and it is released slowly as the melody descends. This aligns with the solemnity 
identified by von Bülow but furthers it by suggesting that we are embodying the musical 
movement. Through this metaphor, Guck places us directly within the diegesis of the 
piece; we experience the gesture rather than simply identifying musical features that 
imply sadness. 
 This is not the only interpretation that Guck offers. In her early work on the 
prelude, Guck (1981) prompted listeners with a number of metaphors and asked that they 
follow the entailments of these in order to determine what each revealed about the music. 
It is in a follow-up publication that Guck suggests that the left-hand melody can be that of 
an observer. She writes: 
From the beginning, I described the lines rising and falling; 
just above, I described how an arch’s line ascends, focuses 
and curves. Movement infuses both[,] the moment I try to 
describe them. It might be like the movement of a ball 
thrown in the air, or the movement of an observing eye 
[. . .]. (1991: 6, emphasis in original)  
The interpretation of the observing eye is different from the breathing metaphor because 
it directs attention outward from the agent; our focus is not on the gesturer but on the 
thing that it is observing. 
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 In Example 1.1, we see the left-hand melody of mm. 1-2 make a quick ascent 
from B2 to D4. C#4 prolongs D4 with as a neighbor-note elaboration, and the melody 
descends slowing back to B2 in m. 3, where the gesture restarts. In m. 1, we hear the 
energy of the initial ascent through the crescendo into beat two; in m. 2, we hear the 
dissipation of energy and the receding of the object into the distance, as the decrescendo 
complements the descent. Larson’s force of gravity is apparent in this passage, but in a 
unique way. Rather than creating an objective, parabolic trajectory, as might be expected, 
the quick ascent of the melody and its slow descent imply that the object is traveling into 
the distance. When tracing an object along this path, our gaze is drawn quickly upward at 
first and then descends slowly as the object travels away from us. Thus, we do not 
experience the motion of the melody in the sense that we imagine ourselves moving 
upward and downward with it; instead, we experience the motion through the 
embodiment of a virtual agent observing a virtual object. 
 
Example 1.1. Chopin, Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 6, mm. 1-2 
 
 As listeners, we train our focus on this virtual observing agent, whose attention is 
similarly trained on a virtual object receding into the distance. (This object is real for the 
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diegesis of the virtual observing agent, but virtual for us.) The unique shape of the 
melody mimics not the motion of the virtual object directly, but the bodily movements of 
a virtual observing agent as it tracks the virtual object traveling into the distance. Just as 
the gestures of the baseball pitcher were used to mime his catching the ball, the gestures 
of the virtual observing agent reveal to us the motion of the virtual object. 
 
Indexical Gestures 
 The gesture that we hear in the melodic arch of the Prelude in B Minor is 
distinctive in that it draws attention away from gesturing agent and toward another 
diegetic entity. In gazing at the virtual object, the agent indexes it by pointing its eyes at 
the object as it moves into the distance. C. S. Peirce identified indexicality as a category 
of sign whereby meaning is projected through a “real reaction with the object denoted” 
(1998 [1904]: 307). For example, smoke indicates—indexes—fire on account of a causal 
connection. Because smoke is often the direct result of fire, the two become semiotically 
linked with the former making known the presence of the latter. The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average is another example of an index whereby a single number reflects the 
value of a group of publicly-traded companies in the United States. Determined by a 
simple equation, this number is revered as an index of economic health because its value 
changes as a direct result of stock valuation. 
 Umberto Eco theorizes the Peircean index in A Theory of Semiotics (1976: 115-
21). He begins by building on linguistic approaches to indexicality, namely the 
demonstrative pronouns nouns /this/ and /that/. He identifies these words as indexical 
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based on their contextual dependency for meaning. In other words, /this/ and /that/ earn 
their meaning according to the context in which they appear. For Eco, the meaning of 
/this/ merely denotes a closeness to the speaker, while /that/ denotes a comparative 
distance from the speaker. Within a given context, they are able to transmit significant 
meaning. Consider the differences in the follows sentences spoken across a table: 
  (a)  This is my apple. 
  (b) That is your apple. 
The apple in (a) is close in proximity to the speaker while the apple in (b) is relatively 
distant. However, this relationship is reversed if the addressee were to make the very 
same utterance. In this second instance, the apple initially referred to by the 
demonstrative /this/ has become known by /that/ in the words of the second speaker.  
 Demonstrative pronouns are indexical in that they have basic meanings (‘near’ 
and ‘distant’), but in practice a more specific meaning emerges through context. They are 
very much akin to pointing (deixis); in fact, one can imagine using an index finger while 
speaking in order to further clarify or emphasize their meaning. Thus, pointing gestures 
are referred to as deictic signs (as are demonstrative pronouns). Pointing is one of the 
most basic indexical gestures that we encounter daily. By extending an arm outward from 
the body and protracting the forefinger, we draw attention to an object that is beyond our 
reach. Although we perform and respond to this gesture frequently and without thought, 
Eco’s (119) analysis of this mechanism is rather interesting. He finds that pointing 
typically involves four features: longitude, apicality, movement-toward, and dynamic 
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stress. When these features come together, a gesture emerges that effectively 
communicates a connection with a distant object, person, or location. 
 Longitude and apicality are the two most crucial features of the pointing gesture. 
With regard to these, Eco writes: 
[The pointing gesture] is longer than it is bulky and ‘stops’ 
at the top of the fingernail. This observation might seem 
rather obvious, but suffice it to think of an iconic surrogate 
of the pointing finger (for instance, of the image of an 
arrow in a road signal) to discover that these features are 
indispensable. (119) 
He continues by observing that the gesture implies an extension beyond the tip of the 
finger toward the indicated object or location. It should be noted that apicality does not 
simply refer to the end or terminus of the longitudinal extension; we should remember 
that the pointing gesture has two ends: the fingertip and the body proper. Eco notes that 
the apical end is marked (significant) in that it possesses a specific meaning about 
direction that the other end does not (119).  Like the person gesturing with a pointed 
finger, an arrow in a traffic signal has two ends. On one end we find a narrow tip or 
arrowhead that the opposite side may lack. The special property of the apical end 
expresses a unidirectional motion toward the remote object or location that the other end 
does not convey. In other words, while the longitude of the gesture produces the path, it is 
the apicality of the fingertip that tells us of the direction. 
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 Eco describes movement-toward as a feature of the pointing gesture that can 
sometimes substitute for longitude. He writes: 
[Movement-toward] must always exist, even if 
imperceptible. In some other kinesic expressions it is 
absolutely indispensable, as occurs when somebody ‘turns’ 
his head or glances toward something. In this case the 
features //movement toward// and //apicality// suffice, and 
//longitude// is not needed. (119) 
I have two criticisms of the above description. First, Eco seems to be refuting his 
previous claim in which he characterizes longitude—along with apicality—as 
“indispensable” (119). This oversight, however, should not upset his entire theory. 
Instead, we might benefit from characterizing longitude and movement-toward as two 
manifestations of the same principle. Longitude is a characteristic of the static form of 
the feature while movement-toward is its dynamic form. My second issue with the 
preceding description of movement-toward is that Eco seems not be describing literal 
movement that is toward an object. When we turn the head to look at an object, we do 
not get physically closer to it; we merely change our orientation. It seems that Eco 
confuses movement-toward with the physical repositioning of the head. Although this 
gesture undoubtedly points toward the object, it is the apicality of the face and its implied 
motion of the gaze that achieve this indexicality. We look toward an object, implying a 
unidirectional connection between the eyes and the distant object. 
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 Dynamic stress is the fourth feature of pointing in Eco’s analysis (119-20).  By 
this, he refers to the repetition, urgency, and the force of the gesture. He describes: 
When a finger points with comparatively little energy it 
means <<close>>, and when pointing with greater energy 
(the gesture being more ample and abundant, with the arm 
itself participating in ‘propelling’ the finger) it means 
<<distance>>. (119) 
I often experience this difference on the first day of the semester when a student standing 
outside of a classroom asks whether he or she has the correct room with a casual point 
toward the door. If the unsure student is standing outside the wrong classroom, I may 
explain with an exaggerated pointing gesture that he or she needs to go way down the 
hall. At times when a student is especially lost, I direct them to another building across 
campus, making a grand gesture in which my arm moves all the way across my body. 
 It is important to note, however, that dynamic stress is often used to index objects 
that are very close to us. When sharing a particularly brilliant passage from a text with a 
colleague, I am known to point repeatedly and forcefully at the page to show my 
excitement. In these instances, the indexed object—the page—is in the foreground. The 
dynamic stress that I use to enact the pointing gesture shows my intense feeling about this 
immediate object. By contrast, I may direct my colleague’s attention by flippantly 
pointing at a page that contains an uninteresting or specious argument. My glib gesture in 
this situation expresses a metaphorical distance from the thing to which I point. Thus, it 
seems that the dynamic stress that accompanies a pointing gesture expresses a difference 
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in the immediacy of an object, but not simply in the way that Eco describes. On one hand, 
the increase in the gesture’s force and repetition convey a distance, while on the other 
hand, this emphasis expresses importance and cognitive immediacy. 
 Pointing with an extended arm and index finger is, of course, not the only way to 
draw attention to something. In his analysis of musical gestures, Hatten (2004: 151-52), 
draws our attention to a gesture in the final movement of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 2 
shown in Example 1.2. Hatten writes that as the piece begins “a scurrilous rascal thumbs 
his nose at us (or makes another appropriate Italian gesture)” (151). Although Hatten 
minces words, perhaps the “Italian” gesture that he refers to is a hand movement in which 
the back of the fingers are placed beneath the chin before moving outward with the arm in 
a quick sweeping motion. The meaning of this widely-known gesture ranges from a 
simple dismissal to a harsh profanity on a par with the American middle finger. But 
regardless of the degree of insult that it connotes, the expression shows derision toward a 
person or object. 
 




 In analyzing this dismissive gesture, we see that it possesses the same 
characteristics as the finger-pointing gesture. The offending gesture exemplifies 
longitude, movement-toward, and dynamic stress. Furthermore, apicality exists at the end 
of the gesture. The movement-toward is perhaps the most identifiable feature. The motion 
of the hand from beneath the chin to a position out in front of the body directs attention to 
the person or object receiving the insult. It is longitudinal in that the length of the arm 
assists the hand in moving outward. The gesture culminates with the arm almost fully 
extended. Similar to the pointing gesture, it is the juxtaposed fingertips that give it 
apicality. Along with movement-toward, the apex of the fingertips at the completion of 
the gesture are marked, indicating the location of the dismissed person. Dynamic 
emphasis is found in the quick sweeping motion outward from the body. A rapid and 
forceful motion toward the target is far more biting than a light and casual extension of 
the arm. 
 A careful examination reveals the four elements of the pointing gesture in 
Symphony No. 2. We hear the preparation of the gesture in the two-note anacrusis figure. 
The slurred F-sharp to G depicts the back of the hand approaching the chin, “cocking” the 
dismissal before it is fully enacted. After a brief pause, we hear the commencement of the 
gesture proper. The sforzando and trill on C# portray the dynamic stress that adds 
intensity to the hand motion while longitude is conveyed through the texture. Beethoven 
scores the opening measures in unison, providing a more directed motion that, like the 
human arm, is longer than it is wide. As noted above, this projects a directional character 
to the gesture, one that extends outward from the body and toward the object of insult. 
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 The temporal aspect of the melody assists in creating movement-toward. With 
dynamic stress enacted by the trill, the melody seems to push toward beat one of m. 2. In 
this melodic motion, we can hear the hand physically extend outward from the chin to 
nearly a full extension of the arm. This is the point of release for the gesture, as beat one 
is a metric strong point. The descent to A that immediately follows depicts the fall of the 
arm as it fully reveals the palm of the hand and underside of the fingers. This final pitch 
of the musical gesture also represents the apical point of the corresponding physical 
gesture which, as a stopping point, helps to give direction to the insult. While the 
temporal aspect inherent in music would seem enough to provide the unidirectional 
movement-toward that the apex offers to a static gesture, such as a traffic arrow, one 
element is not more fundamental than the other. Apical points that segment the music are 
just as inherent as its temporality. All musical gestures have directed temporal motion in 
the same way that all gestures have an apical point in which they end. In this example, we 
see the way that multiple features come together to form the emergent gesture. 
 The gaze is another type of indexical gesture that is a special form of pointing. 
The language that we use to describe the act of looking is similar to that of pointing. We 
cast glances at people, look toward objects, and peer through windows. The marked 
apicality of the face, the craning of the neck, and the straining of facial muscles come 
together to create a type of pointing gesture that is fundamentally similar to that of the 
outstretched arm and pointed finger. The causal relationship with the distant object that 
we index with our gaze is present in the way it affects our visual pointing. A small or 
distant object might cause the observer to squint; a frightful sight might induce a recoil. 
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Although the latter action seems to counteract the motion toward that contributes to 
pointing, our language also suggests that looking involves inward motion as well. We 
take in beautiful scenery. We get a glimpse of a celebrity. The mechanism of sight 
involves looking toward an object and receiving its image as reflected light, and our 
language for describing vision demonstrates our awareness of this reciprocity. 
 This two-way path between an observer and an object permits us to infer an 
embodied vision while revealing information about a distant object. Liszt’s La lugubre 
gondola is widely heard as a depiction of Wagner’s own funeral procession down the 
Grand Canal in Venice. The dark character and the accompaniment texture that reflects 
the strokes of a gondolier’s oar both contribute to this reading. In Example 1.3, we see the 
quick and forceful ascent from E2 to Ab3 that embodies the effort that the gondolier must 
exert to propel the craft through the water. This is followed by three beats of ease as the 
gondolier circles the oar and prepares for the next stroke.  
 
 
Example 1.3. Liszt, La lugubre gondola, S. 200/1, energetic pattern of the gondolier 
 
 We can imagine ourselves standing alongside the river watching the gondola float 
elegantly down the canal while being overcome with rich, somber emotions. As the boat 
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approaches us, its visual trace in our field of vision increases in size. We hear this in the 
crescendo that begins in m. 95 (Example 1.4). As the gondola draws near to us, the 
emotion welling up within our body similarly grows more intense (rinforzando molto). It 
is most immediate in mm. 101-106, where the gondola is largest in our view and the gut-
wrenching sadness is most palpable. This is the height of rhythmic activity in the coda.  
Finally, the watercraft begins to move away from us m. 107 as the dynamics lessen and 
the sight of it grows smaller. The energy of the rhythm starts to subside, stopping 
completely in the final four measures. The dynamics become faint as the piece culminates 
with an almost impossibly soft ppp in the final two measures. As the work ends, the 
gondola has disappeared from view and we are left only with the lingering impression 




Example 1.4. Liszt, La lugubre gondola, S. 200/1, mm. 94-120 
As we continue to point our gaze toward the craft, it recedes into the distance. Its 
size grows ever smaller in our field of vision, just as the volume of the piece diminishes. 
We have come to know the distance and character of the boat by embodying the sensual 
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(aural) trace of the music in the same way that an observer along the Grand Canal would 
embody the sensual (visual) trace of the actual gondola.  
 The virtual object that the observing agent relates to the listener can also be 
stationary, with the indexical gestures portraying the physical movements that the 
observing agent enacts while visually taking in the entirety of the virtual object. For 
example, the fourth movement of Schumann’s Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major (Rhenish) 
reflects the composer’s sight of the Cologne Cathedral during his visit to the Rhineland. 
Schumann captures the essence of his experience by succinctly marking the score 
“Feierlich,” literally “solemn.” In listening to this movement, we can imagine ourselves 
in Schumann’s position, observing the grand spectacle of the exterior of the massive 
structure. Philosopher Charles O. Nussbaum (2007) writes about this movement, noting: 
Certain bodily movements, eye movements, head 
movements, and slow walks round are required to take in 
such a structure. Models of observer and object located in 
musical virtual space complement the musical plan. (231) 
We can hear these ascending bodily movements of an observer in the principal theme of 
the movement. Example 1.5 depicts the melodic segment that I interpret as the gradual 
ascent of the head, neck, and eyes of an observer—perhaps representing Schumann 
himself—taking in the sight of the cathedral. The overall rise of the melody is noticeably 
patient, not at all deliberate. The ascending leaps of a fourth are followed by half-step 
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descents which are mimetic of the awe-filled gaze.7 The observer’s head rises as its line 
of sight scales the front facade to the cathedral’s tympanum where it momentarily pauses 
to examine the detail of the biblical figures carved in relief. The view then continues its 
ascent as it traces the pointed lancets before again pausing contemplatively to reflect on 
further details of the architecture. We can imagine this process continuing all the way up 
to the spires of the cathedral’s towers. 
 
 
Example 1.5. Schumann, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, iv, mm. 1-5, first trombone  
 
 Nussbaum’s approach to the musical representation seems to be an embodied one 
in that he posits a virtual observer much like my virtual observing agent to enact the 
gazing gestures which are then embodied by the listener. Although he uses the virtual 
observer as a channel through which the cathedral (as a virtual object) is relayed to the 
listener, he seems to turn his back on this model later in the same paragraph: 
[T]he musical listener takes on not only the body sets of the 
observer under these conditions, but also simulates the 
                                                 
7 It is important to notice the way in which the interpretation of the gesture is informed by non-gestural 
aspects of the work. The slow tempo, the reverent brass, the minor mode, the prominence of fourths, and 
the imitative polyphony recall sacred genres. By placing the gesture into this context, we are able to better 
articulate its meaning. This allows us to hear the ascending and descending physical movements as those 
performed by a virtual agent expressing deference and wonder. 
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“bodily sets” of the observed virtual object, transformed 
under the influence of a kind of poetic animism. 
(Nussbaum 2007: 231, emphasis in original) 
With this, Nussbaum claims that in addition to representing the observer’s view of 
cathedral, the music can represent the cathedral itself through anthropomorphism. 
Although this seems to subvert the observing agent, Nussbaum is actually suggesting that 
we can hear the cathedral as an agent itself, possessing human features including bodily 
structure and comportment. I do not disagree with this. Recalling Larson’s (2012) theory 
of forces, we hear melodic movement as physical motion, and in Hatten’s (2012: [5]) 
example of melodic leaps, these can be movements of an anthropomorphic agent, even 
though we do not ascribe specific features to it. Just because Schumann’s program for the 
fourth movement of Rhenish indicates that the virtual object is a cathedral, it does not 
necessarily mean that we cannot embody it as a virtual human agent and identify directly 
with it. 
 However, a problem arises with Nussbaum’s desire to subvert the observing agent 
and claim that the cathedral can represent itself directly to the listener through mimesis as 
a result of his first interpretation of the movement. The observing agent observes the 
cathedral from a fixed perspective. The tower spire is considered high because it is high 
relative to the observing agent. The principal melody ascends because it reflects the 
physical efforts of the observing agent in capturing the trace of the cathedral in the 
sensorimotor system. The cathedral is tall but it is not growing taller; a direct 
representation to the listener would not involve an ascending melody unless it were 
 
 41 
becoming taller or changing its anthropomorphic bodily comportment. It seems, 
however, that we cannot avoid representing the cathedral through height gestures, 
because its height relative to us is such an important component in our conceptualization 
of the structure. We think of the cathedral as something that takes effort to observe; thus, 
the observer is essential to its conceptualization. Following a proposal by Nussbaum 
(139), if we were to represent a cathedral in a game of charades, we would not get on all 
fours or contort our bodies into the cross-like shape of the cathedral’s floor layout; 
instead, we would stand tall and draw attention to our height, perhaps raising our arms to 
make a steeple above our heads. It would seem difficult then to remove the observing 
agent from the representation of the cathedral in this movement because our observation 
of it is integral to our understanding of it; its key feature—its height—is a relative 
quality. In removing the observing agent, Nussbaum is actually just overlooking it; he is 
forgetting that observation is an essential part of the cathedral as a concept. In examining 
other works below, we will find that observation is an often neglected aspect of 
conceptual development, one that is largely overlooked by current theories of agential 
gesture. 
 
Breathing or Gazing: Lobbying for the Indexical Gesture 
 The suggestion of indexical gesture begs an important question: Why should we 
hear gestures as indexical when we can just as well hear them as non-indexical gestures. 
Posing the question in a specific context, we might ask: In Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, 
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why should we hear the gesture as gazing when we can hear it more simply as deep 
breathing? 
 I am not suggesting that Guck’s metaphor of the breathing agent is inappropriate; 
in fact, I personally think that it provides a visceral contribution to an interpretation that 
is otherwise vague. The symbolism of the tolling bells and connotations of the minor 
mode set the mood, but the breathing metaphor makes it more descriptive through 
personal engagement. The music suggests the heaving breathing of a virtual agent, and 
the listener co-experiences this through active or passive (imaginative) mimesis. In other 
words, the listener actually enacts the breathing of the virtual agent or simply imagines 
this breathing. 
 Hearing the prelude’s opening gesture as indexical, however, adds another 
element to the interpretation of the piece by giving us access to other virtual entities 
within the musical diegesis. The gaze indexes a virtual object traveling into the distance 
that we can understand as something that draws our focus away from the present moment 
toward a temporally distant place. As a result, the gaze may allegorically represent a 
pensive look into the past or into the future, or perhaps both simultaneously. 
 This is not irreconcilable with Guck’s breathing metaphor because the musical 
gesture can be a multivalent signifier—a sign with multiple meanings. The gesture can 
represent the gaze of an agent and at the same time represent this agent’s deep breathing. 
In this way, the gesture is similar to a pun, in which the two meanings of a single word 
are exploited to enable a sentence to allow for two readings. A linguistic example from 
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Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet (3.1.65-66) is illustrative. Mercutio, just having been 
stabbed, utters: 
  Ask for me tomorrow, and you shall find me a grave man. 
The play on words is obvious: 
  meaning a: Ask for me tomorrow, and you shall find me a serious man. 
  meaning b: Ask for me tomorrow, and you shall find me in a tomb. 
We see here that /grave/ is a multivalent word. Interpreted as in (a), Mercutio expresses 
the seriousness of the wound. Interpreted as in (b), Mercutio specifically acknowledges 
that the wound is fatal. Although /grave/ means serious in (a) but means tomb or 
cemetery plot in (b), the two meanings complement one another to enrich the expression. 
 The dual meaning of the gesture in the prelude functions similarly to the pun 
presented above. The quick-ascent-slow-descent melodic arch that unfolds across the first 
two measures can be heard as both a representation of breathing and gazing 
simultaneously. In other words, this one musical gesture says two things about the 
agential subject that we might actually synthesize into a more complex physical gesture. 
One can imagine breathing deeply while gazing pensively toward the far-off horizon. In 
joining these interpretations, we create an even more vivid image of the agent’s actions 
and emotional state. 
 
Conclusion 
 The relationship between the mind and the body exists at the foundation of human 
cognition. As a result, our conceptualization of the world around us is necessarily 
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mediated by the body and more specifically its channels of sensation. Because we are 
drawn to understand the world in terms of our own bodies, it is not difficult to understand 
why we ascribe human characteristics to non-human entities. Chairs have legs. Clocks 
have hands. Similarly, we describe changes in state as movement that we attribute to an 
agent. Gravity pulls objects down. Lightning is the scourge of Zeus. Humanity is the 
result of intelligent design.  
 Our understanding of music is no different. Considering language that describes 
head-motifs and musical movements, the leap to agency and gesture appears to be a 
natural step. Taking yet another step, we approach a theory of indexical gesture that 
reveals a virtual observing agent who can serve as the lens through which we view the 
diegetic, virtual world that the music constructs. This theory of the virtual observing 
agent does not require a wholly new reconfiguration of our musical understanding. 
Instead, it develops ways in which we already conceptualize music, while enhancing our 





MATHEMATICAL AND LOGICAL FORMULATION  
OF INDEXICAL GESTURES 
 
Introduction 
 We do not earn the virtual observing agent easily. A theory of musical gesture 
begins with human embodiment (Lidov 2005, Cox 2010). Theorists such as Cumming 
(2000) and Hatten (2004, 2012) have moved from an actual listening body, moving to the 
music, as in Cox’s early mimetic hypothesis (1999), to a virtual entity that implies a 
virtual human agency. Studies of intermodality, implied corporeality, and virtual agency 
have led to the construction of a strong foundation for interpreting human gestures in 
music. Based on this work, I have developed a theory of particular indexical musical 
gestures that imply a virtual observing agent. Here, I present mathematical and logical 
constructions to support these indexical gestures, and hence an implied virtual observing 
agency. I follow up on my previous analysis of Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 
6, demonstrating that the thematic melodic arch implies a gazing gesture and therefore a 
virtual observing agent. In the second part of this chapter, I track the chain of inferences 
that a listener makes when hearing the presence of a virtual observing agent in music. 
This is illuminating because it not only helps to support a theory of virtual observing 
agency, but it also articulates the inferential path that one follows when hearing agency, 




Evidence for the Gazing Gesture 
 Consider the arch-shaped trajectory of an object and its effect on an observer. As 
discussed previously, I hold that tracking an object, such as a ball, as it travels along a 
parabolic path, entails certain head, neck, and eye movements that mimic a melodic arch 
contour with a single climax near its beginning. I explain this tracking gesture using 
algebra and trigonometry in what follows.1 
I noted in the previous chapter that if we were to hit an object, such as a baseball, 
up and outward from us, the object would travel along a parabolic path because its 
horizontal speed remains constant due to inertia, while its vertical speed would be 
variable on account of gravity. This is a primary tenet of ballistics—the study of the 
motion of objects that have only an initial moment of propulsion before being subjected 
to environmental forces. Every parabola can be expressed algebraically as a quadratic 
equation or second order polynomial.2 The simplest quadratic equation is  
   𝑦 = 𝑥2 
Figure 2.1 depicts this equation. 
                                                 
1 Through personal correspondence, Isaac Gerg, Shannon Kolensky, and Chris Linick contributed to the 
development of this section by proofreading the formulae. Isaac Gerg provided valuable assistance in 
helping me to conceptualize the arch and to express the virtual observing agent’s movements in terms of a 
trigonometric function. 




Figure 2.1. Parabola          𝑦 = 𝑥2 
 
 To invert the shape so that it reflects the correct parabolic trajectory of the object, 
we multiply x2 by -1. This renders the equation 
   𝑦 =  −𝑥2 
In performing this operation, the plot pivots on its apex, which now represents the high 





Figure 2.2. Inverted parabola          𝑦 =  −𝑥2 
 
 We now have a parabola that looks closer to the trajectory of the object. By 
manipulating the equation further we can place the inverted parabola in a position on the 
graph that more clearly reflects a more typical (slightly less steep) path of motion (e.g., 
roughly a pop fly to second base), with a clearer relationship to home plate (now 
represented by 0,0) and to the ground (now represented by the x-axis). I have altered the 
previous equation to take on the following form: 
   𝑦 =  −0.04𝑥2 + 4𝑥 
 
Multiplying x2 by a value less than 1 widens the parabola; multiplying x by a value 
greater than 0 places it in the first (upper-right) quadrant. This equation is depicted in 
Figure 2.3 with an arrow indicating the motion of the object. In this figure we see the 
apex (or vertex) of the parabola at point (50, 100) and intersecting the x-axis at (0, 0) and 
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(0, 100). These intersecting points are known as x-intercepts. It is important to note that 
the equation y = - 0.04x2 + 4x is the only one that yields a parabola with this vertex at 
(50, 100) and x-intercepts at (0, 0) and (0, 100). If we imagine the distance in terms of 
feet, then this would be the path of motion for an object that reaches a peak height of 
100 feet and lands 100 feet from its initial point of propulsion. It is the force of gravity 
that slows its motion on its ascent and increases it as it falls. Interestingly, however, 
gravity does not affect the horizontal velocity of the object. Because it does not slow the 
movement of the object’s horizontal motion, its movement along the x-axis remains 
constant unless it makes contact with another object. In other words, it continues to move 
away from the y-axis without slowing down or speeding up. Of course, in real life, wind 
resistance (aerodynamic drag) would affect the horizontal motion of the object; however, 
an observer from home plate could not readily detect its negligible effects at the distances 
proposed in this scenario. Thus, I have removed the effects of drag from this analysis. 
Figure 2.3 provides a clear image of the object’s movement from its point of propulsion 




Figure 2.3. Path of motion of object (represented in feet)          𝑦 =  −0.04𝑥2 + 4𝑥 
 
 
 Although an object travels along a parabolic path like the one depicted above, I 
further intend to map the collective head, neck, and eye movements that an observer must 
make in order to track the object moving away from the observer positioned at home 
plate. It is important to remember that the graphs thus far represent an orthogonal 
perspective in which the object’s path of motion is perpendicular to the observer, for 
example, standing on first base. Yet, the observer whose motions we want to determine is 
positioned at home plate, or (0, 0) on the graph while tracking the propelled object. From 
this perspective, the object appears to move outward from the observer. I will 
demonstrate that the contour of the observer’s bodily tracking gesture is not parabolic, 
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nor does it possess the symmetry of a quadratic equation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
head, neck, and eyes would move upward quickly at the beginning of the object’s ascent, 
hang for a moment, and then descend more slowly as the object fell into the distance. 
Placing my focus on visual tracking, I am now concerned with the angle of vision relative 
to the x-axis (i.e., the ground). The angle of vision is at 0º relative to the x-axis when we 
are looking at someone of equal height standing in front of us. When at 90º, we are 
looking straight up at the point on the ceiling just above our heads. 
 We can calculate the zero-point observer’s angle of vision by using trigonometry. 
If we overlay the parabola with a right triangle, as shown in Figure 2.4, we can then 
calculate the angle (θ) at each given point on the graph. For example, at its apex (50, 
100), the right triangle has legs of 50 feet and 100 feet in length. Trigonometric functions 
(i.e., sine, cosine, tangent) help us to determine the unknown angles of right triangles. 
The tangent (tan) of a right triangle involves the relationship between x and y to the 
extent that 
 










    = 𝜃 
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Thus, with regard to  
  𝑦 =  −0.04𝑥2 + 4𝑥 
when 
 𝑥 = 50 
 𝑦 = 100 








tan−1 2 =  𝜃 
 
≈ 63.4° 
    
With this equation, we learn that when the object is at its highest point, the viewing angle 
of an observer, whose eye is exactly at the point of propulsion (0, 0), is approximately 





Figure 2.4. Right triangle placed against path of motion of object 
𝑦 =  −0.04𝑥2 + 4𝑥 
 
 This calculation seems to align with our intuition; however, it is impractical to 
evaluate the viewing angle directly at the point of propulsion (0, 0) because there is 
always some space between the eye and the object. Although this space may seem 
negligible as the object travels into the distance, ignoring it would not permit us to 
accurately portray the viewing angle in the first few moments of the object’s motion. 
Leaving directly from the eye, the object would be almost directly above the head of the 
observer in the first few inches of travel, forcing the head, neck, and eyes to their most 
extreme upward positions. However, placing the observer at, say, 10 feet from the point 
of takeoff provides a more realistic model of observation. We might switch our analogy 
now from the baseball player hitting a ball to a spectator on the same level, but 10 feet 
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behind home plate. The following equation preserves the shape and dimensions of the 
trajectory, merely shifting them 10 feet to the right: 
  𝑦 =  −0.04𝑥2  +  4.8𝑥 –  44 
Figure 2.5 plots the above equation. 
 
Figure 2.5. Path of motion shifted 10 feet right on the x-axis          
 −.04𝑥2  +  4.8𝑥 –  44 
 
 With this more feasible point of view, we are ready to plot the viewing angle for 
all points along the object’s path of motion. We take the equation that mapped the 
object’s trajectory—now offset by 10 feet—and apply the tangent function accordingly: 
  𝑦 =  −0.04𝑥2  +  4.8𝑥 –  44 
 










        = 𝜃 
 
tan−1
−0.04𝑥2 + 4.8𝑥 − 44
𝑥
  = 𝜃 
 
 
Since x represents both distance and time, every value of x gives us the viewing angle (θ) 
at each moment. This is represented in Figure 2.6. Here, x represents the ground distance 
of the object in feet. Because this rate of motion is constant, x can also be seen as 
representing time, but in non-descript units (e.g., 20 ≠ 20 seconds). With respect to the y-
axis, each point represents the viewing angle (θ) in degrees; thus θ in the above equation 
equals y in Figure 2.6. As the object begins its ascent at a point 10 feet away from the 
observer, the viewing angle rises quickly. It begins to steady as it approaches its widest 
angle (≈ 65º).3 The head, neck, and eyes descend slowly as the object approaches a 
distance of 110 feet from the observer. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Note that the apex of the viewing angle is not the same as the apex of the parabolic movement of the 
object. The object reaches its highest point at x = 60, but the head, neck, and eyes begin descending at 




Figure 2.6. Angle of vision at 10 feet from point of propulsion   
𝑦 = tan−1




 Furthermore, we can graph the rate at which the viewing angle changes by finding 
the derivative of the equation depicted in Figure 2.6. The derivative evaluates change by 
measuring the slope of a series of tangent lines. These are straight lines that have only 
one point of contact with the plotted equation. If we place a strip of tape around the 
circumference of a basketball and place a yardstick parallel to that tape, the yardstick 
represents a tangent line because it only touches the basketball at one point. Placing a 
straight line on the outside of the plot in Figure 2.6, similarly, creates a tangent line. The 
derivative calculates change in the slope of the tangent line as it moves across the plot. 
The tangent line in the ascending portion of the graph has a steep, positive-value slope. 
At its apex (x ≈ 33 feet) the tangent line has a slope of zero. As the object falls, the 
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tangent line slants the other way, producing a negative-value slope. Since the rate that the 
observer’s viewing angle changes is more important than whether the head, neck, and 
eyes are moving upward or downward in this equation, we calculate the absolute value of 
the derivative, ensuring that the change in motion is always represented by a positive 
number: 
 
𝑦 =  |𝐷 (tan−1




Each point in Figure 2.7 represents the rate at which the head, neck, and eyes move 
collectively to track the object along its path at any given moment. These plots together 
represent the acceleration (and deceleration) of these tracking movements over course of 
the object’s path of motion. Notice the observer’s movements are quicker at the very 
beginning of the object’s ascent. They become slower as the object nears its highest 
point. These tracking movements then speed up as the object descends; although, they do 
not change as quickly as they do during the ascent.4 
                                                 
4 Figure 2.7 does not specify the value or units of the y-coordinates because a standard unit to measure 




Figure 2.7.  Rate of movement in observer’s viewing gesture tracking an object moving 
100 feet. The y-axis represents the speed of the observer’s movements, beginning fast, 
slowing at the peak, and gradually accelerating as the object descends. 
𝑦 =  |𝐷 (tan−1




 In Chapter 1, I claimed that the quickly-ascending-slowly-descending melodic 
contour of the opening measures of Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 6 
represents a gesture of gazing—pointing with the eyes, as it were. The above modeling 
demonstrates that when an observer tracks an object on a typical parabolic path, she 
collectively moves her head, neck, and eyes quickly upward before descending at a more 
measured pace. Figure 2.6 plots the angle of the observation’s motion relative to the 
ground and shows its change as the object of interest travels. The strong similarity 
between the Figure 2.6 and the left-hand gesture that begins the prelude supports the 
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musical interpretation of a virtual observing agent gazing at something which has been 
propelled into the distance.  
Part II 
Inferring a Virtual Observing Agent 
 The arch-shaped melody is pervasive in Western music. Its common occurrence is 
likely the result—or perhaps the origin—of the compositional paradigm of departure and 
return. Theories of harmonic function posit a cyclic harmonic syntax in which a phrase 
departs from the stability of tonic, creates tension by traveling to the predominant and 
dominant, before finally resting with the return tonic at the completion of the phrase 
ending with an authentic cadence. This harmonic component combines with the energetic 
intensity associated with pitch height. As the pitch element of a melody rises, its intensity 
grows. This musical energy then often dissipates as the melody descends to the tonic. 
 Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff (1983) observe that the vast majority of works 
within the Western tonal idiom have a single underlying tensional shape. They describe 
an asymmetrical arch that has its zenith near the end. A piece typically begins with a 
general sense of relaxation that is prolonged. From here, tension slowly builds until 
reaching its highest degree. It is then immediately followed by a relatively rapid 
deflation, a point of relaxation that coincides with the completion of the phrase or even 
the work as a whole (197-98). Their observation of this musical shape that has a late 




 David Huron (1996: 3-23) has conducted an extensive analysis of melodic 
contours to test the accuracy of our intuitions about musical shaping; he places his 
attention on melodic contour. In his study, Huron draws melodies from a corpus of 
thousands of European folk songs and subjects them to a calculus that he has devised to 
determine the shapes of phrases of varying lengths. He assesses phrase size by the 
number of articulated pitches in each melody and maps pitch height in semitones. 
Huron’s conclusions validate our intuitions about the prevalence of arch-melodies, since 
this was by far the most common shape. However, it is notable that his study does not 
reveal the melodic contour with a quick ascent and slow descent that has been our focus. 
The scarcity of the quickly-ascending-slowly-descending (hereafter QASD) contour is 
thus beneficial to narrowing our interpretation of it. 
 
Markedness 
 A sign that has a feature setting it apart from others like it is considered to be 
marked, or to possess markedness, meaning that such signs have a particular value in 
comparison to their unmarked counterparts. The marked term in an opposition will 
typically have a narrower range of meaning. Edwin Batistella (1990) demonstrates 
markedness in the opposite pair tall and short (3). The opposition in these two words 
seems clear and unremarkable. People of great height are considered tall while those 
below average height are deemed short. However, in describing the height of any person, 
we are given to say, “She is five feet tall,” even though five feet is below average in most 
populations. In a more extreme example, we might say, “She is three feet tall,” still 
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invoking one term of the opposition despite the diminutive stature. This makes it clear 
that the descriptor tall refers not only to great height but that it is also used in reference to 
height in general; thus, tall is the unmarked term of the opposition. Conversely, short 
lacks the latter usage. We do not often say, “She is five feet short.” Such a turn of phrase 
adds an element of commentary that tall lacks in the same context. Although lexically 
oppositional, short is the marked term, and has a narrower meaning that is reserved for 
emphasizing a small degree of height. Tall on the other hand has a broader range of 
meaning, referring both to great height and to height in general. 5 
 Frequency also plays in defining the marked/unmarked relationship. Joseph 
Greenberg (1966) notes that marked features generally occur less often than their 
unmarked counterparts. Regarding language, Greenberg writes: 
[T]he number of phonemes with a particular feature is 
never greater than the number of phonemes with some 
other feature, [sic] it generally seems to be the set 
characterized by the marked feature which is less than or 
equal in number to the set with the unmarked feature. 
(1966:  21) 
                                                 
5 Markedness features significantly in Hatten’s early work on meaning and interpretation (1994).  He 
explains that the unmarked and marked elements of an opposition (e.g., major and minor) contain an 
asymmetry in breadth of meaning. For example, Hatten demonstrates that the minor mode is marked in the 
Classical style when compared to its unmarked major counterpart. The asymmetry exists because minor 




 Linda Waugh (1982: 302) likens the marked/unmarked relationship to the 
figure/ground relationship in that marked elements are rarer and more forward in our 
perception than elements in the background. Additionally, figures are often more 
articulate—narrower and more precise in meaning—than the grounds against which they 
are placed. Schenkerian analysis reveals this in music. The Ursatz that underlies a phrase 
is generally unremarkable, since many works are built from same background structure. It 
would be nearly impossible to identify a piece by looking only at its fundamental 
structure, because only a handful of fundamental structures occur in all tonal music. The 
way a piece differentiates itself from others is through the distinctiveness of its 
foreground, the unique features that are present at its surface. Because these foreground 
features are novel to each piece, the surface (figure) is marked relative to the 
commonplace fundamental structure (ground). 
 The QASD (quickly-ascending-slowing-descending) gesture that I have identified 
above does not have an opposite in the same way that tall has the opposite short. Height 
exists on a clear continuum of which tall and short describe opposing sections at opposite 
ends of a somewhat arbitrary median. Furthermore, tall and short describe only a single 
feature, that of height. The QASD gesture on the other hand comprises multiple features, 
most notably a height component in addition to a temporal component associated with 
horizontal distance. A melodic arch with a slow ascent and a quick descent is not only 
oppositional to the QASD shape, but it is also oppositional to a U-shaped melodic 
contour that begins with a quick descent and slowly rises to completion. The word girl is 
analogous because it represents two features: gender and age. Girl is the opposite of boy 
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in the first sense while girl is the opposite of woman in the second. In the same way, the 
QASD gesture does not have a solitary opposition against which it is marked. 
 But how is the QASD contour marked if it lacks a single unmarked opposition? 
On this Battistella writes: 
At the semantic level of language, markedness is probably 
most easily understood as a relation between a very specific 
linguistic sign (the marked term) and a sign that is 
unspecified for the grammatical conceptual feature in 
question. In this sense, marked and unmarked elements are 
not strictly opposite. (1990: 2) 
With regard to melodic shape, the QASD contour has a very specific and rare feature—an 
early apex. Huron’s survey of melodies has shown us that although most melodic shapes 
unfold as arches, their high points most often occur at or after the midpoint (1996). Thus, 
the marked QASD contour is set in opposition to these other melodic contours by 
possessing an earlier apex. Battistella writes that “[o]ppositions between the presence and 
absence of a feature—between A and not A—are referred to as privative oppositions” 
(1990: 2, emphasis mine). Logically, “A” represents the QASD contour while “not A” 
refers to all other contours. Appropriately, we then consider the QASD contour with its 
narrow range of meaning and distribution as marked against the unmarked range of 
meanings of the more common contours that are “not QASD.”  
 The markedness of the QASD melodic contour also corresponds to the 
markedness of the gazing gesture; they each have a similar spatial and energetic shape 
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and a narrower range of interpretation. If someone were to watch us collectively lift our 
head, neck, and eyes rapidly and then slowly lower them, the person standing before us 
would likely think that our attention is drawn toward something else, perhaps something 
that is in the distance. We recall from Chapter 1 that Marion Guck suggests that the 
gesture, as set in the B-minor prelude, represents labored breathing (1981: 37). Although 
this seemed to broaden the range of meaning of the gesture and rob it of its 
distinctiveness, I argued that the musical gesture could be a multivalent signifier with two 
complementary somatic interpretations. It is easy to imagine an agent lifting and lowering 
the head, neck, and eyes in accordance with the melodic contour while breathing deeply 
with the same energetic shape. As the agent quickly takes a deep breath, it typically 
directs its vision upward. The agent exhales at a more measured pace, lowering its 
shoulders as the head, neck, and eyes gradually descend. With this, the two 
interpretations of the QASD contour merge within the body to create a more visceral 
embodiment of the prelude’s expression. 
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From Listener to Virtual Agent 
 Having explored the markedness of the QASD contour that narrows its range of 
meaning, we are poised to further situate it within a theory of embodied observational 
gesture. To accomplish this most effectively, I follow the chain of inferences that one 
makes when connecting a real listener to a virtual observing agent. This exercise in 
logical reconstruction attempts to clarify any present ambiguities in the theory. I present 
the inferences of the theory in two sections. In the first, I take a step-by-step look at the 
logical inferences while simultaneously demonstrating their application to Chopin’s 
Prelude in B Minor. In the second section, I apply these inferences to Chopin’s Barcarolle 
in F-sharp Major, Op. 60. 
 
Case Study 1: Chopin, Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 6 
1) An actual agent (listener) hears a musical gesture as embodied (human) gesture. 
 
Arnie Cox (2001, 2011) holds that listeners hear music as mimetic of human 
movement through a physical empathy, whereby musical sounds are 
conceptualized through the listeners’ own motor systems. According to this 
“mimetic hypothesis,” in the process of listening, a listener 
a) performs an off-line simulation of the movements 
necessary to produce the sound, or 
b) performs an off-line simulation of a similar movement 
with the same energetic profile. 
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In the first instance, an engaged listener might hear the sound of drumming and 
imagine beating the drum herself. This movement may even be realized through 
physical entrainment. Certainly, we have all caught ourselves or others making 
micro-movements with the hands to imitate a prominent drum part in a piece. In 
the second instance, a listener who hears an upward melodic leap followed by a 
step-wise descent (i.e., an appoggiatura) may simulate (or perform) an action such 
as lifting and lowering the shoulders or eyebrows, or she might imagine reaching 
upward with the arm and grabbing something with the hand. 
 
Chopin, Prelude in B Minor 
The melodic arch in mm. 1-2 has bodily implications in that the listener hears the 
upward and downward motion unfold through space as a unified shape that is tied 
together by a phrase mark. The gesture is further unified through a dynamic arch; 
the natural increase and decrease in dynamics adhere to form a single gestural 
shape that follows the familiar tension-and-release paradigm. This movement is 
not only replicable in the human body. The mimetic hypothesis (Cox 2011) holds 
that our conceptualization of these gestures requires, at minimum, our off-line 
simulation of them. A number of somatic motions with this shape readily may 
come to mind, such as inhaling and exhaling (Guck 1981) or more generically, 




2) Musical gesture heard as embodied (human) gesture implies the presence of a virtual 
agent in a virtual environment. 
  
Physical gestures differ from musical gestures in that the gestural aspect of the 
former is real while that of the latter must be realized in sound to convey real 
qualities of an energetic shaping through time. In other words, physical gestures 
have a real materiality to them (i.e., the human body), while musical gestures are 
musical representations/expressions of physical movement. But just like their real 
physically-embodied counterparts, musical gestures require a materiality, albeit 
one that is virtual. Accordingly, when we identify a virtual gesture in music, we 
necessarily infer the presence of a virtual agent who embodies it. 
 
We can follow the parallel further. In the same way that real agents who embody 
gestures exist in a real environment, virtual agents enact their virtual gestures 
within a virtual environment (Hatten 2004: 115), what I call a diegetic space or 
diegesis. Within this virtual environment, we experience the effects of virtual 
forces such as gravity, inertia, magnetism (Larson 2012), momentum, and friction 
(Hatten 2004: 115-16) as environmental forces. We can also imagine this diegetic 
space as having virtual boundaries (Hatten 2012: [4]) that influence the motion of 
the gesture. For example, the setting of a barcarolle in compound duple meter 
influences the gestures of the agent, causing them to unfold within a rocking, 




Chopin, Prelude in B Minor 
The presence of the tension-and-release gesture in mm. 1-2 implies the presence 
of an agent who embodies it. Because this gesture is virtual (i.e., a musical 
representation of gesture) the agent who performs this gesture is similarly virtual. 
This virtual agent exists within a virtual environment that contains forces and 
boundaries that influence its movement. For instance, the cresecendo that 
accompanies the quick upward motion in m. 1 suggests the presence of an 
energetic impulse that resists the downward force of gravity. With this in mind, 
we can hear the decrescendo that accompanies the descent through m. 2 as 
yielding to this force. Here the virtual agent gives in and allows gravity to bring it 
to the ground. This state of rest from which the agent departs and later returns is 
represented by tonic, specifically B2, as it occurs on beat one, a point of metric 
strength. This metric pitch location serves as a foundation for the agent—a point 
where it is at rest. 
 
Inwardly-focused or outwardly-focused gestures? 
 As a sign, a gesture communicates information and directs the attention of the 
person receiving this information either toward (inward) or outward (away) from the 
gesturing agent. For example, a gesturer might lower her head and place her face in her 
hands in an expression of sadness. This is an inwardly-focused gesture in that it 
communicates information about the gesturer. In a different situation, if we ask someone 
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to show us the exit, she is likely to gesture with an outward arm and an index finger 
toward the door. This pointing gesture does not draw our attention toward the gesturing 
agent. Instead, we look outward, away from the gesturing agent, in the direction indicated 
by the outstretched arm. 
There are, however, inwardly- and outwardly-focused elements of the gesture in 
both of the above situations. The gesture of sadness likely draws a causal connection to 
something outside the gesturing agent. If we were to come across this gesturer, we would 
undoubtedly speculate about the cause of this gesture. It could be the reaction to a 
reprimand from a teacher, news of an unfaithful partner, or the sight of a car accident. In 
a similar way, an outward-focused gesture can communicate information about the 
gesturing agent. When asked to be shown out, a very forceful pointing gesture toward the 
door reflects something about the gesturer, perhaps her annoyance and desire to be left 
alone. Because much information is contained in a single gesture, we must concede that 
the distinction between inwardly- and outwardly-focused gestures is fluid. It is through a 
gestural competency that we are best able to interpret the practical function of a gesture 




3a) The prominence of the gestural aspect implies the presence of a virtual gesturing 
agent. 
3b) The prominence of the observational aspect implies the presence of a virtual 
observing agent. 
 
It is important at this point to make a distinction between virtual agency and a 
virtual agent. Although we often overlook the distinction, it is revealing and 
profitable to analysis to describe their relationship. I define virtual agency as the 
capacity for an inferred entity within a virtual world (environment or diegesis) to 
act with an apparent volition and self-awareness. A virtual agent is this entity that 
possesses these inferred qualities. Examples of virtual agents include the novice in 
Dukas’s The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, Florestan and Eusebius in Schumann’s 
Davidsbündlertänze, and the personification of Fate in Beethoven’s Symphony 
No. 5. An agent may also go without a nominal designation, as is the case in 
Beethoven’s Sonata Pathétique, Op. 13, which begins with particularly strong 
emotions that are expressed in both harmonic tension and articulation. Through its 
gestural and emotional profile, we infer the presence of a virtual agent who enacts 
the implied physical movements and experiences the feelings heard in the work, 
yet we do not ascribe a specific name to this agent. In each of these examples, 
agency is found in musical action and expression, and the agent results from the 




Distinguishing virtual agency from the virtual agent permits us to recognize two 
agential modes: gesturing (or performative) agency and observing agency. 
Gesturing agency describes somatic movements and emotions expressed in music 
that are at the center of a musical discourse. Dance genres include excellent 
examples of gesturing agency because they have a clear performative element as 
Bach’s first Sarabande from his English Suite No. 1 (Example 2.1) demonstrates 
this aspect. The weight on beat two of each measure is a defining feature of the 
slow dance in triple meter. The short-long rhythm that we hear in mm. 2 and 4 
gives the music the gestural weight that is reflected by a dancer whose actual 
weight shifts accordingly. As listeners, we center out attention on the dancer and 
the dancing gestures that he or she performs. In contrast, observational agency is 
present when agential gestures and emotions are directed outward, toward an 
entity that is inferred to be at a distance from the virtual agent. These entities 
include virtual objects, environmental boundaries or gravitational “platforms” 
(Hatten 2012), and other agents. Although the gestures and emotions that produce 
this type of agency are still embodied by the agent, they are importantly indexical 
in that they draw focus away from the agent and toward another (detached) 





Example 2.1. J.S. Bach, English Suite No. 1 in D Minor, BWV 812, Sarabande, mm. 1-4  
 
Having teased apart the distinction between an agent and its agency, we now 
bring the two together. Gestural agency and observing agency are agential modes 
that are present in two distinct agential roles: the virtual gesturing agent and the 
virtual observing agent. The virtual gesturing agent is the role taken on by the 
virtual agent when it exhibits gestural agency, such as by performing gestures 
with an immediate focus to itself. In hearing the dancing gestures in the rhythm 
and meter of the sarabande, we imply that an agent—a dancer—also exists to 
embody the movement. The virtual observing agent refers to the virtual agent’s 
role when performing indexical gestures such as pointing or looking. The 
identification of agential roles is important because it permits an agent to both act 
in the diegesis (e.g., run, jump, and dance) while being observant of entities in the 




Chopin, Prelude in B Minor 
In her work on this prelude, Guck (1981) suggests a number of guiding metaphors 
for listening. In each, she suggests a guiding metaphor and then allows her 
subjects to further construct an interpretation. What she reveals in these studies is 
that listeners can fit music to a number of interpretive metaphors, each drawing 
attention to different salient features of the musical structure. Guck eschews the 
notion that with any piece there is a “correct” metaphor, writing  
As patterns flow together, they combine their power, 
inexorably drawing the listener’s attention. Compelling as 
they are, such confluences inevitably reach a peak of 
interaction before each flows off at its own rate. As patterns 
flow each in their own way, they may work at cross 
purposes to each other, eddying and conflicting. Patterns 
rival each other for the listener’s attention, and the listener 
senses the different currents as they surge to the surface and 
then submerge, flowing against or through each other and 
parting (1981: 123, italics my own). 
With this, she suggests that an interpretation may benefit by mixing metaphors 
and using the strengths of each to help us better conceptualize the piece. 
 
4) The virtual observing agent individuates itself from virtual objects, a virtual 




The indexical gestures of the virtual observing agent imply a distinction between 
itself and other entities that exist with the diegetic space of the music. After all, 
the act of observation requires two essential elements: the observer and the 
observed entity. Consider the following scenario: 
 
When I first moved to Austin, Texas for graduate study, I learned my way around 
the city by jogging through a different neighborhood each day at dusk. On my 
first evening run through downtown, I noticed several hundred people lining the 
east side of the city’s most prominent bridge. From a distance, I assumed that 
these were demonstrators whose protest zone had been relegated to one side of the 
bridge so as not to impede pedestrian traffic. However, as I approached the 
multitude, I noticed that everyone was facing outward from the bridge with their 
eyes directed slightly upward. Their direction of sight and pointing gestures led 
me to conclude that they were observers. These gestures drew my attention away 
from the crowd and toward something that was apart from it. As I followed their 
gaze, the observed entity was revealed to me: thousands of Mexican free-tailed 
bats flying in a vortex pattern above the trees. It was a remarkable sight. 
 
The gestures of the virtual observing agent cue in the listener to the details of the 
entities that it observes. Once I had understood that the people on the bridge were 
performing observing gestures, I was able to deduce a number of things about 
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what they were looking at before actually observing it myself. The upward gaze 
and the moving heads of the bat-watchers led me provisionally to assume that 
objects that they were observing were airborne and still in motion. I further 
deduced from the emphatic pointing gestures of the children that the object of 
observation was something remarkable; they were probably observing something 
that to this point they had never seen. 
 
Observing gestures can also reveal information about the environment. Mentioned 
above, Hatten (2012) characterizes the musical forces described by Larson (2012) 
as environmental forces. Larson convincingly demonstrates the way in which a 
melody seems to act like a physical object that is subjected to the forces of 
gravity, magnetism, and inertia. According to this model, melodic pitches are 
simultaneously drawn downward (gravity), toward a point of stability 
(magnetism), and at the speed and in the direction of on-going motion (inertia). 
Matthew BaileyShea, however, suggests that forces specific to a particular 
environment can also influence musical motion (2012: [11]). For example, the 
compound meter of barcarolles and gondola songs reflects the rocking of the boat 
that is central to those genres. 
 
Chopin, Prelude in B Minor 
The existence of a gesture assumes the presence of an agent to embody it. The act 
of gazing, for instance, requires an agential entity to perform the gaze. Similarly, 
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pointing cannot occur without implying the existence of an entity that enacts the 
pointing. Thus, gesture implies agency.6 
 
5) The individuation of the virtual observing agent implies a single observational 
perspective of  the diegesis. 
 
In embodying the individuated virtual observing agent, the listener is given a 
perspective of the diegetic space. The listener constructs the virtual world 
represented in the music as though he or she were positioned uniquely within it. 
The geometry of the imagined virtual space appears skewed from this perspective. 
Objects increase in size and appear more detailed as they come into the 
foreground; parallel lines converge as they extend into the distance. This 
relational space is created in various ways. Differences in dynamic intensity can 
distinguish objects that are close from those that are distant. This is true of music, 
as well. For example, the (less intense) vamp of a rhythm section that begins a 
piece of jazz music provides a setting that is generally unremarkable when 
compared to the (more intense) highly configured theme that emerges. If we 
subject the passage to a Schenkerian analysis, we see that more mundane parts of 
                                                 
6 Although gesture implies agency, this agency may be subtle. For instance, an electronic traffic sign with a 
flashing right-pointing arrow in a construction zone is without a doubt an object; however, agency is 
embedded within it because the sign "tells" the driver to merge right. Although it is the arrow (i.e., an 




the music are placed in the background while the attention-grabbing, unique 
elements comprise the foreground. 
 
Chopin, Prelude in B Minor 
The quick-ascent-slow-descent (QASD) shape of the melodic arch in mm. 1-2 
resembles the bodily movements that one would make when tracing the path of an 
object moving into the distance. As demonstrated in the first part of this chapter, 
the actual flight path of such an object is parabolic. Accordingly, one who is 
positioned directly beneath the apex of motion, or at a point that is perpendicular 
to it, tracks its motion with a symmetrical gesture resembling the parabola. 
However, it is the unique shape of the gesture in these measures that positions that 
virtual observing agent at a specific point relative to the object’s motion. In 
drawing a connection between the QASD gesture and the collective motions of 
the observer’s head, neck, and eyes, we come to understand the perspective from 
which this virtual agent views the virtual object. 
 
6) The individuation of the virtual observing agent implies a single subjectivity 
possessing a single emotional perspective or unique affective state. 
 
By individuating the virtual observing agent from other entities within the 
diegesis and by locating this agent in relation to those entities that it observes, we 
in effect position a lens through which a listener observes this diegetic space. It 
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might be helpful to conceptualize the virtual observing agent as a coin-operated 
tower viewer that one would find atop the Empire State Building. These 
stationary telescopes offer a view of the urban landscape from a solitary position. 
In the same way that a tourist views the city below through the mounted 
binoculars, the real listener observes the diegetic space of the work through the 
virtual eyes of a positioned virtual observing agent. 
 
Like most metaphors, the above one has its limits. Whereas the tower viewer only 
contains lenses to give the viewer visual information, the human-like virtual 
observing agent can transmit all types of sensory information to the real listener. 
For example, dynamics can portray relative physical distance. Mahler uses this 
technique in Symphony No. 1 when he sets the trumpets offstage at the beginning 
of the first movement. 7 By positioning the real trumpets at a distance from the 
audience and reducing their volume, he places the virtual musicians that perform 
the heralding call at a distance, within the diegetic space of the pastoral scene. 
Meter and rhythm can similarly reflect the bodily movement of a virtual agent.  
An example of this is the oboe recitative from the Bacchanale of Saint-Saëns’s 
Samson and Delilah that captures the sensuousness of the orgiastic genre 
(Example. 2.2). Free from the rigidity of meter (ad lib.), one can hear the sinuous 
melody as depicting the unsteady body of a virtual agent caught up in drunken 
                                                 
7 The score indicates that the trumpets should be “set at a very far distance” (In sehr 
weiter Entfernung aufgestellt). 
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revelry. The melody begins with vain attempts to stabilize itself on A5, slipping 
numerous times in the process. The line then slurs downward and unsuccessfully 
grabs at E5 before falling finally to A3 where it comes to rest. Alternatively, one 
might just as easily hear the exotic Phrygian cadenza as expressing a sultry, 
sexual bodily movement. Regardless of the interpretation, it does not take much 
effort for an attentive listener to imagine himself or herself as performing these 
actions. By experiencing the music as through one were a virtual agent (or virtual 
observing agent), the real listener imagines the complex of sensations (e.g., 
vision, sound, movement, balance, etc.) of that virtual agent. 
Example 2.2. Saint-Saëns, Samson and Delilah, Bacchanale, recitative 
 
The collection of these sensations within the virtual observing agent suggests 
various thoughts and emotions—hence, an emerging subjectivity. This 
subjectivity within the virtual observing agent is unique in that it is positioned 
within the diegetic space. It observes only what is made observable; it is not 
omniscient. The affective state is often similarly positioned. The virtual observing 
agent usually experiences emotions that are aligned, because these affective 




Chopin, Prelude in B Minor 
The unique melodic contour of the left hand in mm. 1-2 uniquely positions the 
virtual observing agent within the diegetic space of the work. As the virtual object 
travels away from the virtual observing agent, the agent experiences a feeling of 
loss or deprivation. The articulation of this affect is enhanced by the “tolling 
bells” or consoling hand gestures found in the highest voice and, of course, the 
slow tempo and minor mode. The attentive listener follows the entailments of the 
agent’s gaze within the topical environment to make better cognitive and 
emotional sense of the agent’s subjectivity—its conscious self. With this final 
step, we see that the music implies the presence of an individuated, sensing, 
thinking, feeling, and conscious, human-like agency, through whose skin the 
listener can experience the music.  
 
 
Case Study 2: Chopin, Barcarolle in F-sharp Major, Op. 60 
Chopin’s Barcarolle is another pensive (though less gloomy) work for solo piano 
that features a QASD melodic shape. Like the Prelude in B Minor, the Barcarolle projects 
a wistful and longing character. The nine minutes that pass between the first measure and 
the last seem to represent a space that is almost devoid of time. The 12/8 meter offers the 
piece a delicate sway that is filled in by almost constant eighth-note rhythms. This 
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permits both the expression of an observer gazing at the night sky, and the buoyant 
rocking of the gondola in which we might imagine the observer sitting. 8  
The piece opens with low C#s that are sounded in the first and second octaves. 
Their earthy tone resonates deep in the listener’s chest, providing a solid foundation and 
an embodied point of reference for what is to come. The next beat presents a stark 
contrast to the first with G#5. The melody maintains its height for a moment then 
descends lazily into m. 3. Its indirect fall is like that of a feather; the melody flutters 
upward and downward while making its protracted descent. The inner voices complement 
this light and ethereal sound by creating consonant intervals on each of the following 
beats.  An appoggiatura on each beat injects a soft energy that pushes the music forward. 
 
Example 2.3. Chopin, Barcarolle in F-sharp Major, Op. 60, mm. 1-6 
                                                 
8 Janice Dickensheets observes that “the Venetian Gondolier song with its lilting six-eighth [sic] meter and 




 David Kopp (2014) describes the three measures that begin this piece as depicting 
a pyrotechnic device—a rocket—as it soars into the night sky above the canals the 
Venice. His vivid account is as follows: 
The barcarolle as a genre is, of course, a Venetian boat song. 
One of my most lasting impressions of a long-ago trip to 
Venice is of a sultry summer night which happened to be the 
festival day. Over the canals, fireworks repeatedly lit up the 
sky. Not until years later did this image occur to me as I 
played the opening measures of the Barcarolle: shot from 
below, the music lands high in the sky in a burst of 
predominant energy, its sparkling parts slowly floating down 
through the air at slightly unequal speeds. [9] 
 
Once heard in this way, it is difficult to imagine a more memorable and appropriate 
scene. The octave C-sharps on beat one of m. 1 portray the initial combustive force that 
propels the rocket upward. The depth of the sound implies both the thud of the rocket as 
the initial propulsive force is applied to it and it leaves the mortar barrel. In the silent 
space between beats one and two, we visually track the almost visually imperceptible 
ascent of the pyrotechnic. The right-hand entrance of the supertonic G# minor 6/3 chord 
on beat two portrays the mid-air explosion, causing a sudden burst of light that blooms in 
the night sky. The slow-moving descent into m. 3 vividly illustrates the pockets of light 
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casually falling to the earth, with the pitches of the harmonic texture sketching the many 
glowing embers in the mind of the listener. I have rendered Kopp’s description in Figure 
2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8. Visual representation of Kopp’s description of Chopin, Barcarolle, mm. 1-3 
 
 The pyrotechnic rocket that we hear in the first three measure of his piece is a 
virtual object since it is the object toward which the virtual observing agent directs its 
gaze. Unlike the virtual object depicted in the Prelude in B Minor, the virtual object in the 
barcarolle has virtual materiality within the diegesis. It is not simply a metaphor for a 
past memory or an uncertain future; instead, it exists in the same virtual space that 
contains the virtual observing agent. It is already a rocket at its first level of 
interpretation. 
 In a few sentences, Kopp is able to describe the three-measure introduction in 
great detail. He presents a vivid image that is immediately accessible to the listener, even 
one who has not experienced fireworks over the Venetian canals first hand. Kopp does 
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not nuance his interpretation; instead, he allows us to fill in the gaps, making connections 
to the music and discover the finer details ourselves, as I have attempted above. Although 
connecting the few dots that Kopp provides does present a challenge, it requires us to 
follow the same chain of inferences necessary for our interpretation of the Prelude in B 
Minor.   
 
 
1) Actual agent (listener) hears musical gesture as embodied (human) gesture. 
 
Kopp describes the Venetian scene with articulate imagery for which he hears a 
parallel in the Barcarolle. That Kopp hears musical sounds as representing 
embodied movement should come as no surprise. Recalling the mimetic 
hypothesis, we know that when a listener hears music, he or she conceptualizes it 
through either on-line or off-line motor action. We might hear the rowing motion 
of the gondolier that begins in the left hand in m. 4. The rhythmic and melodic 
contour reflects effortful push of the oar and its relaxing return to the gondolier. It 





2) Musical gesture heard as embodied (human) gesture implies the presence of a virtual 
agent in a virtual environment. 
 
 Although Kopp was physically present when he witnessed the fireworks soaring 
above the canals that one summer evening, the movements or gestures that he 
makes while reliving this experience musically are not necessarily physical. 
While listening, he may recreate some of the physical gestures (e.g., gazing) that 
he performed when he was actually in Venice; however, many of these 
movements will be muted if not entirely inhibited. Although Kopp is a real 
listener, his interpretation reflects the actions and experiences of a virtual agent in 
a virtual environment, namely Kopp’s past self that very summer evening in 
Venice. 
 
3b) The prominence of the observational role implies the presence of a virtual observing 
agent. 
 
 There is a point that has yet to be made clear, one that is slightly muddled by the 
language that Kopp chooses to describe the Barcarolle. In writing that “the music 
lands high in the sky,” it may seem that Kopp suggests that the music is a direct 
representation of the aerial firework. However, we must remember that in 
describing the Venetian scene, Kopp places himself in a clearly observational 
role. His memory is not of being the firework; it is of witnessing it. Because his 
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experience of its movements is mediated through his observing gestures, the agent 
that he posits in his description has a notably observational role. 
 
4) The virtual observing agent individuates itself from virtual objects, a virtual 
environment, and other virtual agents. 
 
 Kopp establishes himself at a remove from the motion of the fireworks in the 
scene with the language that he selects to describe it. He keeps his distance by 
writing that “the music lands high in the sky” [italics mine], notably refraining 
from say, “I land high in the sky.” In describing the represented object (i.e., the 
firework) in the third-person, he individuates himself from it and establishes 
himself as an observer to its motion. 
 
In the above analysis of the Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, I suggested that the 
quick-ascent-slow-descent (QASD) melodic contour represented the physical 
actions necessary to track an object moving away from an observer and into the 
distance. Having established this as an indexical gazing gesture, I proceeded to 
integrate this with the solemnity of the piece and its funereal signs in order to 
articulate a reading that was otherwise unattainable. I concluded that the piece 
projects a feeling of loss through the sorrowful, longing gaze of the virtual 
observing agent as it tracks an unknown object moving outward from it. The 
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analysis sought to better define the emotional state of the virtual observing agent 
than was possible through purely topical interpretations.  
In our focus on the virtual observing agent, I neglected to specify the 
virtual object—the thing that the virtual observing agent tracked with the 
collected movements of its head, neck, and eyes. I speculated that this virtual 
object could, itself, be a symbol interpretable as a metaphor for a distant memory 
or a vision of the future. Regardless of the interpretation, I recognized the implied 
contemplation bound up in the gazing gesture. However, I purposefully avoided 
further describing the virtual object as a material entity within the diegetic space 
because the music lacked the necessary degree of specificity for me to 
unequivocally identify and name it. (Its characterization as a ball was hypothetical 
and served only to aid the understanding of ballistic motion.) This ambiguity drew 
my attention to the virtual object’s symbolic meaning. I concluded that the QASD 
contour represented a longing gaze through time (toward the past or future), but I 
stopped short of further describing the virtual object, holding that the music 
articulates its symbolism to a greater extent  than its virtual materiality.  
 
5) The individuation of the virtual observing agent implies a single observational 
perspective of  the diegesis. 
 
The position of the virtual observing agent relative to the virtual object (i.e., the 
firework) is not overly specified by the music. We cannot say that the virtual 
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observing agent sits in a gondola at the Rialto Bridge and that the firework is 
launched from a position 510 feet north and blossoms in the sky at a height of 
212 feet. This music simply does not provide this level of detail in its construction 
of the diegetic space. Yet the music is not so vague that it does not provide some 
important information about the virtual environment. We can deduce that the 
firework travels along an upward path that draws the observer’s vision upward. 
The speed and degree at which the gesture occurs suggests that the virtual 
observing agent and the virtual object are relatively close to one another.  
 
6) The individuation of the virtual observing agent implies a single subjectivity 
possessing a single emotional perspective or unique affective state. 
 
 The observing gesture in mm. 1-3 positions the virtual observing agent at a point 
below the virtual object—the aerial firework. When informed by the topical 
allusion to the gondola and motivated by Kopp’s recollection of an evening in 
Venice, the unique contour of the QASD gesture provides us with clues to the 
nature of the object and perspective from which it is observed by the virtual agent. 
Moreover, the agent also experiences a complex of emotions, thoughts, and other 
sensations while in this setting. This includes the rocking of the 12/8 meter, 
particularly palpable in the accompaniment that begins in m. 4. Through the 
virtual observing agent, the listener may feel pensive or wistful both through the 
far-off gaze of the QASD gesture and by the simplicity suggested by the genre 
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(Dickensheets 2012: 131). Certainly, an analysis of these few measures falls well 
short of offering a thorough interpretation of the work. But from this small section 
of music, it is possible to demonstrate a method of conceptualizing this piece and 
hearing it through the body and senses of a virtual observing agent. 
 
Conclusion 
 My examination of the QASD gesture has contributed to the theory of the virtual 
observing agent by grounding an imaginative reconstruction of motion with physics and 
mathematical articulation. I have demonstrated that this melodic contour imitates the 
physical indexical movements that an agent performs while visually tracking the path of 
an object that travels upward and outward. This human gesture is also found in 
metaphorical gazing, whereby a person has a far-off look while deep in thought. In many 
cases, both the literal and metaphorical virtual gazes are mutually supportive, reinforcing 





OTHER INDEXICAL GESTURES AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I further explore musical gestures that suggest the presence of a 
virtual observing agent. I first place my focus on ascending melodic lines that mimic the 
indexical gestures of an agent casting an upward gaze or reaching outward with 
aspiration or desire. I find that in certain musical contexts, this indexical gesture toward a 
virtual object can lead the listener to identify an emotional yearning, a type of gazing in 
which the “object” is metaphorical within the diegesis. In my examination of these 
musical gestures, I also consider the performance gestures that they reify, notably with 
reference to Beethoven’s Emperor Concerto and his Piano Sonata in A Major, Op. 101. 
Further on in this chapter, I shift the relationship between the observing agent and the 
virtual object, studying examples in which the virtual object remains in a fixed position 
while the observing agent moves around it. I propose a virtual observing agent that takes 
in the sight of a stationary object from multiple perspectives. Through this interpretive 
lens, I look at two compositions programmatically linked to monumental architectural 





Yearning as Indexical Gesture 
 
Indexical Gesture in Beethoven, Piano Concerto No. 5 (Emperor Concerto), Op. 72, ii 
The second movement of Beethoven’s Emperor Concerto is one of the most 
beautiful pieces of the composer’s catalog. Nearly fifty years after its first performance, 
biographer Anton Schindler considered the work as a whole to be the “summit of all 
concerto music written for the instrument,” citing the composer’s skill in projecting 
spirituality (1966 [1840, 1860]: 160). William Kinderman observes that “the serene slow 
movement in B major acts as an immense parenthesis,” describing its mood as “dream-
like reflection” (1995: 135). In Example 3.1, we see that the movement contains a 
number of topical markers associated with the expression of pastoral bliss: slow tempo 
(Adagio un poco mosso), major mode, soft dynamics, parallel thirds (violins, mm 1-2, 9, 
11), contrapuntal wedges (mm. 7, 9, 11) and consonant appoggiaturas (mm. 5-6, 13-15) 
(Hatten 1994: 98-99). The movement is non-virtuosic, as typical of concerto slow 
movements. Its demands from the pianist instead lie in the delicacy that one must employ 
while navigating the keyboard. The melody further reflects the simplicity of the idyll 
(97). It is through the careful attention to timing and the recognition of the muscular 










The movement begins with the homorhythmic texture and controlled counterpoint 
of the bound style. In m. 5, the melody of the first violin jumps upward a minor seventh 
from F#4 to E5. Following the chordal texture of the first four measures, the sudden 
assertion of melodic independence by the highest voice catches the listener’s attention. 
The energy heard in this quick and substantial melodic leap in the first half of m. 5 seems 
to dissipate in the second half of the measure as the melody descends more leisurely E4 –
D#4 – B3 – F#3. This gesture repeats in the following bar (m. 6). The importance of this 
repetition and reinforcement become understood in m. 16 where the solo piano has its 
first entrance.  Here, the melody also makes a rapid ascent from F# in the fifth octave, 
this time, to F# high in the sixth octave. The short duration of the lower F# seems to 
reflect a sort of propulsion, much like the firework that David Kopp (2014: [9]) uses to 
describe the opening gesture in Chopin’s Barcarolle, Op. 60. It hangs for a moment and 
descends leisurely with triplets in a simple meter. The metric discontinuity (three-against-
two) allows the melody to float downward, rather than ascend more directly. The 
rhythmic non-alignment of the latter two notes of each triplet figure as though the melody 
were a feather in mm. 16-17 offers it a degree of lightness even catching an occasional 
updraft while floating downward. 
Although the imagery of a feather or a firework is easy to visualize, it remains 
detached from the human body and, therefore, it does not directly represent a human 
gesture. We recall that in Chapters 1 and 2, this quickly-ascending-slowly-descending 
(QASD) melodic contour reflected the collective head, neck, and eye movements that an 
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observer makes when visually tracking an object that moves into the distance along a 
parabolic path. The visual tracking movements are much quicker as the object ascends in 
the observer’s foreground of vision, but more measured as the object descends into the 
background. Interestingly, this is the gesture that one might make when suddenly 
encountering a beautiful vista. After all, pastoral depictions in art have long represented 
an idealized vision of nature while providing a setting for deep thought and self-
reflection.1 
We can imagine the virtual agent coming upon a scene of verdant pastures that 
stretch outward toward the horizon. Faced with the impressive sight, the subject’s head 
darts upward quickly, perhaps accompanied by a sudden awed gasp, before descending at 
a slower pace. The gesture also is one that might occur if one is seized by a sudden 
insight and then reflects upon it in wonder, as in metaphorical gazing. 
Amid the contemplation of this melodic arch, we find another indexical gesture in 
the concerto, one that is more pressing in character. In mm. 7-9, the first violin pushes 
upward from the weight of F#4, through G4, to G#4 (5̂ – b6̂ – 6̂). The tonal stability of F# 
(5̂) gives it a magnetism that resists the upward motion to G and G# (Larson 2012: 
88-95).2 The laborious chromatic ascent and the crescendo are evidence of this effort. 
                                                 
1 Renato Poggioli notes that European writers of the seventeenth century shifted the depiction of the 
pastoral from one of outward passion to one of inward contemplation and self-examination. By exploring 
“pastorals of melancholy and solitude” these authors were able to develop “the pastoral of the self, which in 
the end transcended all previous traditions of the genre” (1959: 686). 
2 Because the tonic triad creates tonal stability, Larson identifies its component pitches as exerting a 
metaphorical magnetism. He writes that “[m]elodic magnetism is the tendency of an unstable note to move 
to the closest stable pitch” (2012: 88). 
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After pausing to gather strength, the melody strives upward again, reaching its tonic goal 
(B), on beat 3 of m. 8. These linear ascending gestures are much different from the 
relaxed gaze of mm. 5-6 and 16-17. The melody in mm. 7-8 expresses the effort of a 
virtual observing agent as it reaches or yearns for tonic.3 In embodying this agent, one 
stretches the arms outward toward something that is beyond reach. The virtual observing 
agent indexes the object of desire by “pointing” its arms and focusing its attention in that 
direction. 
Once reaching tonal stability, the melody climbs upward yet again; this time the 
woodwinds double the violin’s stepwise ascent B4 – C#5 – D#5 (1̂ – 2̂ – 3̂). This gesture 
expresses a reach toward spiritual fulfillment that goes beyond what is tonally sufficient 
(B) in order to achieve a sense of transcendence (D#). This spiritual achievement, 
however, proves elusive, since the deceptive cadence (V7 – vi) in m. 10 undercuts the 
expected perfect authentic cadence. The virtual agent then makes another attempt toward 
cadential fulfillment and achieves it with V7 – I across mm. 12-13. The suddenly soft 
dynamics of those measures, however, rob the music of the spiritual perfection that it 
seeks; of course, such an achievement is not to be expected in the opening bars of a 
lengthy movement. Instead, the early placement of this gesture that yearns for spiritual 
                                                 
3 In her article “Sources, Containers, and Paths,” Janna Saslaw (1996: 217-43) discusses musical direction 
using the “source-path-goal” image schema. Saslaw recounts the many ways that theorists historically have 
conceptualized forward harmonic, for example, “starting with the tonic and passing through a small or large 
number of intermediate locations, that is, chords” before reaching tonic once again (222). The yearning that 
we hear in mm. 7-8 draws on this same schema and identifies the listener’s foreknowledge of the melodic 
and harmonic goals that lie (hopefully) at the end of the musical “path.” 
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fulfillment permits it to serve as a premise for the aspiration expressed throughout the 
remainder of the movement. 
 
We take away from this example (mm. 8-9) the notion that an ascending melodic 
line can project an indexical gesture, particularly when it is goal-directed. This gesture is 
similar to the observing gesture heard in the QASD contour (m. 7-9), but here the step-
wise gesture expresses a more pressing desire as it draws nearer to the upper tonic. The 
gesture meets Eco’s (1976: 119) criteria for indexical pointing; like the pointing finger, 
the melody is 1) elongated (longitude) by its 2) direction of motion, and its 3) apical tip is 
present in each successive pitch. The 4) dynamic stress of the gesture is present in the 
intensity of its projected desire. Although the gesture seems to achieve local goals (i.e., 1̂ 
in m. 8 and 3̂ in m. 9), several musical undercuttings keep it detached from its overall 
expressive goal in these measures. This reaching gesture continues to point toward the 
virtual object of its desire but it never quite attains this goal.   
 
Teleological Melodic Ascent as Indexical Gesture 
 The step-wise ascent that progresses from 5̂ to 8̂ toward an authentic cadence is 
notable for its subversion of contrapuntal norms. According to Steve Larson’s theory of 
melodic forces (2012), a melodic ascent from dominant to tonic contradicts the prevailing 
magnetic forces of gravity and magnetism. In Example 3.1, 5̂ in m. 7 is tonally stable 
within the chordal foreground (tonic) and tonal background (B Major). Its subsequent 
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movement upward to b6̂ (or #5̂) demonstrates an exertion of agency, an action against 
both the downward pull of gravity and the magnetic pull of stability. Its continued 
upward movement demonstrates the melody’s energy. The melody does not possess a 
restful quality even when it reaches tonic at the perfect authentic cadence of m. 8. 
Instead, it draws our attention forward in time to the reposeful closure that we receive 
later in the piece. 
In a lecture at the University of Texas Music Theory Symposium (April 2014), 
Michael Buchler delivered a paper entitled, “What Goes Up,” an examination of Tin Pan 
Alley and classical Broadway songs that conclude with a structural linear ascent through 
the upper tetrachord  (5̂ – 6̂ – 7̂ – 8̂). Buchler’s citations include such notable tunes as 
“Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious” (Mary Poppins), “When You Wish Upon A Star” 
(Pinocchio), and “People Will Say We’re in Love” (Oklahoma!). Each of these show 
tunes concludes with an ascent to tonic that suggests the infusion of agential energy, a 
resistance to the environmental force of gravity. Hatten (2012: [5]) describes this as 
“initiatory energy” and holds that its opposition to environmental forces leads the listener 
to infer agency. But Buchler goes on to draw out the significance of the ascending 
tetrachord. He contends that each song’s closing ascent is part of the background 
structure that comprises the fundamental line or Urlinie. Of course, this ascent exists as a 
notable contradiction to the requisite descending Urlinie of Schenkerian orthodoxy. 
Buchler, however, shows quite convincingly that in this more recent style, the ascending 
Urlinie occurs with relative frequency, citing the examples above and a host of others. 
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Yet this ascending structure is rare within the larger context of the Western tonal canon 
from which Tin Pan Alley and Broadway emerge. Thus, the ascending Urlinie has 
become not only a novel way of bringing tonal and structural closure to music, it is also a 
marker of expressive potential. 
 An example of the expressivity of the structural ascent is found in the British 
World War II song “The White Cliffs of Dover” (Walter Kent and Nat Burton). The piece, 
written during Britain’s early years in the war (1941), became popular in a recorded 
performance sung by Vera Lynn that was released the following year. A hope for peace 
and liberty from Axis powers is expressed in the first verses: 
  There’ll be bluebirds over, 
  The white cliffs of Dover, 
  Tomorrow just you wait and see.  
 
  There’ll be love and laughter, 
  And peace ever after, 
  When the world is free.  
The imagery is well-established as the opening melodic figure ascends 3̂ – 5̂ – 8̂ with the 
lyrics “There’ll be bluebirds.” This blossoming motive mimics the fairly rapid upward 
movement of an observer whose head, neck, and eyes rise to capture the monumental 
chalky bluffs of the title. This ascending gesture becomes thematic throughout the work, 
and notably returns in the last line of the song. Example 3.1 depicts the vocal melody in 
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the final bar. The gesture continues past the initial melodic ascent with a delayed melodic 
descent that is only initiated by word “over.” The observer’s gaze thus follows a QASD  
arch-shaped pattern that looks both up and down the massive cliffs of the song’s title. 
 
 
Example 3.2. Kent and Burton, “The White Cliffs of Dover,” (1942 recording) 
(transcription mine) 
 
 The final melodic line of the piece is perhaps the most noteworthy element of the 
structure in light of Buchler’s work. Beginning from in the antepenultimate measure, 
Lynn proceeds downward 4̂ – 3̂ – 2̂,  but balks at the expected descent to tonic. She 
instead leaps up a fifth (Bb3 – F4), completing the line 6̂  – 7̂  – 8̂.4 
Following Buchler, I hold that the ascending tetrachord is not only a structural 
possibility for the fundamental line, but it can be a marked expressive indexical gesture 
that mimics the head, neck, and eye motions of gazing at or yearning for a virtual object. 
This song ends by looking forward in time, employing tomorrow as the virtual object that 
the singer yearns for, with an almost naïve hope. We can imagine Lynn looking upward, 
                                                 
4 The same melodic contour (QASD) begins “Over the Rainbow” from The Wizard of Oz (Arlen and 











, as she lifts her head, gazes upward, and asks, “Why, oh, why can’t I?” Buchler 
(2014) cited the example in a handout. 
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perhaps even extending and reaching an arm toward the peaceful future for which she 
pines, and her gesture constitutes a metaphorical gaze. 
Buchler’s study of the ascending tetrachord offers us an entry point into 
understanding this melodic line as a musical gesture with virtual physical implications. 
His choice of repertoire benefits from its pairing of melody and lyrics, which together are 
able to carry a specificity of meaning not found in purely instrumental music. However, 
what he uncovers is still valuable when the text is stripped away. We are now positioned 
to explore Buchler’s hunches about the expressive implications of the ascending 
tetrachord in a study of untexted works that suggest other types of indexical gestures.  
The descent of the Urlinie (fundamental line) is taken as a natural principle of 
tonal music in much the same way that gravity is taken as a natural property of the 
physical environment in which we live. In fact, Schenkerian theorists Allen Cadwallader 
and David Gagné (1998) note that Schenker found the fundamental descent to be rooted 
in Nature:  
[T]he fundamental line descends from the initial tone to the 
final 1̂. The reason for this aspect of Schenker’s theory is 
that he considered the first tone of the Urlinie—the primary 
tone—as an “image” or representation of the overtone in an 
overtone series of which the tonic is the fundamental. He 
therefore considered the descending motion to be the most 
direct path for this “overtone” to return to its fundamental, a 
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direction that also corresponds to a release of musical 
tension. (108)   
Accordingly, a three-line descent in C major, for example, descends E - D - C (3̂ – 2̂ – 1̂) 
because this upper-voice structure is trying to return to the fundamental. (It might be 
more accurate, however, to say that the Urlinie attempts to come as close to its 
fundamental as possible because this upper-voice C goal is itself an overtone of the lower 
C found in the bass of the complete Ursatz.) Thus, Schenker suggests that Western 
classical music is born out of a contrapuntal framework that is not based simply on style, 
but instead rooted in a natural acoustic phenomenon. 
 The acceptance of this tenet of Schenkerian theory is notably challenged by David 
Neumeyer in his article, “The Rising Urlinie” (1987). In it, Neumeyer suggests that the 
fundamental line may ascend to tonic (5̂ – 6̂ – 7̂ – 8̂) with the same ease that it descends 
in Schenker’s conceptualization of the tonal structure. Through Viktor Zuckerkandl 
(1956), Neumeyer identifies 5̂ as the point of most “dynamic” tension; that is, 5̂ strives to 
reach tonic more than do other scale degrees because of its position in the middle of the 
scale (Neumeyer 1987: 280). Zuckerkandl describes the dominant scale degree as 
figuratively perched on the edge of a knife (1956: 97) and thus bound up with potential 
energy that it desires to expel. If tipped in one direction, the Urlinie will fall to 4̂ and 
onward down to tonic (5̂ – 4̂ – 3̂ – 2̂ – 1̂). If tipped in the other direction, it will progress 
upward until it reaches the upper tonic (5̂ – 6̂ – 7̂ – 8̂). 
 
102 
 Neumeyer explicates with the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in A 
Major, Op. 101. The expression of the movement is somewhat inward, marked by the 
performance description mit innigsten Empfindung (literally, “with innermost feeling). 
There are also repeated undercuttings of cadential closure, inward wedging textures, and 
pregnant pauses. Given this inward character, the piece seems to be an unlikely candidate 
for an atypical structural ascent that stretches the background upper line, pulling the away 
from the bass. However, Neumeyer finds the ascending tetrachord to be the fundamental 
upper line (Urlinie) of the piece (300-01). A section of his graph is found in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Neumeyer’s (1987: 300) middleground reduction of Beethoven, Op. 101, i  
(truncated, mm. 59-77)  
 
 Carl Schachter critiques Neumeyer’s notion of the ascending Urlinie in the 
appendix of his article, “Schoenberg’s Hat and Lewis Carroll’s Trousers: Upward and 
Downward Motion in Musical Space” (1996). He claims that 6̂ has a natural tendency to 
fall toward 5̂, thus inhibiting the domino-effect described by Zuckerkandl (1956: 338-39). 
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Schachter draws on the following diagram from Zuckerkandl to press his point (Figure 
3.2):  
 
Figure 3.2. Reproduction of Zuckerkandl’s melodic tendency diagram (1956: 98) 
 
Notice that the longer arrows on the bottom depict the “knife-edge balance” of  5̂; as 
mentioned earlier, it is pulled both downward to the lower tonic (1̂) and upward to the 
higher tonic (8̂). The shorter arrows just above depict the direction of force that pulls 
certain pitches toward more stable ones—this is similar to Larson’s force of magnetism 
(2012). Because pitches of the tonic triad are considered most stable, the remaining 
pitches of the scale draw toward them (recalling Larson’s magnetism). In considering 
lateral distance and the compounding influences of the arrows in the above diagram, 2̂ is 
drawn to 1̂, 4̂ is drawn to 3̂, and 7̂ is drawn to 8̂. The tendency of the submediant (6̂), 
however, is somewhat problematic, as we have seen in Beethoven’s Emperor Concerto, 
because of the competing tendencies depicted in the opposing arrows. It is here that 
Schachter centers his argument, claiming that the downward pull of the top arrow 
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counteracts the upward pull of the arrow beneath it.5 Therefore, when 5̂ is “tipped” in the 
direction of 6̂, it returns to 5̂ in a neighbor motion. The downward pull to 5̂ overcomes 
the upward pull toward 8̂ that is stretched across a vast chasm—a perfect fourth—of pitch 
space. 
 But Schachter accepts Neumeyer’s readings of obvious ascending Urlinien in 
Schubertian dances (e.g., D. 779, No. 2 and D. 969, No. 7), describing these short works 
as akin to sections of larger works. Nonetheless, Schachter remains resistant to permitting 
this upward motion from becoming more than a structural oddity. For Schachter, the 
ascending tetrachord is sufficient to end short dances and piano miniatures, but it cannot 
provide the satisfactory closure that larger works require (339). 
 This inability for an ascending Urlinie to provide real and significant closure 
seems to quash the proposition of finding this feature in a substantive work. Schachter, 
for instance, seems to suggest that if the analyst identifies an ascending fundamental line 
within a large work, the analyst simply is not looking hard enough for the “true” 
descending line. I prefer a more charitable interpretation that accepts Neumeyer’s reading 
of a structural ascent at the end of the movement while acknowledging the lack of 
conclusiveness that Schacter believes it would bring to a piece.  While the Neumeyer’s 
ascent to tonic marks the formal end of a movement, it also suggests that something is 
                                                 




. Furthermore, the 




 is unsuited for any structural melodic motion. 
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left unfinished. In this way, the music projects the feeling of desire, as experienced by a 
virtual agent.   
In Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in A major, Op. 101, i, the fundamental line ends 
with a climb to tonic that is reached in m. 77 (Example 3.3). This upward motion is 
reiterated in the final two measures as the melody ascends E6 – F#6 – G#6 – A6. Although 
it reaches a tonal goal, this unconventional background structure leaves things unfinished, 
with the rising melody akin to the rise of an interrogative vocal inflection. Although the 




















 Two opposing gestural types comprise the first movement of Op. 101 (Example 
3.3): an outward motion and an inward motion. These are present in the very beginning of 
the work, since the rising of the melody in mm. 1-2 has a descending complement in mm. 
3-4. Looking closer, we see that this opposition is further present in each two-bar unit. 
The opening melody ascends a sixth (G#4 to E5) before falling a fourth (E5 to B4). 
Similarly, its response begins on the anacrusis to m. 3 and ascends an octave (A4 to A5) 
before journeying downward through mm. 3-4. The left hand acts in kind, although 
reversing its direction. The lower voice descends stepwise in mm. 1 and leaps up into m. 
2. The lowest voice then drops (A3 to C#3) from m. 3 to m. 4 and steps upward to 
conclude the phrase.6 
 Hatten describes the first in the gestural pair as “yearning” (1994: 57). This 
gesture is indexical by virtue of its teleological nature. One does not simply yearn, but 
yearns for sometimes. Yearning represents a specific type of indexical gesture in which 
the agent engages in a more active role in its attempt to draw closer to a virtual object. 
This contrasts with that virtual observing agent who gazes upward at a firework soaring 
above the Venetian canals in Chopin’s Barcarolle, Op. 60 (Kopp 2014). There, the 
connection that draws together the virtual agent and the virtual object is suggested by the 
indexicality of vision. The agent’s gaze is pensive and relaxed. Yearning, however, 
                                                 
6 This contrapuntal analysis disregards E2 in mm. 1-2, treating it as a fifth voice situated beneath the four-
voice texture that does not properly participate in the counterpoint. The proper tenor voice in m. 1-2 
unfolds through compound melody, ascending B4 - E4 - F#4 in the right hand on the second division of each 
beat. The location of the tenor voice is seen more clearly in mm. 3-4 when it is placed in the left hand (F#4 - 
E4 - D4 - C#4 - A3 - G#3). 
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abandons this passivity and expresses a more active form of agency that seeks to draw 
together and unite the virtual agent and its desired virtual object. 
 Nowhere is this connection between agent and object more pronounced than in 
the yearning that is embodied as a reaching gesture. With the arms extended outward 
from the body, the agent literally draws nearer to the desired virtual observed object. This 
movement-toward the object of desire distinguishes it from more passive indexical 
gestures such as the contemplative gaze. 
I describe the yearning and reaching agent as a “virtual observing agent,” because, 
despite the action-oriented nature of the gesture, it is strongly characterized by both its 
indexicality and its perspective that suggests observation. Given the implied passivity of 
the word “observation,” I will defend a more active type of “engaged observation.” The 
observer’s eye remains fixed on the goal (i.e., virtual object of desire), while the virtual 
observer’s body appears to actively move toward it.  
 
Yearning as Performance Gesture 
We recall Cox’s mimetic hypothesis which holds that our perception and 
conceptualization of observed movement is understood through a sort of off-line physical 
mimesis. Cox explains that “[p]art of how we understand others is by imagining 
performing the observed actions [of others]” (2011: [9]). According to this principle, 
when we witness the physical movements of another, we ourselves run a mental 
simulation of that action as part of our comprehension of it. Studies (Iacoboni et al. 2005, 
Mukamel et al. 2010) that may further support his hypothesis have compared action-
 
111 
performing subjects to action-observing subjects and have found homologous neural 
activation within the areas of the frontal and parietal lobes that are responsible for motor 
action. Although this mental simulation may be below the level of consciousness, the 
evidence suggests that to some extent we understand an action by imagining our 
engagement in that action. 
 Cox (2011: [9]) takes this a step further and applies it to music and our perception 
of its motion. He continues: 
Part of how we understand music is by imagining 
performing one or more of the following: 
a) the observed sound-producing actions (intra-
modal MMI [or mimetic motor imagery]), 
b) analogous sound-producing actions (cross-
modal MMI) 
c) other analogous exertions (also cross-modal 
MMI)  
While we have extensively explored analogous exertions (e.g., gazing) in this 
dissertation, we have not significantly discussed sound-producing actions. The latter 
describe actions or gestures that have a sonic component to them. Recall the opening of 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony from Chapter 1 in which we heard Fate’s impetuous 
knocking. To some, this famous motive resembles the action and sound that one makes 
while rapping one’s hand forcefully and repeatedly against a hard surface. Whether or not 
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this was Beethoven’s intention, it is not difficult to understand the connection between 
the music and the virtual perceived action. 
  Our understanding of music is similarly influenced by performance gesture. 
Certainly all classically trained musicians have at least some experience at the piano, at 
least knowing the basics of its structure and mechanics. We know that loud sounds 
require a forceful depression of the keys, while soft sounds require delicate, fluid motion 
of the wrists and fingers. The location of the keys also influences the performance 
gestures of the pianist. The middle register is within easy reach of the hands, while the 
extremes of the high and low registers require the arms to be stretched outward from the 
body. Thus, according to the mimetic hypothesis, listeners perceive and conceptualize the 
music of an instrument they are familiar with by imagining playing the piece along with 
the performer. 
 
Yearning and Yielding 
Returning to the Sonata in A Major, we see that the implied physical movement 
and its associated affect of the expanding and contracting contrapuntal wedge is felt in 
the performing gestures of the pianist. The outward motion of the voices requires the 
extension of the hands and arms away from the center of the body. The contraction of the 
wedge is accomplished with the inward motion of the hands and arms toward middle C. 
We may also hear this contrapuntal wedge as the breathing of an agent. A long inward 
breath fills the body, expanding the lungs and broadening the chest in mm. 1-2. It is then 
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expelled through the complementing phrase (mm. 3-4) as the lungs contract and the 
shoulders lower to a more restful position. 
 Hatten, too, connects yearning to the indexical act of reaching. He writes: 
One can easily imagine how “yearning” might correlate with 
“upward” motions, since upward motions are iconic with 
“reaching,” and “reaching” relates to yearning through 
metaphors such as “reaching for a higher existence.” 
(Hatten: 57) 
He later expands: 
[Yearning] is conveyed in this movement [of the sonata] 
through two kinds of processes: extended rising lines or step 
progressions [...] and immediate upward chromatic moves. 
(100) 
Fitting this affect to the opening gesture in m. 1, we see that the rising melodic line, the 
broadening textural wedge, the increase in dynamic intensity, and the pianist’s outward-
moving hands represent the desire of a virtual agent—the entity to which we necessarily 
ascribe this emotion.  
 “Resignation” is Hatten’s opposition to the above-mentioned striving gesture. He 
describes the process of resignation as accomplished through “yielding,” whereby the 
music slows its path toward its goal, whether cadential closure, dynamic climax, or the 
realization of a pitch tendency (1994: 57). 
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“Resignation” could then attach to “descending” motions, 
through similar derivation (as in “lapsing from an implied 
ascent”), or simply by being considered oppositional to 
“yearning.” (57) 
He identifies the cadential deferrals found in mm. 19-21, mm. 21-22, and mm. 22-23 
(V4
6 – V2
4 – I6) as examples of this affect (57-8). The desire for thematic closure and tonal 
resolution in the subordinate key area is created both through syntax (i.e., its position in 
the exposition) and the cadential expectation of the cadential 6/4. The cadence in each 
instance is undercut as the bass slips down from 5̂ – 4̂ (chord-root to chord-seventh), 
necessitating a further resolution to 3̂ in the bass, as I6. With the bass failing to achieve 
proper closure to 1̂, the cadence is forced to yield, like an airplane that defers its landing 
because its approach is either too high or too low. However, after circling the runway a 
number of times, the bass touches down (5̂ – 1̂) in mm. 24-25. 
 The movement’s many cadential failures do not go unnoticed by Kevin Korsyn, 
who characterizes the piece as exemplifying a “rhetoric of evasions” (1983: 24). Korsyn, 
too, cites the numerous deceptive cadences throughout the movement and further notes 
the absence of a cadence in the development section (mm. 35-54). To this point, the 
through-composed nature of the exposition and the lack of articulated formal junctures 
connecting the major sections would make a developmental cadence disconcerting; 
continuity, in the sense of uninterrupted flow, is thematic for this movement. Yet amid 
this hinge-less formal structure, the movement abounds with deceptive cadences, places 
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where the listener is robbed of resolution. The quantity of these potential endpoints or 
musical “might -have-beens” in this movement establishes resignation as the 
complementary pole in the yearning-yielding thematic opposition of the work. 
 
Yielding as Performance Gesture 
The deferral of closure and flouting of musical expectations in Beethoven’s Op. 
101, i, has a significant corporal element that can be felt physically by listeners. In fact, to 
my ears the feeling of failed resolution precedes my recognition of the harmonic and 
melodic elements that comprise the cadential failure or deferral. I can identify the 
progression V – vi as a deceptive cadence a split-second before consciously hearing 6̂ in 
the bass on the second harmony. It is not uncommon for my mouth to widen slightly at 
the harmonic undercutting or to feel my abdomen contract in response to the discomfort 
of the cadential evasion. I suspect that my reaction is not unique. 
When teaching the introductory course to music theory, I similarly teach my 
students to recognize the distinction between V and I by experiencing the musical 
expectation through their own bodies.7 They begin by standing balanced on two feet as I 
play tonic (I). I instruct the students to begin transferring their weight to the right foot as I 
play a predominant (ii6 or IV). I then progress to V, at which point they are standing on 
one foot, wobbling and often contorting the upper body to achieve balance. Finally, with 
                                                 
7 This pedagogical approach draws inspiration from Alexandra Pierce’s Deepening Musical Performance 
Through Music: The Theory and Practice of Embodied Interpretation (2007). Pierce explores the way that 
the body’s interaction with gravity influences musical expression (9-36). As in my classroom exercise, she 
equates the tonic with physical balance, writing that “balanced alignment is the body’s tonic chord” (15). 
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a grand gesture of my hands, I play tonic (I) and the students shift their weight back to 
center as their other foot returns to the floor. This pedagogical exercise enables the 
metaphorical tension and release of the sonic V – I to be experienced bodily. 
 We return to this exercise later in the semester when I introduce the deceptive 
resolution (V – vi). As before, the students stand on two feet for tonic, shift their weight 
to the right for the predominant, and flail their arms while standing on one foot for the 
dominant. Once again, as I move my hands to the piano to play the next chord the 
students begin to shift their weight back to center. But instead of tonic, I play the 
submediant (vi). This elicits a number of groans and laughter at the deception; students 
sometimes have to use their desks to catch themselves because upon hearing the “wrong” 
chord, they lift the foot that they are falling toward. This helps the students to understand 
the “deception” created in the deceptive cadence. The predominant and dominant create 
an expectation that is undercut by the step-wise ascent of the bass. This links the feeling 
of non-satisfaction with this cadential progression in the ear, mind, and body of the 
student. By conceptualizing the progression through an additional modality, I find that the 
students come to possess a better understanding of harmonic syntax. 
 The performative aspect of the deceptive cadence in Op. 101 is another point for 
consideration. The inward motion of the hands and the contraction of the contrapuntal 
wedge brought on by the deceptive cadence is intensified by the inclusion of vii o7/vi in 
m. 6. The upward slipping of the bass (E3 – E#3 – F#3) and step-wise descent of the 
highest voice (E5 – D5 – C5) counteract the expanding wedge in the previous measure. 
The harmony marks the onset of an expressive reversal that corresponds to the 
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contrapuntal reversal. This is a moment when yearning gives way to yielding. 
Furthermore, the chromatic ascent of the bass in m. 6 emphasizes the motion of the left 
hand that is drawn inward toward the body as the right hand descends in kind. Although 
the local tension of viio7/vi evaporates in the resolution to vi, a deeper level of tension is 
brought about by the harmonic undercutting by the submediant in place of the expected 
tonic. The contrapuntal motion of the deceptive move draws the pianist’s hands and arms 
inward, perhaps giving the appearance of self-embrace at this poignant moment. 
Beethoven adds emphasis to the affective quality of the progression by setting it with a 
fermata, permitting both the listener and pianist an extra moment to feel the expressed 
affect.  
 The bodily tension of the inward-moving hands is found earlier in Beethoven, in 
the composer’s Piano Sonata in C Minor (Pathétique), Op. 13 (Example 3.4). The first 
movement begins by placing the hands and arms of the pianist in a slightly awkward 
position to the left of the body. Notice the fifth finger of the right hand on middle C. The 
hands are stretched open with the left hand spanning an octave (C2 – C3) and the right 
hand reaching a sixth (Eb3 – C4). The texture is thick and the register is ponderous, 
requiring seven fingers simultaneously to sound two tightly-stacked minor triads in the 
lower register. As the dark tones of this opening harmony evaporate, the texture thins and 
the hands expand the tonic triad outward (i6 – passing 6/4 – i), as if they were giving the 
piece room to breathe. This outward contrapuntal wedge, however, is soon undercut with 
the interruption of viio7/V on beat three. Kofi Agawu identifies this interruption as a mark 
of the sensibility found notably in C.P.E. Bach (1991: 42). The upward augmented fourth 
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leap of the bass (C3 to F#3) is a particularly jarring reversal of affect; as the bass descends 
downward from 3̂, it is given only a sixteenth of a beat to sound 1̂ before being yanked 
upward by a tritone. The fully-diminished seventh chord that it supports resolves to its 
prescribed resolution of V on beat four, yet a sense of tension persists. 
 
Example 3.4. Beethoven, Piano Sonata in C Minor, Op. 13, i, m. 1 
(Vienna: Universal edition, ed. Heinrich Schenker, 1918-21) 
 
This discomfort is not only heard in the prolonged instability of V, but it is also felt in the 
body of the pianist, whose hands have come together at the center of the body. The 
dominant triad is voiced as snugly as possible with G3 – B3 – D4 fingered 1 in the left 
hand and 1, 3 in the right hand, respectively. In this position, the arms of the pianist are 
drawn uncomfortably together with the elbows perhaps touching the sides of the body 
and muscle tension felt in the raised shoulders. These movements together create an 
unsettling self-embrace that is felt by the performer and parallels the unsettling feeling 





 Having discussed both the connection between imagined movement and its 
relationship to performance movement, we are ready to conclude the analysis of the first 
movement of Op. 101. We recall that the yearning and yielding are manifest in the 
contrapuntal wedge and in the outward and inward performative gestures that create a 
back-and-forth between tension and relaxation. The ascending Urlinie of the background 
described by Neumeyer (1987: 300-01) is reified in the foreground as the upward 
melodic ascent in mm. 101-02. Hatten notes the poignancy of this upward gesture with its 
galant-style delayed resolution of the leading tone to beat two of the movement’s final 
measure (1994: 103). This is where Schachter’s observation of the inconclusiveness of 
the ascending Urlinie becomes apparent. Schachter writes: 
These readings [provided by Neumeyer] contain upper-voice 
structures that would normally characterize sections rather 
than whole compositions. After all, one can all encounter 
pieces with “incomplete” Urlinien (notably 5̂ – 4̂ – 3̂) or 
pieces that end on V instead of I (also with incomplete 
Urlinien, ending on 2̂). (1996: 339) 
If the ascending Urlinie is incomplete, it is fitting, then, that it is found in the first 
movement of this thematically-integrated sonata cycle. In this way, the true structural 
closure of the descending line that Schenker and Schachter require is deferred. We leave 
the agent with a sense of hope, although its ultimate desire is still unfulfilled. 
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 The final melodic ascent of the movement (mm. 101-02) is a reiteration of the 
Urlinie that previously closed the recapitulation; therefore, it can be seen as possessing 
those same expressive qualities. The affect of this final rising gesture is one of yearning 
or reaching upward, an observation made explicit by Hatten (1994: 57). We can imagine 
a virtual observing agent extending its arms outward and upward with each rise of the 
structural line. The effort of the striving gesture is apparent in the retardation of the 
leading tone in the final measure. This is not the rocket gesture (Agawu 1991: 30), 
infused with an abundant energy that propels it rapidly upward. Rather, this ascent is 
earned in each ascending step as it moves toward transcendence. 
 The contrapuntal expansion that concludes the movement marks the point of 
greatest textural breadth. Here, the affect of striving experienced by the virtual observing 
agent is felt in the pianist’s reaching performance gesture, as the hands and arms extend 
outward from the body. The highest and lowest voices are separated by a five-octave span 
(A1 to A6) while four octaves of negative space are situated in between (A2 to A5). The 
outward extension of the hands is a clear realization of the reaching gesture associated 
with the yearning expressed in the work. 
Although the direction of the pianist’s reach is different from that of the virtual 
observing agent, the effect (and the affect) are the same. With the hands separated to 
registral extremes, the performance gesture is also focused outward from the body. 
Together, we find that the expanding counterpoint of the Ursatz and Urlinie is realized in 






Observing from Multiple Perspectives 
 To this point, we have explored virtual objects within the diegesis that are 
observed by the virtual observing agent from a single perspective. For instance, in 
Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 6, we recall that the virtual agent was in a 
distinctly observational role, rendering it a virtual observing agent per our definition. This 
virtual observing agent performed visual tracking gestures as though it were following 
the movement of a physical object rising away from it and falling into the distance. I said 
that although the marked melodic contour occurred numerous times throughout duration 
of the piece, these gestural reiterations and fragmentations were thematic transformations. 
In other words, the temporal pacing of the actual piece did not necessarily align with the 
temporal pacing of its representation. We could imagine the piece depicting the gazing 
gesture as though an agent were performing it with the music in the first two measures, 
but I suggested that the presence of the gesture later in the work was for emphasis of 
affect and thematic continuity. Yet despite the variations that the gesture was subject to, 
its singular identity remained the same. This led us to reason that the piece represented an 
agent gazing at a virtual object from a single perspective. 
 The idea of an agent taking on a single perspective within a work is appealing to 
an embodied theory of musical agency, because it suggests the persistence of the single 
subjectivity of a unified agent. Just as a photograph captures the vision of the 
photographer from a particular perspective, the Prelude in B Minor represents the virtual 
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observing agent viewing the diegesis, namely the virtual object, from a similarly fixed 
position. We understand that the listener experiences the music through the “eye” of the 
virtual observing agent in the same way that the image captured by a photograph is that 
seen by the photographer peering through the lens of the camera. 
The analogy that likens the virtual observing agent to the photographer and 
camera lens can be seen by looking at Ansel Adams’s Redwoods, Bull Creek Flat, 
California (1960). This work by the famed American photographer presents an image of 
the towering flora in California’s Humboldt Redwoods State Park. The photograph offers 
the viewer a single perspective from a camera (and likely Adams’s own eyes) positioned 
a few meters from the tree line. The image captures the viewer, bringing her into the 
diegetic space constructed by the photograph. We view the image of the redwoods as 
though we were present in the forest where the camera snapped them. The virtual 
observing agent functions similarly. It brings the real audience into the virtual, diegetic 
space represented by the work. The listener projects herself into the diegetic space as an 
observing agent in the same way that the viewer of Adams’s photo embodies the 
photographer’s perspective and becomes present in the California forest. 
 
One Object, Multiple Perspectives  
Let us imagine that on the very same day that Adams captured this image of the 
redwoods, he also snapped a photo of these trees but from different angles. Suppose, 
further, that Adams published this in a collection under the same title. Would these 
photos, taken from multiple perspectives, compromise the existence of a single, unitary 
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agent, or would it splinter the subjectivity? Mostly likely, the single subjectivity would be 
preserved across the various images. Consider, in this regard, the triptych Three Studies 
of Lucian Freud (Example 3.5) by British painter Francis Bacon. In this work, the artist 
presents his subject from three contrasting visual perspectives. The unique geometry of 
the framing lines surrounding each of the three images establishes the diegetic space as 
consistent for the seated figure; this in turn helps orient the viewer to the virtual 
observing agent’s perspective within the diegesis. Interestingly, each vantage point also 
seems to provide a distinct figurative perspective. Bacon modifies the color of the left 
shoe in the second frame and paints the chair with a darker shade in the third. Ernst van 
Alphen (1992) describes the work: 
In the left-hand panel the figure is seen at some distance 
[depth] from the left edge of the canvas, while in the other 
two panels the figure is placed slightly away from the right 
side. In the right-hand panel the external focalizer is further 
away from the figure than in the other two panels. (42) 
Alphen’s account of the triptych interestingly acknowledges both the virtual object (“the 
figure”) and the virtual observing agent (“the focalizer”). Within the diegetic space of the 
work, the virtual object remains in a generally fixed position while, as the title suggests, 





Example 3.5. Francis Bacon, Three Studies of Lucian Freud (1969), original in color 
 
A number of factors suggest that a single observing agent is preserved through the 
three panels, despite the three differing perspectives. Recall that in Chapter 1 we drew on 
Leonard B. Meyer’s (1973: 44-79) conditions for conformance in order to explain how 
multiple musical ideas can join to form a single agency. These conditions of perceived 
conformance (Figure 1.1) are applicable here by analogy. Bacon’s simultaneous 
presentation of the same subject, sitting in the same position, and against the same 
backdrop, are the most obvious contributing factors to a cohesive subjectivity. This is 
further supported by the consistency of color scheme, canvas size, and medium. By 
preserving a number of similarities among the three images, Bacon preserves both the 
identity of the virtual object and unifies the three visual perspectives into the single 




In Chapter 1, I mentioned the slow fourth movement from Schumann’s 
Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major (Rhenish) in order to note that virtual objects can also be 
stationary (Example 1.5). This work represents the massive cathedral at Cologne, yet it is 
not representative of the structure directly. The melody, the harmony, and the timbre of 
the brass do not paint a musical image of the grandiose structure, the biblical mosaics in 
the stained glass, and the pointed steeple directly. Instead, the music replicates the 
physical motions that one enacts when encountering this cathedral. With this, we infer the 
presence of a virtual observing agent who lifts its head and eyes to take in visually the 
enormous structure. In listening to the music, we hear the melodic ascent as the upward 
motion of the head and eyes as it traces the building upward, perhaps pausing 
momentarily to examine the stained glass and interlocking stones on their way to the 
spire. These (deictic, indexical) observing gestures further combine with topical markers 
such as the solemnity of the slow tempo and the regal timbre to further characterize the 
indexical gesture. This chordal brass texture is a token of the bound style and all the 
religious allusions that come packaged with it. Together, these express the reverence that 
the observer experiences when encountering this sacred stone monolith. 
Because music is evanescent and unfolds through time, it has some difficulty 
representing lifeless materiality. Following the suggestion of Charles O. Nussbaum 
(2007: 231), I hold that the musical representation of the cathedral is mediated through 





We may not be able to learn just from listening that the 
fourth movement of Schumann’s Rhenish Symphony 
(marked “Feierlich,” meaning “with solemn ceremony”) 
was intended by the composer to represent the great 
cathedral at Cologne. But we do understand that whatever it 
represents is something vast, massive, and structurally 
intricate, with interlocking elements that demand repeated 
crisscrossing explorations. (231) 
“How do we understand this?” Nussbaum (231) asks while providing his own answer: 
Certain bodily movement, eye movements, head 
movements, and slow walks round are required to take in 
such a structure. (231) 
 Not only is Schumann’s depiction of the cathedral mediated through the eyes of a 
virtual observing agent, the composer provides us with what I would consider an 
immersive experience. Nussbaum holds that the Schumann takes us on a tour of the 
building, portraying it to the listening “observer” from numerous points of view. Our 
view is drawn around the structure in much the same way as a sculpture invites us to 
observe from multiple perspectives. Jean Cocteau notes that “[s]culpture [...] obliges us to 
move round it” (1921: 12). Cone also recognizes the observer, writing that “an observing 
persona may be thought of as walking around a free-standing statue, so as to see all sides 
of it” (1974: 3).  The true experience of this three-dimensional work comes in observing 
it from many vantage points. It is not enough to see the cathedral from the front; to more 
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fully appreciate it, one must travel around it, observing each detail and taking time to 
reflect on its majesty. 
  
Multiple Perspectives as Expressive Doubling 
 The notion that one may take multiple perspectives of the same musical subject 
has received attention from Lawrence Kramer in his article “Expressive Doubling: 
Beethoven’s Two-Movement Piano Sonatas and Romantic Literature” (1988). In it, he 
addresses four of Beethoven’s formally peculiar piano sonatas—Op. 54 in F Major, Op. 
78 in F-sharp Major, Op. 90 in E Minor, and 111 in C Minor. Kramer contends that 
works in the two-movement form permit “expressive doubling,” which he goes on to 
describe as “the configuration that results when a literary or musical work repeats the 
same basic pattern—whether of imagery, rhetoric, texture, or design—in contrastive 
versions” (176). Kramer later tightens up this description of the expressive doubling, 
describing it as “a form of repetition in which alternative versions of the same pattern 
define a cardinal difference in perspective” (1990: 22). In presenting the same basic 
material in two different forms, the composer provides the listener with two viewpoints 
of a single idea.  
 Kramer illustrates this in his study of the two movements of Beethoven’s Piano 
Sonata in F-sharp Major, Op. 78. He identifies the primary key and the dotted rhythmic 
figure as the single idea that binds the movements (1990: 37ff). These characteristics are 
seen in the incipits presented in Example 3.6. In drawing attention to these similarities, 
Kramer shows that the two movements are part of the same musical discourse, which 
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draws their unique features into direct contrast with one another. The first movement 
paints an idyllic scene with slow, tuneful (adagio cantabile) melodies and consonant 
harmonies. Kramer further writes that this opening movement is “expansive,” noting that 
both major sections have repeats (40). The second movement presents a contrast, with its 
aggression and instability. It opens unapologetically with immediate force (forte) and 
with the abrupt dissonance of an Italian augmented sixth chord. In comparing the two, we 
see the “cardinal difference in perspective” that Kramer describes (20). On the same tonal 
canvas (F-sharp Major), Beethoven presents two contrasting perspectives of the same 
dotted rhythmic idea. 
 
  
Example 3.6. Beethoven, Piano Sonata in F-sharp Major, Op. 78, 




 If we understand the rhythmic motive common to both movements of 
Beethoven’s Op. 78 as a musical “object,” then it is not a large conceptual leap to 
understand its extra-musical representation as a virtual object like the cathedral at 
Cologne that is represented in Schumann’s Rhenish. We hear the many ascents of the 
opening theme as the many curious upward gazes that an observer takes when observing 
the cathedral. The layering of this melody, its transfer to various instruments, and its 
resetting in the dominant represent distinct perspectives on the same subject. This is akin 





Multiple Perspectives in Debussy, La cathédrale engloutie, Préludes, Book I, no. 10 
 Multiple perspectives are taken by a virtual observing agent in another work about 
a cathedral—La cathédrale engloutie. For this work, Debussy draws on the myth of the 
Cathedral at Ys that belonged to a kingdom existing off the Brittany coast. According to 
legend, the principality and its cathedral lay below sea level while under the protection of 
a natural levee. Entry into Ys was possible only through a single locked gate whose key 
was held by the king. It is said that through deception, the key was stolen and turned over 
to an evil being—Satan, in some tellings of the story—who opened the gate during high 
tide. With the water rushing in at an incredible rate, Ys and its inhabitants were 
swallowed by the sea. Debussy’s La cathédrale engloutie (Example 3.7) illustrates the 
epilogue to the story, which holds that the cathedral of the sunken Ys periodically 













Example 3.7. Debussy, La cathédrale engloutie, mm. 31-51 
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Example 3.7. Debussy, La cathédrale engloutie, mm. 52-71 
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Debussy depicts the Cathedral of Ys from two distinct perspectives by employing 
the technique of expressive doubling. He presents the same musical content and its 
associated representation (i.e., the cathedral) in two forms. The effect is of offering the 
listener two distinct perspectives of the same subject. Although Kramer (1990: 20) 
suggests that in Beethoven’s Op. 78 this “cardinal change of perspective” is figurative, 
the perspective of our virtual observing agent in the Debussy Prélude can be understood 
more literally. Because the music represents the Cathedral of Ys as seen through the eyes 
of a virtual observing agent, changes in perspective are not just limited to differences in 
conceptualization or opinion. The presence of a virtual observing agent allows a change 
in the virtual location of the observer within the diegetic space represented by the work. 
Just as the virtual observing agent walked around the cathedral at Cologne in Schumann’s 
Symphony No. 3, Debussy is able to posit an agent who observes the Cathedral of Ys 
from multiple spatial locations. 
 The work opens with two harmonies that approach the outer edges of the 
keyboard; these are constructed as G1 – D1 – G2 and D6 – G6 – D7. The open fifths create 
a temporal distance as they recall the dyadic harmony of medieval parallel organum. The 
right-hand chord even sounds the harmonics one would hear across the empty space of 
the middle octaves. With this, we already receive a hint of the titular cathedral. Daniel 
Ericourt writes, “The first section of the piece (bars 1-15) may be taken to represent the 
early morning sea mists enshrouding the cathedral” (1978: 51). Debussy directs the 
pianist to perform with a profound sense of calmness (Profondément calme) at a very soft 
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dynamic (pp). With even more description, the composer writes, “Dans une brume 
doucement sonore” (In a softly sounding mist), an articulation of the haze that sits atop 
the waters of the Brittany coast of northern France. A pentatonic ascent of parallel fifths 
in the key of G begin to take shape from within the haze. Debussy sets these as inner 
voices. This allows the ambient cloud to persist throughout the measure, hinting at the 
cathedral’s emergence from out of the mist. We might hear the consecutives fifths, 
although soft, as stone pillars that catch our sight. Ericourt continues, describing “the rest 
of the piece [projects the cathedral’s] appearance (second section, bars 16-46), and 
eventual succumbing to the sea (third section, bars 47-89)” (1978: 51). Figure 3.3 depicts 
the tripartite form of the work as described by Ericourt. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Formal layout of La cathédrale engloutie according to Ericourt (1978) 
 
 The cathedral begins to emerge from the fog in m. 16, where Debussy writes, 
“Peu à peu sortant de la brume” (Little by little out of the mist). We paint in our minds 
the scene with fog rolling through a vast landscape from which an old cathedral emerges. 
Monet’s Houses of Parliament series, which depicts the home of the British legislature on 
the Thames, might come to mind. The image of the cathedral is a sort of Celtic pastorale 
to which Debussy adds a touch of grandeur and mythic fantasy. One might even recall 
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Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog, the iconic depiction of a 
pensive man, standing on a rock above the sea; he casts his gaze outward onto the water 
and toward the mountains that peek out from the mist. As part of the landscape, the 
Cathedral at Ys naturally suggests an observer, and its emergence from the mist is a sight 
that is easily constructed in the mind of the listener. The right hand performs ascending 
and descending chordal structures that are imitative of the observing gestures of a virtual 
agent as it captures the sight of the cathedral. The observer’s eyes move up and down the 
walls of the cathedral in mm. 16-17. 
 Interestingly, the observing gesture is not represented by a single melodic line, as 
we have seen previously. Debussy’s employment of planing, as in mm. 28-40, represents 
a broader vision that includes the periphery of the observer’s sight. Yet the melodic effect 
is not lost. John Clevenger holds that this triadic parallelism belongs to the melodic 
domain and describes planing as a thickening of the melodic line (2002: 67). To 
understand this, we can compare the thin stroke of a pencil to the wide stroke of a paint 
roller. Rather than writing with a narrow melodic line, Debussy uses planing to musically 
paint the image with a broad brush. In doing so, the observing agent looks past the minute 
details of the cathedral, and instead visually takes it in on a larger scale.  
 The virtual observing agent’s perspective of the cathedral begins to change as it 
sinks back into the ocean. Debussy creates the effect of bubbling water in with a low-
register major second (F#1 – G#1) in mm 68-70. The effervescence intensifies as the dyad 
oscillates in m. 71. A more fleshed-out syncopated accompaniment in the same low 
register begins in the following measure. The score indicates “Flottant et sourd” (floating 
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and mute), suggesting the projection of the near silence that one would hear when 
observing the cathedral from beneath the surface of the water. With the section marked 
pianissimo and composed with a bubbling accompaniment, the music is felt in the body 
just as much as it is heard in the ear. The observing gesture that viewed the cathedral in 
mm. 28-41 is transposed down octave to further indicate the underwater perspective of 
the now-engulfed cathedral.  
 All told, the virtual observing agent looks upon the cathedral from two 
perspectives that generally correspond to the formal delineations made by Ericourt 
(1978). Debussy uses mm. 1-15 to create an atmosphere, defining the environment of the 
diegesis as mythic and spacious. The middle section (mm. 16-46) portrays the cathedral 
emerging from the mist and coming into focus for the virtual observing agent, whose 
eyes trace the walls of the monumental virtual object. The cathedrals descends into the 
sea in mm. 47-84, while the virtual agent observes from an underwater perspective. 
Debussy adds to this effect by indicating in m. 72 that it should sound “like an echo” 
(Comme un echo). Because the identity of the cathedral is tied to its final resting point, it 
is necessary to depict it musically from beneath the surface. The final measures (mm. 84-
89), marked “Dans la sonorité du début” (In the sonority of the beginning), are a terse 
recollection of the beginning. It is as if the virtual observing agent were reflecting on its 





 We have moved beyond the simple gazing gesture in this chapter and have 
explored gestures that suggest both a yearning virtual agent and an agent viewing a 
virtual object from multiple perspectives. In studying yearning, we have seen that 
reaching gestures of the virtual observing agent can be reinforced by performance 
gestures of a similar nature. This corporeality has led us to further attend to the affective 
content associated with these indexical gestures, providing us a point of entry into the 
role of emotion in Chapter 4. The examination of virtual observation from multiple 
perspectives has allowed us to unify various indexical gestures within a single agency 
and has revealed the intricacy of a virtual object. This, too, leads into the next chapter, 





VIRTUAL OBSERVING AGENCY, EMOTION, AND NARRATIVE 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter further examines the virtual observing agent and its relationship to 
emotion and narrative. It is a logical extension of the previous chapters because, as 
discussed below, there exists an intimate relationship among human expression, human 
movement, and human emotion. Because indexical gestures receive their individuation 
from the indexed objects or agents, a study of emotional transmission across this gap is 
warranted. The unfolding or development of emotions leads to an examination of 
narrative, specifically the observational and perspectival nature of a narrating agent. 
 I begin this chapter by drawing together research in human movement and human 
emotion. I then explore a typology of emotional distance that disentangles sympathy and 
empathy, which leads to a study of the virtual observing agent’s capacity to participate as 
a narrator. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the second movement of Berlioz’s 
Harold in Italy in which I speculate about the protagonist’s emotional experience while 
acting as an observer to the pilgrim’s procession. 
 
From Motion to Emotion 
 The ability of music to arouse emotions in the listener is for many the primary 
reason for engaging in the listening experience. In the previous chapter, we have 
examined the inseparable, intermodal relationship between music and human bodily 
 
142 
motion. We have observed that these two aspects of the listening experience are so tightly 
bound together that listeners conceptualize music primarily through embodied metaphors. 
Lawrence Zbikowski (1997), for instance, postulates that a pitch is described as “high” 
because such a pitch resonates high in the head when singing while a low pitch resonates 
lower in the body, specifically in the chest (202-03). Similarly, a listener may describe a 
tempo as “quick” because quick bodily motions are required to produce the rapid rhythms 
that comprise it. The use of spatial and physical metaphors is not unique to music; this 
embodied mode of conceptualization is also used with respect to emotions. Consider the 
language used in the following sentences: 
1) John has been feeling down since he lost his job. 
2) The uncertainty of the situation had me feeling tense. 
3) After completing her project, she felt a weight lifted off her 
shoulders. 
The use of “down” to describe the emotional state in (1) is not arbitrary. Feelings of 
sadness are often accompanied by a lowering of both facial muscles and physical 
position. The frown is the most iconic image of sadness, mimicking the turned down 
corners of the mouth in opposition to the smile. We may also lower our bodies in times of 
sadness, placing our head in our hands to weep, or even descending to our knees when 
overcome by sorrow. Similarly, the use of “tense” in (2) captures the muscle action of 
anxiety. Close games are described as “nail-biters,” reflecting the tension of the jaw 
muscles as they engage in nervous behavior. In (3), “weight” is used to describe an 
undesirable burden on an individual that is relieved after a significant task has been 
 
143 
completed. Although often understood as metaphorical, an individual’s bodily 
comportment may actually reflect the encumbrance caused by an actual weight. A large 
project that is tiring might cause us to move slowing with lowered heads and shoulders. 
Upon completing the project, we feel energized and stand more erect, as though a real 
weight has been lifted off our shoulders. In these examples, we see that our conception of 
emotional states is intimately tied to the bodily movements and postures that these 
emotions induce. Thus, the jump from human motion to emotion is not simply a creative 
linguistic trope; rather, it is demonstrative of an important link between body and feeling.  
 The first step toward uncovering the way in which a piece of music evokes a 
specific emotion or complex of emotions comes from understanding the nature of 
emotion. The analysis of this subject has a long and rich history. Plato wrote about 
spiritual love in Symposium; Aristotle developed strategies for influencing the emotions 
in Rhetoric; Aquinas disentangled passions and intellect in his Summa Theologica; and 
Descartes reduced all affective experience to a few basic emotional states. Philosophies 
in this vein use the human soul as a platform for emotional experience. They hold that 
emotions develop within the incorporeal soul, enter into our conscious experience, and 
manifest as a bodily response. 
 More modern theories of emotions, however, have viewed the body as 
fundamental to the emotional experience, not merely a consequent of it. William James 
(1884) famously writes, 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract 
from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily 
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symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-
stuff” out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that 
a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that 
remains. (193) 
James further emphasizes the importance of the body to the emotional process by 
claiming that bodily response is actually the impetus for emotion, occurring before the 
emotional experience proper. He emphasizes that 
the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as 
they occur IS the emotion. (189, italics and capitalization in 
original) 
If we apply this theory to our experience while watching a horror film, it would have us 
seeing a ghastly sight, impulsively jumping and screaming, and only then feeling scared 
as a result of the brain interpreting our somatic reactions. For James, the emotion proper 
lies in the recognition of the physiological response.  
 An experiment by James D. Laird (1974) supports this theory and what is called 
the facial feedback hypothesis. In the study, Laird had a group of subjects manipulate the 
muscles in their faces to produce smiles while having them evaluate the funniness of a 
series of cartoons. To prevent influencing their reactions, Laird avoided emotionally 
charged words such as “smile” and operated under a cover—he attached electrodes to the 
faces of the subjects, asked them to tense and relax facial muscles one by one, and led 
them to believe that he was testing the electrical impulses associated with these 
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movements. Although misdirected by this cover story, subjects reported that they found 
the cartoons funnier when their own faces resembled smiles, thereby providing evidence 
to support James’s theory that bodily response precedes and induces emotional 
experience.  
 
Music and Emotion: A Physical Experience 
 Joseph LeDoux describes the process by which stimuli induce emotional 
responses in mammals in The Emotional Brain (1996). Writing from the perspective of a 
neuropsychologist, LeDoux discusses the brain and central nervous system activities 
involved in emotional and physiological responses. His model (1995: 223-24) recognizes 
the important roles of the thalamus, amygdala, and cortex. Summarized generally, the 
thalamus receives stimuli information directly from (most) sensory organs. It offers this 
information a minimal degree of evaluation before passing it to the amygdala. If 
warranted, the amygdala sends a signal to evoke the appropriate physiological response 
(e.g., recoil, jump, abdominal tension). But LeDoux holds that the sensory information 
received by the thalamus is also copied to the cortex, where it undergoes a slower process 
of greater scrutiny. Now vetted, this information is sent to the amygdala and onward to 
enact the appropriate physiological response. 
 Consider this process when listening to the second movement of Haydn’s 
Symphony No. 94 (Surprise Symphony) shown in Example 4.1. The movement begins 
with an innocuous staccato melody in the strings that evokes a sense of tranquility 
through its simplicity and lightness. In approaching the half cadence in m. 8, Haydn 
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employs a secondary dominant (V/V) that emphasizes the primary dominant to which it 
resolves, while creating the expectation of a consequent phrase with an equally calm 
demeanor. This balance of form begins in m. 9 with the initiation of the same melodic 
and harmonic material, but in an even more subdued manner; the dynamic marking of 
pianissimo in m. 9 further reduces the intensity of the already-soft (piano) opening that is 
mm. 1-8. Having the strings play pizzicato and removing the second violin from the 
melody in mm. 9-16 also offers the melody a greater sense of lightness and buoyancy. As 
in the first eight-measure phrase, the melody once again proceeds to a half cadence 
emphasized by a secondary dominant in the penultimate measure. However, emblematic 
of his trademark musical humor, Haydn immediately follows the half cadence of m. 16 
with the full ensemble repeating the dominant, fortissimo. Listeners unfamiliar with this 
piece (and many familiar with it, too) often jump reflexively at the startlingly loud sound 
that upsets the expectation of relaxation and breath so tastefully and delicately set up in 
m. 8. It is the heightened feeling of ease and tranquility of the consequent phrase that 
provides contrastive valence to make the fortissimo on beat two of m. 16 so jolting.1 
                                                 
1 David Huron describes the amplification of emotional response associated with surprise as “contrastive 
valence” (2006: 21-25, 412). 
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Example 4.1. Haydn, Symphony No. 94 (Surprise Symphony), ii, mm. 1-16   
 
The way in which Haydn’s Surprise Symphony elicits an emotional response in 
the listener, however, is rather atypical. Whereas the above passage from the symphony 
induces an unexpected knee-jerk reaction that is below the level of consciousness, most 
other affective expressions in music are less charged. In fact, one might even argue that 
the jarring G chord in the symphony could just as easily been accomplished by a well-
timed slammed door at the rear of the concert hall, and thus classify the gesture as a 
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frivolous and novel “effect” that is not properly musical. Most music draws us in and 
persuades us to experience an emotion in a more casual way than the brutish tutti of the 
symphony, which forces us to engage by instilling a genuine, even if only momentary, 
fear within us. 
How, then, does music express emotion without the ability to smile or present a 
physical threat to our well-being? Aaron Ridley (1995: 75-76) proposes that musical 
shapes—complexes of pitch, dynamics, rhythm, articulation, timbre, harmony—resemble 
inflections of the human voice in a meaningful way. Drawing the two together, he 
describes these emotionally-charged musical contours as melismas. Ridley holds that in 
listening to music, we imitate these melismas off-line without visible action. In other 
words, listeners “perform” melismas in the brain, although these may not become overt 
physical movements. This, of course, aligns with the mimetic motor imagery described in 
Arnie Cox’s “mimetic hypothesis” (2001, 2011). 
We see an example of this physical empathy in the opening two-note gestures of 
“Lacrimosa” from Mozart’s Requiem (Example 4.2). These measures are a well-known 
expression of sorrow, even when removed from the texted lamentation that follows. 
Focusing on the first violin, we can understand the eighth rest on each beat as a quick, 
sobbing breath followed immediately by wail of grief, with each dyad moving from 
tension to resolution. According to the mimetic hypothesis and Ridley’s understanding of 
melismas, the engaged listener experiences an associated emotion, perhaps sorrow, 
because he or she enacts the breathing and vocal gestures in the mind, engaging many of 
the same neural patterns as would the same physical action. Whereas the Surprise 
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Symphony induces an emotion through reaction, listeners most often feel emotion through 
physical and emotional empathy with the perceived emotional expression, in this case the 
analogous human expression of the first violins. 
 
Example 4.2. Mozart, Requiem, “Lacrimosa,” mm. 1-2 
 
Music and Emotion: A Cognitive Experience 
To this point, we have focused primarily on the way in which musical meaning 
and emotion are conveyed through the intermodal conceptualization of musical gestures 
as physical human gestures, and through the neural imitation of these gestures. But solely 
taking this approach overlooks a large body of research into learned musical associations. 
One such example is the minor mode, which is marked for tragic affect in the Classical 
style (Hatten 1994: 36-38). Listeners hear sadness in pieces that are in minor because the 
convention of the style has so firmly solidified the association between the two that it is 
nearly inescapable. Of course, it is possible to see the gestural motivation behind this 
assimilation of music and emotion; the lowered third, sixth, and seventh scale degrees are 
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metaphorically lower in the emotional spectrum. Other conventional musical signs have 
no connection at all between physical gesture and their associated emotional meaning.  
In the seminal book on topic theory Classic Music: Expression, Form and Style 
(1980: 21), Leonard Ratner identifies the pedal point as an indicator of a pastoral musical 
setting because it is imitative—that is, it is a Peircean icon—of the musette or bagpipe 
drone associated with rustic, idyllic music. The serenity and naïveté that it evokes are not 
(necessarily) achieved by imagining the gestures of the droning bagpiper; instead, these 
expressive states are experienced through the recognition of a conventional association 
that binds pedal point and an idealized idyllic setting.2 
 The emotional reactions evoked by these types of learned associates are 
fundamentally different from those triggered by the unexpected fortissimo entrance in 
Haydn’s Surprise Symphony or the sobs of Mozart’s Requiem. For example, the C minor 
harmony at the beginning of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in C minor, Op. 13 (Sonata 
Pathétique), depicted in Example 3.4. The listener does not have a reaction to an affective 
appraisal of a stimulus that induces an autonomic bodily reaction that the mind reads as, 
say, tragic passion. Certainly, the fortepiano dynamic marking and the low register cause 
an unconscious affective appraisal that may cause us to react physically, perhaps with 
muscle tension causing a slight jump, but it does not evoke, in itself, everything that is 
bound up in tragic passion. Such an emotional state is the result of classical conditioning 
                                                 
2  In Peircean terms, a pedal point in a pastoral piano sonata is an icon of the bagpipe drone because it 
sounds like (imitates) the pastoral bagpipe. The drone is a symbol of a pastoral setting on account of 
convention; the bagpipe (or a similar droning instrument) is commonly found in art and literature that 
depicts an idealized pastoral setting. 
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through stylistic convention; it comes from the stylistic semantic content within the 
sonority. The C minor harmony indicates a negative emotional state because of stylistic 
associations of the minor mode and our expectation that the first harmony of the piece 
will be the tonic which indicates the mode.  The dense textural layering of the chord in 
the lower register is also a conventional sign of darkness or dread. Because these affective 
states are not the result of a pre-cognitive affective appraisal of a stimulus, they are not 
emotions in the proper sense of the word. Instead they are proclivities toward true 
emotions that we might think of as affective tendencies.  
 Psychologists have described these affective tendencies as moods. Unlike 
emotions, moods are not typically induced by pre-cognitive affective appraisal. 
Furthermore, they are often less acute (Lazarus 1991), more lasting (Ekman 1994), and 
less narrowly directed (Frijda 1994). The tragic affect of the C minor tonality of 
Beethoven’s Sonata Pathétique may be expressive of an emotion, but in a proper sense, it 
can only cause us to experience a mood. When we then hear the gestural shapes within 
the music—the melodic contour, rhythmic patterns, and dynamic figures—we imagine 
our bodies performing these gestures, perhaps even enacting the associated breathing and 
slight muscular patterns. With the mood having lowered the threshold toward a negative 
emotion (e.g., tragic passion), we are more likely to actually experience this emotion as 





Modes of Emotional Engagement 
In describing the emotion that we hear in music, we are necessarily giving music 
agency. Because a non-sentient entity lacks the capacity for expression, hearing any 
emotion in music implies that we conceptualize the work as having the ability to reason 
and emote. Neural and physical mimesis permits a listener to conceptualize the 
expressive content of a work and co-experience that expression. More accurately, the 
listener anthropomorphizes the music, inferring its sentience, and then ascribes the 
perceived emotions to the work (or a particular passage within it.) Theorists have collated 
these emotions and have conceptualized them as expressed by an agency (Hatten 2004, 
Monahan 2013) or persona (Cone 1974, Robinson 2005) that exists within the work. One, 
then, can say that a sad passage is sad because it—the agent or persona ascribed to the 
music—expresses a sadness that is identifiable by the listener. Such an assertion, 
however, requires an asterisk to address the questions that it undoubtedly raises. What if 
the listener lacks the ability to understand the emotions? What if the listener inhibits the 
experience of the supposed “expressed” emotion? What if the listener is disinterested? 
It is common for a listener to feel and embody the emotions expressed in a piece 
of music, yet it is not infrequent that he or she experiences emotions that are disengaged, 
idiosyncratic, reactive, or orthogonal to those expressed. Aaron Copland notes in his 
audience primer, What to Listen for in Music (1939 [1957]: 9-19), that a piece can exist 
on one of three musical planes, depending on the type of engagement chosen by the 
listener or afforded by the situation. One might situate Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata in 
the background of consciousness at dinner, in the foreground of appreciation at a recital, 
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and under the close critical scrutiny of analysis in the classroom. Furthermore, a listener 
may also experience an emotion that is incongruent with the one expressed, as might be 
the case when one hears something objectionable. For example, the Nazi anthem, 
Horst-Wessel-Lied, is triumphant in rhythm and lyrics, yet it conjures understandably 
negative emotions in many Western listeners. It is necessary, then, for a theory of musical 
emotion to address only valid emotional experiences expressed by the music through the 
embodiment of a virtual agency or persona staged within the music. Although this 
distinction may seem artificial and inappropriately contrived, it follows the methods by 
which validity is circumscribed in other theories of musical interpretation that strive for 
intersubjectivity. Robert Hatten identifies “aesthetically warranted emotion (AWE) [as] 
those real, measurable emotions which are directly motivated by stylistically competent 
interactions with […] those musical discourses that involve the intentionally conceived 
presentation, development and interaction of expressive states” (2010: 83). Such a 
definition removes overtly solipsistic interpretations and instead aims to endow a 
prototypical listener with the requisite sensibilities for meaningful engagement. 
The presence of two sentient beings is necessary for there to be any type of 
emotional engagement in music. On one end lies the diegetic agency that expresses the 
emotions ascribed to the piece. This can take on a number of forms: composer, narrator, 
interpreting conductor, performer, virtual gesturing agent, and virtual observing agent. 
On the other end lies the agency that is external to the work. Although often described as 
a real listener, this non-diegetic agent is better understood as an abstraction of a 
collective subjectivity borne out of a general agreement among many listeners. This 
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collective subjectivity may take into account specific listeners (e.g., critics, analysts, and 
notable musicians), audiences contemporary with the composer, scholars, relevant social 
and cultural reception histories, or a mixture or subset of these.  
The relationship between internal and external agencies is fundamental to 
characterizing the emotional experience. I describe this relationship between an internal 
sentient agent and an external sentient agent by delineating four modes of engaged 
emotional experience: simple cognitive recognition, empathy, sympathy, and divergent 
affection.  
1. Simple cognitive recognition occurs when we as listeners cognitively 
recognizes an emotion that another is experiencing, yet do not become 
emotionally invested ourselves. This often occurs when we are indifferent 
to the person or agent that is experiencing the emotion first hand. When 
greeted with a cheery smile by coworker on a Monday morning, we might 
recognize the exuberance but not have the energy or desire to engage with 
a corresponding emotion.  
2. Empathy means co-experiencing (feeling with) another’s emotion. When 
we see someone smiling, we may reflect the smile on our own face, which 
places us in a more positive mood. Upon observing the emotional 
expression of another, we have a congruent emotional experience, as if 
affected by the same emotional source or stimulus (Figure 4.1a). 
3. Sympathy is a mode of engagement that occurs when we observe the 
emotional expression but have a different emotional experience. Although 
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this expression is often in the same vein as that of the person we observe, 
it is not as if our own emotion is a direct emulation of the initial emotional 
source (Figure 4.1b).  For example, if we were to see a close friend 
sobbing after having lost her job, we would be likely to feel a similarly 
negative emotion, yet it probably would not bring us to tears. We might 
comfort the friend by saying, “I feel for you.” 3 Our own emotional 
experience is not nearly as palpable as hers, but it is generally in alignment 
with it.  
4. Divergent affection exists when our emotional experience is markedly 
incongruent with that of another. For example, if a coworker were to 
ecstatically tell us that she received the promotion that we were also up 
for, we might feel dejected because we envy that person. (Hopefully, we 
would know to enough to dampen this expression!). This mode of 
emotional expression is distinct from sympathy because the emotions are 
particularly divergent. 
                                                 
3 I draw the characterization of “feeling with” (empathy) versus “feeling for” (sympathy) from Robinson 








Figure 4.1. Transmission of Emotion: a) Empathy and b) Sympathy 
  
As mentioned, there is a degree of overlap in these emotional types. Cognitive 
recognition, for example, is necessary for us to partake in the other three affective modes. 
Our reactions of empathy (feeling with) and sympathy (feeling for) involve our cognitive 
recognition of the source emotion that is felt in another. It is by mentally identifying 
another’s emotional state that we are often able to feel the appropriate, corresponding 
empathetic or sympathetic emotion in our own bodies. Divergent emotional experiences 
also involve cognitive recognition, since they too are reactions to the initial emotional 
expression of another. For instance, we might identify the sadness felt by an antagonist 
while feeling a sense of happiness. It is also common for us to feel empathy and 
sympathy simultaneously, as often happens at a funeral. When a friend loses a parent, we 
express sympathy; our sadness is something that we feel for our friend. In this same 
situation, we may also experience empathy to the extent that we remember losing a 
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parent ourselves and feel grief with our friend. Thus, empathy involves a more direct 
embodiment of the emotional state of another, sympathy is more distant, and the 
divergent emotional experience is at an even further affective remove. 
 Neuroscientists Frederique de Vignemont and Tania Singer identify four 
necessary conditions for human empathy. They write that empathy exists if 
(i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to 
another person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by 
the observation or imagination of another person’s affective 
state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the source of 
one’s own affective state. (2006: 435) 
For example, if my significant other tells me that she has recently received a promotion, 
and this news elicits a genuine excitement within me, it is likely that I am empathizing 
with her. With reference to the conditions put forth by de Vignemont and Singer, the 
emotion that I feel [i] is the same [ii] as the one that I have witnessed [iii] my significant 
other  [iv] experience . By contrast, we can understand sympathy as an emotional reaction 
that does not meet the second condition. For example, consider the situation in which I 
see an undergraduate sitting in the hallway, nervously waiting to be called for her 
semester performance jury. Rather than beginning to shake and perspire myself, I offer a 
comforting smile and say, “You’ll do great.” Although I feel an emotion [i] at the sight 
[iii] of this student [iv], I do not co-experience [ii] her emotion. Instead, I view her 
expression of anxiety from an empathic distance that enables me to react with a different 
expression. The difference between the emotion observed and the one experienced is the 
 
158 
fundamental distinction. De Vignemont and Singer contend that the experience of 
empathy is modulated by four factors: the emotion itself (i.e., intensity, salience, and 
valence); the relationship between empathizer and target; the characteristics of the 
empathizer (i.e., gender, ability to understand, personal arousal tendencies); and the 
context of the situation (i.e., justification for emotion, interfering emotions) (2006: 437-
38). All of these factors influence the empathic distance between the emotion expressed 
by the target and the one experienced by the observer. 
   The empathic distance—the degree to which the emotions of the observer and 
the target differ—is essential to a theory of musical emotion because emotions that lie on 
the surface of the music are not always those experienced by the listening agent; more 
exactly, these are not always expressed by the primary agency within this work. As I 
alluded to above, a piece of music may contain a number of virtual agents arranged into a 
hierarchy. Seth Monahan (2013) outlines four agent classes: 1) analyst, 2) fictional 
composer 3) work-persona, and 4) individuated elements (327-33). These “can appear in 
an array of alternate guises and/or with a number of metaphorical overlays” that 
Monahan calls “avatars” (348). Avatars represent more specific embodiments of agency, 
such the emotions of a programmatic character, the intentions of the composer, and the 
actions of a particular instrument part (347-53).4 Monahan recognizes that it is not 
uncommon for listeners to shift their attention from one agent class to the next (221-22). 
We might describe the yearning expressed by Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in A major, Op. 
                                                 
4 Although an avatar (e.g., “the pianist”) may have a real-world counterpart (e.g., Murray Perahia) the 
focus of any non-empirical analysis properly remains on the former.   
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101 (work-persona) in one sentence, while in the next sentence comments on the cunning 
of Beethoven—that is, a fictionalized version of him—for continually depriving the work 
of its expected closure. Here, we see a hierarchical arrangement of agency within a piece 
and our ability as listeners to shift focus from one level to the next without incident. 
Furthermore, because this “cunning” Beethoven is external to the interior, diegetic world 
of the piece, we would say that the piece expresses yearning rather than cunning. To 
measure the empathic distance between the expression of the listener and that of the 
piece, one would determine how the emotion of the listener compares with that of 
yearning.  
Consider Liszt’s La lugubre gondola I (S. 200/1), an elegy written in Venice, 
perhaps as a presentiment of Wagner’s death.5 As seen in Example 1.4, the piece employs 
compound meter (6/8) to depict the buoyancy of the gondola. The accompaniment 
(Example 1.3) that dominates the first two sections (mm. 1-38 and 39-76) reflects the 
alternation between difficulty and ease in propelling the craft with an oar. We can 
imagine Liszt mourning at the edge of the canals and watching the gondola that holds the 
deceased Wagner pass with the current below him. 
 Treating an engaged listener as an observing agent, we can speculate about the 
emotional distance between this listening agent and the virtual agent within the work, 
                                                 
5 Liszt wrote in a letter to music publisher Ferdinand Taborszky dated June 8, 1885: “First of all, dear 
friend, will you be so kind as to go to my house with Frau von Fabry? I stupidly forgot there—in the 
bedroom, not in the salon—the beautiful revised copy of a composition for piano and violin or violoncello, 
together with the transcription of the same for pianoforte alone. The title is ‘La lugubre Gondola’ (the 
funeral gondola). As though it were a presentiment, I wrote this élégie in Venice six weeks before 
Wagner’s death” (1895: 473). 
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say, a fictionalized version of Liszt. Consider the following possibilities for the listener’s 
emotional response: 
1) The virtual agent’s (Liszt’s) expression of sorrow in the music causes the 
listener to feel sorrow as if the sight of Wagner’s funeral gondola were its 
source. 
2) The virtual agent’s (Liszt’s) expression of sorrow in the music causes the 
listener to feel compassion for Liszt. 
The first is an example of empathy because, as seen in Figure 4.1, there does not exist a 
significant empathic distance between the listener and the virtual agent; the listener’s 
emotions directly mirror those of the virtual agent. Furthermore, it satisfies the four 
conditions laid out by de Vignemont and Singer (2006: 435). The second scenario is an 
example of sympathy because the listener’s emotions diverge from those of the virtual 
agent. While the agent’s emotions incite an acceptable response from the listener, they 
are distinct. 
Of course, the difficulty in untangling these two modes of emotional engagement 
is symptomatic of an inarticulate emotional language that often conflates the two. This is 
further complicated by the complexity of emotional expression. As mentioned above, 
when attending a funeral, we may feel compassion for a grieving friend (sympathy) while 
sharing in her sorrow (empathy). Yet we have seen that a closer examination of the 





 In this section, we have placed much of our focus on the degree of engagement 
between the non-diegetic listening agent and an agent within the diegesis. While the 
former is an observing agent, it is not the virtual observing agent that we previously 
discussed. Yet the analogy between the two is helpful in conceptualizing emotional 
engagement. In the next section, we step into the music and examine the empathic 
distance between virtual observing agents and the other agents upon which they gaze.  
 
Musical Frames and Narrative 
In theorizing a virtual observing agent, one cannot help but consider its 
connection to narrative and, more specifically, the role of the narrator. Before continuing, 
it is necessary to make a distinction between “narrative” as conceived by James Liszka 
(1989) (and adapted to music by Byron Almén [2008]), and the “narrator” as presented in 
this dissertation. The former is a more broadly conceived notion of narrative that, put 
tersely by Seth Monahan (2013), is a “tracking of meaningful change over time” (265). 
However, when discussing a narrator here, I am referring most closely to Hatten’s 
“narrative agent” (2014: 226), a virtual agent who acts as a storyteller, relaying the events 
within the diegetic space to the non-diegetic listener. The presence of this agency 
distinguishes the two, representing a narrower conceptualization of narrative than the one 
described and implemented by Liszka and Almén.  
The narrator (narrative agent) is a specific type of virtual observing agent; thus 
the two possess a number of common features. First, both act as lenses through which the 
listener experiences the virtual world. Because these agents act as conduits between the 
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interior and exterior spaces of piece, their accounts may exhibit various inflections, 
ellipses, and reordering of events. Indeed, neither conveys events necessarily with 
accuracy, but according to a given perspective, interpretation, and intention. 
However, the narrator is distinguished from the broader class of virtual observing 
agents in that the narrator always exists at the highest level of the musical discourse. 
Moreover, the narrative agent is akin to storyteller speaking about characters and events 
from which it is conceptually detached. In literature, this virtual agent often creates the 
necessary narrative distance through use of the past tense. For instance, the trite opener 
“it was a dark and stormy night” establishes the setting as an unspecified past that is 
temporally removed from the narrator, the virtual agent whose perspective the reader 
assumes. A writer may also create narrative distance through the use of third-person 
pronouns such as he, she, him, her, they, and them, while notably avoiding the first-
person pronouns I, me, we, and us. Again, this places the narrator at a remove from the 
characters and events that are found in the discourse. 
Music, however, lacks a proper past tense (Abbate 1991, Chapter 2) and an 
equivalent for third-person pronouns to set the listener at a distance from the work. Yet 
music can signal the past through other means, namely quotation, repetition, and topical 
and stylistic allusions. For example, the recapitulation of a sonata recalls past themes in a 
“referential retracing of the rhetorical materials laid out in the exposition” (Hepokoski 
and Darcy 2006, 19). Beethoven’s String Quartet No. 15 in A Minor, Op. 132, iii 
similarly recalls past music, but that which is outside of the work. The slow movement 
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opens with imitative polyphony in the Lydian mode that draws the ear back to music of 
the sixteenth century. 
Janice Dickensheets identifies the “bardic style” as a style topic with an implicit 
narrator (2012: 126-27). Unlike Beethoven’s Op. 132, iii, which references the sixteenth 
century from its position in the nineteenth century, works in the bardic style recall a 
timeless past. She writes that “[t]he effect is a musical epic retold by a poet, complete 
with danger, heroism, chivalry, and often, romance” (127). Unlike a simple allusion to a 
past style, the bard and its tale are essential to the identity of the topic, with the narrating 
bard often explicitly evoked through arpeggiation, itself an allusion to the primary 
instrument of the bard—the harp (126-27). 
A narrator may also be present at the beginning of a discourse, fade into the 
background, and return later to the foreground. Shelley’s Frankenstein is a prime 
example. The novel begins as a series of letters written by Captain Robert Walton. 
Written mostly in the present tense, Walton’s narrative tells of his ongoing expedition to 
the North Pole and of the professor, Victor Frankenstein, that he rescues along the way. 
The narrating Walton writes in a letter that he greatly anticipates a story that the professor 
has promised to tell him, and the beginning of the central and most well-known portion of 
the novel is marked by a sudden change in the discourse. The perspective is transferred 
from Walton to Victor Frankenstein. It is here that the professor tells the tale of the 
monster. Although the professor speaks in the past tense, the discourse absorbs the reader 
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as though it were using present-tense language.6 Captain Walton reprises his role as 
narrator near the end of the final chapter when he returns to the foreground. The novel 
concludes from Walton’s perspective as he again writes letters describing—and reflecting 
upon—the death of Frankenstein and his creation. 
This distinction between levels of discourse is analogous to Edward T. Cone’s 
distinction between a picture and its frame (1968: 11-31). Cone identifies two purposes of 
frames:  
First, it separates the subject chosen for treatment from its 
own imagined surrounding—what I call the internal 
environment: second it protects the work from the 
encroachment of its external environment, that is, of the 
real time and space in which the listener perceives. (15) 
Cone speaks of the frame as a boundary separating the piece of art proper from that 
which is outside of it. In moving forward with Cone’s observations, Richard Littlefield 
finds this framing effect in stock literary openings, such as “once upon a time…” (1996: 
[3.10]). Although properly part of the literary work, the triteness of this syntactic phrase 
prepares the reader to enter a different discursive plane. While the narrative voice 
pervades the piece, perhaps speaking in the past tense and with third-person pronouns, 
the reader becomes engaged with the story—the lowest level of discourse—and the 
awareness for the narrator fades. The narrative voice reemerges when the listener is 
                                                 
6 Käte Hamburger (1973 [1957]: 64-81, as cited by Hatten, 1997) employs the term “epic preterite” to refer 
to the use of the past tense in foregrounded narratives. Here, past-tense verb constructions do not create 
their typical temporal separation; instead, the discourse is more immediate to the reader. 
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pulled out of the story with a similarly trite conclusion: “…and they lived happily ever 
after.” 
 
The Narrator in Mendelssohn, Song without Words, Op. 30, no. 3 
 Cone finds these “internal frames” in music (1968: 22), citing Mendelssohn’s 
Song without Words, Op. 30, no. 3 (Example 4.3).7 The piece begins and ends with 
identical three-measure units that are detached from the body of the work. As an opening, 
these measures prepare by preluding, expanding the tonic triad (E major) from E2 to B6 
through three harp-like arpeggios. The arabesque texture is like that of an ornate picture 
frame with sinuous, interlacing decoration that separates it from the outside world. The 
tightly-voiced V7 at the end of m. 2 supplants the opening expansive tonic and, without 
flourish, quickly resolves through a perfect authentic cadence that prepares the piece for 
its transition to the beginning proper. This cadential cliché is the not-so-subtle clearing of 
the throat that reigns in the textural expansion of the tonic arpeggio and prepares the 
entrance of the body of the piece. The desired silence follows.  
                                                 
7 Cone refers to this work as “Song without Words No. 9 (Consolation)” (1968: 22, emphasis mine). 
Although it is the third piece in the Op. 30 collection, it is Mendelssohn’s ninth published in the genre, with 




Example 4.3. Mendelssohn, Song without Words, Op. 30, no. 3, 




The body of this work begins with a visual cue, a double-bar that divides m. 3. (I 
use “m. 3a” and “m. 3b” to refer to each half of the measure.) Tightly-voiced harmonies, 
conventional 4+4 phrase structure, regular harmonic motion, and thematic continuity 
comprise the main part of the piece. Its chromaticism, dynamic contrast, and gazing 
gestures (mm. 3b-4, 7-8, 16-18) give it a feeling of hopeful determination. 
The harp-like gesture of the opening returns in m. 25, and, again, it serves the 
separate the work from the external environment. This closing frame (mm. 25-27) is a 
replica of the opening frame (m. 1-3), with two notable differences. First, the resolution 
of the melody from the body of the work elides with the onset of the closing frame on the 
downbeat of m. 25. While the interface between the opening frame and the body (m. 3) is 
marked by silence, the body of the work bleeds into the frame in m. 25. This overlap 
suggests an integration between the body of the work and its internal frame. Drawing on 
the analogy of painting, it is as though the artist carefully chose a specific frame for the 
canvas and that it was an integral part of “the work.” Similarly, Mendelssohn fits the 
body of this work with an ornate, arabesque frame and the two become intertwined. The 
second difference between the internal frames exists in the final measure of each; m. 3a 
concludes with a beat-and-a-half of rest while m. 27 contains a fermata on the final rest. 
To understand this compositional choice, it is important to remember that the “outer 
edges” of each frame are the first and final measures of the work. Although Cone refers 
to the first three and final three measures of this work as “internal frames” (1968: 22), the 
silences that precede and follow them, respectively, are the true frames (or external 
frames) that delineate the so-called internal and external environments. The performer, of 
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course, waits for silence before playing, and it is easily earned from most audiences. The 
silence that follows the music, however, must often be demanded.8 The inclusion of the 
fermata on the final rest of the piece ensures that the pianist maintains a pose that signals 
the audience to sit in silence. The outer edge of the frame only meets the wall, so to 
speak, when the performer draws his or her hands away from the keyboard and gives way 
to the sound of the external environment. 
 Having both a performance frame marked by silence and an internal frame 
marked by the harp-like texture creates two frames for the piece, and, consequently, two 
narrators of different types. The silence that serves to frame the performance develops the 
performer as a narrator who “recalls” or “tells the story” of the work for the audience. 
John Rink characterizes the performer as the one who “determines the music’s essential 
‘narrative’ content […] by shaping the unfolding tale on the spur of the moment in an 
expressively appropriate manner” (1994: 112). Although this may be worthy of scholarly 
attention, this external narrator is not the one for which the theory at hand is positioned to 
address; therefore, I will dispense with it and pivot to the narrator evoked by the internal 
frames of mm. 1-3a and 25-27. 
 The narrative agent—topically represented as the bard—is proper to the work and 
is, therefore, an internal narrator.  I have already noted that bardic voice evoked by the 
texture in Mendelssohn’s Songs without Words is evoked through topical allusion; the 
                                                 
8 Cone keenly observes the framing effect of silence in performance situations: “If we are members of an 
audience, silence should present to us a period of empty time in which nothing is happening. It should 
separate our individual and collective movements from the movement that is, for the time being, to control 
us all: the music. This is why the singer waits for the late-comers to be seated and for the coughing to stop. 
This is why the conductor poises his baton.” (1968: 16, original emphasis)  
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expansive arpeggios mimic the bard’s harp. Although narration is essential to this topic, 
the narrative agency is also signaled through discontinuity, which Abbate characterizes as 
“disjunctions with the music surrounding it” (1991: 19). In the above Song without 
Words, the requisite musical disjunction exists in the textural differences between the 
arpeggios of the internal frame and the chordal texture of the work’s body. Because the 
close voicing of the cadential progression in m. 2 and 3a reveals the texture of the body 
before it properly begins, a silence in m. 3a helps to effect the musical discontinuity that 
separates the frame from the picture. (A framing silence is not needed to create 
disjunction between mm. 24 and 25, because of the textural change is immediate.) This 
abrupt change in the musical discourse assists in securing the bardic voice, that stands 
apart from the lower-level discourse as a virtual observing agent or an internal narrator.  
A musical disjunction creates a “shift in level of discourse,” Hatten’s term for a 
“sudden reversal [that] suggests a self-reflexive response or shift in consciousness on the 
part of a single agent, rather than an external agency antagonistic to the progress of a 
protagonist” (2004: 47). This is akin to the change in perspective that occurs at the 
conclusion of Frankenstein when there is a return to the discourse of Walton’s letters. 
Written afterward, these letters comment on the preceding events, signaling an ascent to a 
higher discursive level. A similar shift occurs with the sudden reappearance of the 
arabesque texture in the Song without Words. In Frankenstein, the discourse begins at a 
higher level—one that foretells the primary discourse—and moves to a lower level—the 
primary discourse of the creature’s genesis. An analogous shift from higher to lower 
occurs in the opening of the Song without Words.  
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One of the primary criticisms that Abbate levels against musical narrative is that 
music can do but not show. She writes: 
In terms of the classical distinction, what we call 
narrative—novels, stories, myths, and the like—is diegetic, 
epic poetry and not theater. It is a tale told later, by one 
who escaped to the outside of the tale, for which he builds a 
frame to control its dangerous energy. Music’s distinction 
is fundamental and terrible; it is not chiefly diegetic but 
mimetic. Like any form of theater, any temporal art, it traps 
the listener in present experience and the beat of passing 
time, from which he or she cannot escape. (1991: 53, 
emphasis mine) 
(It is important to note that her use of “diegetic” here equates to “narrative.” I discussed 
this meaning and the classical opposition between mimesis and diegesis in Chapter 1.) 
Abbate’s observation is astute—the innate immediacy of music seems inescapable, even 
with a supposed narrator. Mendelssohn’s Song without Words begins with a narrative 
agent, but this agent seems to disappear throughout the body of the work and only 
remerge in the final bars. Where does the narrator go in the interim? 
 The narrative agent is the lens through which the listener experiences the musical 
discourse that he or she comes to understand. The literary distinction between “story” and 
“discourse” is helpful to this metaphor. Jonathon Culler characterizes story as “a 
sequence of actions or events, conceived as independent of their manifestation in 
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discourse,” and contrastively defines discourse as “the discursive presentation or 
narration of events” (1981: 169-70). It can be said more plainly that the story represents 
actual events, while the discourse represents a recollection or interpretation of those 
events. Returning to the above metaphor, the events in front of the lens are the story, the 
lens is the narrative agent, and the discourse is the image as it is received by the viewer’s 
eye. Narrators can act as opaque lenses that limit the events that the viewer sees, or they 
can be transparent, giving the viewer a relatively unaltered view of events (although 
inevitably from a given perspective). In a frame story, the onset of the work’s body is 
often marked by an apparent dissolution of the narrator; this occurs in Mendelssohn’s 
Song without Words. Because the musical events are immediate to the listener, there 
seems to be no space for the narrator. It is as though the music were a story, not a 
discourse. 
The effect of the dissolving narrator is similar to that of wearing sunglasses. 
When we first put on a pair of sunglasses, we are hyper-aware of the opacity of the lenses 
that darken the image of the world before us. Yet we know that the objects that we look 
at appear to us not exactly as they really are. Although the lenses alter their shading from 
our perspective, the objects do not actually change color. But after a short while, our 
awareness of the interposed lenses fades. Even though they continue to change our 
reception of the images before us, their darkened tint largely goes unnoticed. This 
narrative dissolution also occurs in film. For example, most do not recall that Miloš 
Forman’s Amadeus (1983) is actually narrated by Salieri, who appears at the beginning 
and ending of the film. This explains the numerous biographical inaccuracies regarding 
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Mozart’s life. The film does not present to the viewer the story of Mozart; rather, it 
provides a discourse through the narrative lens of Salieri. The same can be said of the 
bardic narrator in the Song without Words. Although the narrator may disappear from 
view as the work shifts to a lower level of discourse, its presence is still implied and, 
therefore, necessary to the proper understanding and interpretation of the work. 
 
The Narrator in Dukas, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice 
Placed at a higher level of discourse, one might assume that the narrator would 
not participate at the lowest level of the discourse, where the diegetic action occurs. After 
all, the bard in Song without Words bookends the work but is absent from the body. It 
tells of the main discourse but is not featured as an agent within it. However, this 
contrasts with the narrating Salieri, who is also a character within his historical account 
of Mozart’s life. Similarly,in the Sherlock Holmes tales of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Dr. 
Watson is given narrative privileges while also being a participant in the narrated events. 
Paul Dukas’s symphonic poem The Sorcerer’s Apprentice possesses a narrative 
element that is similar to the first-person perspective of Dr. Watson. Of course, its 
narrative component is helped along by its association with Goethe’s “Der 
Zauberlehrling” from which Dukas derived the work; however we find that the Dukas 
setting is able to engender agency and perspective through its own musical means, 
without relying solely on the literary ballad. Having gained popularity due to its 
adaptation in Disney’s 1940 musical classic Fantasia and its subsequent re-releases, the 
tale of an overly-ambitious apprentice is widely known. 
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Goethe’s telling of the story begins when a sorcerer (Hexenmeister) leaves the 
side of his apprentice. The inexperienced protégée, having overheard a spell from his 
master, attempts to replicate an act of sorcery and animates a broom to prepare a bath. As 
the broom proceeds to carry the water for the bath, the apprentice begins to realize that 
the spell has worked too well; the anthropomorphic broom is astonishingly quick and is 
filling up every bucket and bowl it can find. With the tub beginning to overflow, the 
apprentice attempts to recall the magic words to reverse the spell, but they escape his 
memory. Desperate to stop the broom and defuse the situation, the apprentice takes an ax 
to the broom, splitting it in two. Each piece, however, regenerates itself into a new 
whole, with each carrying water as before. Panicked by the now-doubled efficiency, the 
apprentice calls out to his master to cease the enchantment. In the last stanza, we 
suddenly hear the words of the sorcerer—the real master—break the spell and return the 
broom to its original, insensate state. 
 Of the virtual agents (characters) that Goethe includes in his narrative (i.e., 
sorcerer, apprentice, two brooms), the reader is most likely to identify with the 
apprentice. This inclination is certainly influenced by the subject within the title of the 
work and the presence of first-person pronouns (i.e., ich and meinem) in the text, as well 
as the perspective on events that occur in the story. For example, the frenzy that is 
experienced as the broom begins to flood the dwelling is expressed only by the 
apprentice. We must remember that the actions of the broom are dutiful. Although 
animated, the bewitched broom is as mechanical as an automaton—unfeeling and 
perfunctory. It is carrying the buckets of water at a rate that might be desirable in another 
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situation. However, it is the apprentice—not his inanimate servant—who understands the 
seriousness of the situation and experiences the actions of the broom as frantic and 
distressing. 
 This perspective, which is understood through an individualized expression, is 
important to establishing narrative in a musical setting because it creates the necessary 
separation between entities within the diegesis. Language is rich in indexical (deictic) 
signifiers such as /you/, /she/, /this/, and /that/, words that the speaker uses to direct his or 
her attention toward objects or other agents. For music to point, however, it must convey 
this indexicality by portraying physical gestures through combinations of melodic 
contour, rhythm, dynamics, and articulation. Although music may take a bit more effort 
to clearly distinguish /this/ from /that/, it can express such a distinction by creating a 
separation between two virtual entities, typically two virtual agents. 
In Dukas’s musical setting of The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, we hear the broom 
performing dutifully for the apprentice immediately following the enchantment. In mm. 
67ff we hear the broom’s well-known 9/8 theme set in F minor. This section is primarily 
diatonic and is scored lightly with woodwinds and strings to portray the nimble and 
effective servant broom. From the perspective of the apprentice, the animated broom is 
performing its task of carrying water as planned and to his satisfaction. But it is not long 
until the music runs amok, filling with chromaticism and an ever-thickening texture. The 
piece grows louder and becomes more unwieldy as the apprentice becomes frantic with 
his realization that he has lost control of his minion. Perhaps it is during this chaos that 
we first recognize the apprentice as the virtual agent with which we most closely identify, 
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because the music expresses his panicked emotional state; after all, the broom is mindless 
and acts only according to the spell. Through this individuation of the two agents and by 
our identifying with the apprentice’s panic, the music achieves the necessary distance 
required to suggest a narrative interpretation. 
 To the same degree that Dukas’s work has become part of popular culture, an 
essay by Carolyn Abbate (1991) entitled, “What the Sorcerer Said,” has become part of 
the scholarly canon for musicologists and theorists. In it, Abbate draws the works of 
Dukas and Goethe close together as she attempts to see if music permits the same degree 
of narrativity in the symphonic poem that language affords the epic ballad. Abbate 
admits early on that she is less charitable in her identification of narrative than we might 
hope for music, stating that she does not hear narrative in music very often. She writes, 
In my own interpretations (and my own narrative behavior) 
I will interpret music as narrating only rarely. It is not 
narrative, but it possesses moments of narration, moments 
that can be identified by their bizarre and disruptive effect. 
(29) 
With this, she seems to be discussing the distancing effects created through a shift in the 
level of discourse (Hatten 1994, 2004). This enables the music to reflect or comment on 
the ongoing musical events in much the same way as a dramatic soliloquy in which 
diegetic temporality halts while a character expresses his or her inner thoughts. Abbate 
finds this narrative instance in the final measures of the musical work, which serve as an 
epilogue that stands at a remove from the events of the “story.” Their separation from the 
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rest of the music is achieved through a pregnant pause and a distinctively slow, 
somewhat deflated character. For Abbate, these measures are detached from the dramatic 
action that comprise the symphonic poem proper and serve as the single instance of 
narration within the work (60).  
 Abbate concludes her analysis of The Sorcerer’s Apprentice by writing that with 
the detachment of the epilogue comes a voice “speaking in the past tense” (1991: 60). 
This analogy to language follows an early discussion in the essay in which Abbate claims 
that music’s narrative failings are in part due to a lack of the past tense as a distancing 
tool (52-6). Although we discussed above that the final measures of Dukas’s work 
suggest a past tense, it is their novel occurrence that requires a marked shift in the level 
of discourse. Spoken and written languages on the other hand have conventional 
signifiers (i.e., verbs) to indicate tense; these verb forms are so articulate and common 
that they do not require disjunction to indicate tense. For Abbate, it seems that narration 
comes easy to language because one can write pervasively in the past tense; whereas the 
fundamental temporality of music and the immediacy of the performance make it 
difficult to listen to the music—engage with it—while remaining distant from it. 
 As described above, narrative implies a sense of distance while music—
particularly gestural music—requires us to listen with an engaged presence. Although a 
seeming paradox, we must remember that music has its own means of portraying 
distance through indexical gestures embodied by the listener. When we point to an object 
across the room, we create a connection between the body and the distant object, thus 
drawing together the immediacy of the action and the distance of the indexed object. 
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When a melody ascends, we may be inclined to hear the ascent as mimetic of the upward 
movement of our body as we gaze or point toward an object, such a bird, traveling up 
into the air. Although the melodic ascent imitates the (immediate) physical movements 
required to track the flight, the gesture suggests that the gesturer is indexing and 
portraying distance.   
 Hatten (2004: 227) describes a performance technique whereby a narrative 
element is added through a physical gesture enacted by the performer. He proposes an 
instance in which a pianist relaxes her posture upon reaching the coda of a sonata. The 
function of a coda as an after-the-end section, in which any residual tension dissipates 
and thematic fragments from earlier in the work are brought to mind as though they were 
snapshots in a photo album, lends itself to a number of retrospective gestures. She may 
lift her head upward in thought or recline slightly to a tranquil position of reminiscence. 
These gestures are indexical in that they are made in direct reference to the music 
emerging from the piano at the present moment; their purpose is to draw out and 
emphasize an expression in the music, as through the performer were pointing her finger 
and saying, “Do you remember this theme?” In enacting these performance gestures 
during the coda, the pianist creates a disjunction between her more attentive, upright 
position throughout the body of the sonata and her more relaxed, reflective posture. 
These are analogous to the sense of involvement that we feel during the piece proper and 
the separation that we experience during the contemplative coda. Through an indexical 
gesture, the performer is able to portray to the listener the narrative element of the coda, 
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which simultaneously evokes the immediacy of the embodied musical experience and the 
distance necessary for narrative. 
 Regardless of the individual narrative procedure, we have seen that distance is 
fundamental to the expression of narrative. Abbate (1991) emphasizes the past tense as 
creating temporal separation in language, and Hatten (1994, 2004) speaks of a shift in the 
level of discourse as represented in the music and methods by which a performer portrays 
narrative commentary through indexical performance gestures. The representation of 
distance within the music that these authors discuss presents an interesting intersection 
with the virtual observing agent. Each features a sort of interpreter through which the 
musical events are relayed to the listener, through the establishment of distance by means 
of metaphorical pointing. By embodying this interpretive agent, the listener is given a 
unique perspective of this virtual world. In addition to the limited view that comes with a 
first-person perspective, Hatten describes narrative agency as providing a “filtered” view, 
in that the events within the musical discourse are seen through the eyes of a narrator 
who may inflect them as he or she sees fit (2004: 225-26). 
 This is not to say that all music involves a virtual observing agent that is narrative 
in nature. We must remember that narrative is an event-driven perspective that implies 
temporality, even if it is only through the ordering of events. Although temporal in its 
substance, music does not always represent a temporal narrative space that is congruent 
with its sonic unfolding. Moreover, this representation can be entirely void of 
temporality; it may be a simple vignette that describes virtual objects and inner thoughts, 
and it is only by necessity of the medium that these are handed to the listener as 
 
179 
sequenced sonic events. As Edward Pearsall keenly observes, “though [music] unfolds 
through time, [it] does not necessarily constitute a temporal gesture on the semantic 
level” (2006: 41).9 
 The Sorcerer’s Apprentice is an example in which the virtual observing agent 
functions as a narrator who also exists within the plot itself. Much like Dr. Watson in the 
Sherlock Holmes stories, the eponymous apprentice describes events as he both literally 
and figuratively observes them, and he exerts influence on these actions as well. Dukas’s 
work, in conjunction with Goethe’s text, gives clear substance to the virtual observing 
agent. We do not just see the events through the lens of a transcendent observer, we take 
on the perspective of a virtual observing agent who has the capacity to produce effects on 
other agents and entities within the virtual environment.  
 
Observation and Emotion in Berlioz, Harold in Italy, ii (March of the Pilgrims) 
 Berlioz wrote Harold in Italy (1834) in response to a request by Paganini for a 
significant work for viola. The piece in four movements depicts scenes observed by the 
youthful Harold as he travels the Italian countryside. Berlioz admitted to drawing 
inspiration from the melancholy young knight in Byron’s Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage. In 
addition to the influence of Byron’s narrative poem, there is an autobiographical element 
                                                 
9  Of course, gestures by their nature require time for their unfolding; however, the temporal element of the 
gestural gestalt is so brief that it is insufficient to propose or contribute to a narrative by itself. David Lidov 
writes that a gesture is a “molar unit of motion,” implying that it is indivisible, thus inseparable from its 
temporal component (2005: 132). 
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to the work, as it was written just a few years following the young Berlioz’s residence in 
Italy after winning the Prix de Rome.   
Despite Paganini’s love of the work, Harold is often measured against the 
yardstick of the widely-praised Symphonie fantastique, which premiered in 1830.10 Both 
symphonies are programmatic, with movements threaded with an idée fixe; however, they 
diverge in the use of this thematic device. In the earlier composition, the idée fixe 
undergoes transformations that reflect the changes in mood. But the changes in Harold 
are minimal, demonstrating the viola’s distance and individuation from the surrounding 
music. Moreover, Harold’s theme is far more simplistic (Example 4.4). Compared to the 
obsessive 40-bar idée fixe introduced in the first movement of Symphonie fantastique, the 
parallel period in eight measures denoting Harold expresses the naiveté of the young 
traveler freshly encountering the world. 
 
 
Example 4.4. Berlioz, Harold in Italy, i, mm. 38-45, solo viola, 
first entrance of the idée fixe 
 
 The observational aspect of Harold in Italy is earned both through the work’s 
reference to Byron’s epic poem and through the contrast between the solo viola and the 
rest of the orchestra. Edward T. Cone notes that Harold is an observer because his theme 
                                                 
10 After hearing the symphony for the first time, Paganini famously wrote in a letter dated December 18, 
1938: “Beethoven spento non c’era che Berlioz che potesse farlo rivivere.” (“Though Beethoven has died, 
Berlioz could revive him.”) (Enrico Panzacchi 1895: 203, translation mine). 
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is presented in the introductory frame, outside the bounds of sonata-allegro proper of the 
first movement (1974: 91-93). When we identify with Harold, we establish him as a 
narrative agent within the diegesis who relays to us what he sees and feels. Cone further 
holds that the symphony is not an “objective narration”—that is, it is not simply a series 
of Italian scenes presented to the listener (93). Rather the “composition reports a 
subjective experience” through the eyes and body of Harold (93). This mediation by a 
narrative agent is the distinguishing element. Harold stands interposed between the 
audience and the procession of pilgrims, creating two levels of diegesis. Figure 4.2 shows 
the way in which information travels to the listener, always from the diegetic space to the 
non-diegetic space. When a narrator is present, the information travels within the diegetic 
space to a narrator who in some way modifies it (e.g., ordering, clarifying, muddying, 
etc.) before sending it to the listener. Because the flow of information always travels 
toward the narrator on its way to the audience, two levels of diegetic space are creates. 
This is the same type of diegetic framing function that we discussed above in both the 
Song without Words and Frankenstein. The bottom row of Figure 4.2 depicts this framing 
function in the second movement of Harold in Italy. Here it is clear that we, the listener, 
do not have direct access to the “sight” of the pilgrim’s march. We learn about it through 
the musical narration of Harold, who describes the scene in a manner that he deems 
fitting for us. Like Watson and Goethe’s/Dukas’s apprentice, he is a character within the 
diegesis. But unlike these two, Harold’s role is more passive, as he is primarily an 
observer who comments upon the action and does not enact obtrusive, consequential 





Figure 4.2. Flow of diegetic information to the listener 
 
 This narrative agency functions as a virtual observing agent in that it indexes 
elements of the diegesis—the pilgrims, countryside, and the church bells in the final bars. 
The pervasive idée fixe of the viola represents Harold’s presence throughout the 
movement. Berlioz clearly individuates this theme, demanding that the listener 
understand it as standing apart from the rest of the music. In Example 4.5, we see that 
although the theme appropriately harmonizes with the surrounding music, it maintains its 
own character. This is perhaps best heard in the solo viola’s mid-phrase entrance in m. 
58. Rather than joining the rest of the ensemble at the start of a new phrase, the viola 
enters with the passage in media res, as though the virtual agent Harold unexpectedly 




Example 4.5. Berlioz, Harold in Italy, ii, mm. 54-69 
 
 It is to be made clear, however, that the narrating Harold is not literally 
represented by the viola. Instead the presence of viola represents moments when 
narrating agent Harold—the virtual observing agent—more directly injects himself into 
the musical story. If we understand the music as text, the narrating Harold is present from 
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beginning to end and exerts full control over the musical tale that he tells. Each melody, 
each timbre, each dynamic, and the organization of these musical events reflects the 
narrator describing the scene as he observes it. (Thus, the musical idea indicating the 
pilgrims might be thought of as the narrator observing, “Those pilgrims are marching 
along the path.”) But, of course, narration always prefixes an outwardly objective 
statement with recognition of the narrating agent and, in this instance, the virtual 
observing agent. This adds a performative aspect to the previous state, now understood as 
the narrating Harold stating, “I observe those pilgrims marching along the path.” The 
observing aspect of the statement is helped along by the deixis of the pronoun those. 
Continuing with the analogy, we can understand the entrance of the viola to be a more 
explicit first-hand account, with the narrating Harold perhaps saying, “I have just come 
across those pilgrims marching along the path.” 
As both a narrator and a virtual observing agent, Harold places himself at a 
distance from this pilgrim’s procession that he happens upon during his travels. Although 
the soloist’s theme complements the surrounding harmony (suggesting favorable 
sympathy), Berlioz prevents it from becoming fully absorbed into the texture, thus 
avoiding empathetic attunement. Harold’s theme begins in m. 62 at the return of the 
canto in the second violin. While the canto sits atop the texture and unfolds with a 
relatively high degree of rhythmic activity, Harold remains detached, pacing along in half 
notes and whole notes. His melodic movement at the level of the measure rather than the 
beat is expressive of his passive and observational role. Harold’s music is thoughtful and 
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pensive, as if the young lad were awestruck by the world that he meets on his sojourn 
abroad. 
 
 Having established Harold as a narrating virtual observing agent who exists 
within the story that he tells, we are poised to speculate about his emotional experience. 
Does Harold lose himself in the experience, feeling the same emotions as the pilgrims in 
an expression of empathy? Or does Harold stand at an emotional remove, feeling a 
different complex of emotions?  
 For the case of empathy, we see that Harold’s theme harmonizes well with the on-
going chorale, while also projecting reverence in its slow unfolding. Comparing his 
theme in mm. 62ff to its realization in the first movement, we notice that Harold adapts it 
to accommodate the duple meter of the marching pilgrims. It is as though he sings along 
with their tune while being sensitive to their expression of veneration. 
The case for sympathy, however, seems much stronger. While he engages with 
the pilgrims and shares in their experience, Harold remains (somewhat) emotionally 
distant from them, understanding himself as a stranger in a strange land. We understand 
this from the manner in which Harold places his theme on top of the canto. Apart from 
the one-versus-many textural dynamic, the pilgrim’s hymn unfolds in eight-measure 
phrases, divided into two-measure sub-phrases. Harold creates syncopation, both in the 
offbeat entrance in m. 58 and in the theme itself. Although the rhythmic augmentation of 
the first-movement’s theme (Example 4.4) helps it to be less imposing to the chorale, it 
does not shed its triple meter. This creates syncopation in the hypermeter, with the 
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pilgrims performing in two-measure units while Harold sings along three measures at a 
time.  
In all, it seems that Harold’s expression of reverence is different from that of the 
pilgrims. He observes them and engages with their song, but remains at a remove. 
Interestingly, Harold does not use indexical gestures to create the narrative and emotional 
distance between himself and the virtual object that is the procession. His role as virtual 
observing agent is achieved instead through the lack of complete musical integration, to 
wit, the metric misalignment. Although the music lacks a real musical gesture of 
indexicality, Harold’s virtual distance in the diegesis suggests that he casts an indexical 
gaze upon the pilgrims has he observes their sacred ritual. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have further explored the interpretive potential of the virtual 
observing agent by bringing together narrative and emotion. We have found that current 
research suggests an intimate link between physical human movement and human 
affective feeling. Because musical gestures are not often indexical, evaluating the 
empathic distance between two agents creates the necessary space and individuation to 
suggest the presence of a virtual observing agent, even in the absence of indexical 
gestures. Shifts in the levels of discourse are also indicative of emotional distance, 
interpretable as musical narration. When a virtual observing agent exerts control over the 
ordering and interpretation of “story” events, a narrative agency emerges. By exploring 





 I return to Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, Op. 28, no. 6 in order to briefly 
demonstrate an analysis and propose a line of inquiry now that we have a more complete 
theory of virtual observing agency in hand. In Chapters 1 and 2, I claimed that the 
melodic contour that we first hear in the left hand of mm. 1-2 imitates the shape of a 
gazing gesture. Specifically, this contour represents the motions of the head, neck, and 
eyes as an observer visually traces the path of motion of an object that ascends in the 
foreground and descends in the distance. I characterized the gesture as thoughtful and 
pensive, aligning it with the “tolling bells” that von Bülow heard in the right hand and 
with knowledge of its performance at Chopin’s funeral. Without a doubt, the lethargic 
tempo (lento assai) and the minor mode contributed to this perception of gloom. I then 
paired these interpretations with my gestural hearing in order to paint the image of a 
virtual agent gazing through time toward something not readily attainable—perhaps the 
past or the future. 
 Chapter 3 more deeply explored the nature of virtual objects, specifically objects 
in fixed positions that were observed from multiple perspectives. Although the opening 
gesture of the Prelude in B Minor suggests that a stationary agent is observing a moving 
object, we can speculate nevertheless on its nature. Is it moving hurriedly away from the 
virtual observing agent? Do non-identical iterations of the contour represent different 
perspectives on the same object, or do they represent new objects? Furthermore, we 
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might ask if the virtual observing agent yearns for the object like the agent in 
Beethoven’s Sonata in A major, op. 101, i. 
 Narrative and emotion were the focus of Chapter 4. Whereas the previous 
chapters explored the agent and the object, this final chapter looked closely at the space 
between them. We found that music can create a separation between an agent and an 
object through indexical gesture, framing, and various types of discontinuity. Although 
my study of Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor has not revealed a strong narrative agency, I 
discussed the emotional expression of the virtual observing agent in detail. I did not 
address, however, the empathic distance between the virtual observing agent and other 
agents or personas that potentially exist within the work. Drawing on Monahan’s (2013) 
agent classes, we might look closely at the emotions of the “fictional composer” to see if 
they differ from those of the virtual observing agent. Do other virtual agents emerge 
throughout the work? If so, how do their emotions differ? A theory of virtual observing 
agency places new analytical instruments into our interpretive toolbox. And combined 
with these types of questions, the theory leads us toward developing more compelling 
readings of a work. 
 
The theory that I have put forth in this dissertation does not seek to radicalize 
listening. Rather, it provides a new method for conceptualizing music that simply furthers 
those inclinations that many performers, music educators, and listeners already have. The 
human body has long played a role in performance practice, namely in the way that 
performers attune their performance gestures to the shape of the music; music educators 
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know the worth of physical entrainment when teaching young students; and listeners who 
give into the impulse move to the music understand that there is physical motion implicit 
in every piece. Of course, gesture is more than movement; it is movement that is 
necessarily communicative. Gestures are natural parts of human expression that enable us 
to say, “Hello,” “Good bye,” and “Thank you,” without ever uttering a word. Music 
similarly draws on the repertory of human bodily expressions, encoding these 
communicative human gestures in sound and style. Properly primed, we can easily 
recognize these familiar human expressive elements that exist in music. 
A theory of virtual agency advances the human proclivity for recognizing 
movement and communicative action in music. More significantly, the explicit 
identification of a human-like agent permits more confident speculation about the nature 
of gestures and their development throughout a given work. A theory of virtual observing 
agency expands upon this. Indexical gestures in music, such as pointing, gazing, and 
reaching, suggest the presence of a virtual agent that is individuated from other elements 
represented in the musical discourse. By pointing a virtual finger or casting a virtual 
glance, an observing agent can help define a virtual environment and furnish it with 
virtual objects. 
 The distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic spaces has featured 
significantly in this dissertation; respectively, they distinguish the virtual world 
constructed as a musical representation from the material world in which the listener 
resides. Musical gestures seem to lie right where these two spaces meet, having both real 
and representational aspects. The real listener hears and recognizes musical gestures in 
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the sonic material of the music, while the meaning of these heard gestures exists within 
the diegesis. In the latter case, gestures may take on meanings that participate in the 
construction of a robust virtual world. 
We have seen that indexical gestures may stratify the diegetic space, creating 
levels of discourse and narration. Just as a real listener may judge and comment on events 
within the diegesis, a narrative agent—a special type of virtual observing agent—may 
exert influence on the way in which the “story” of the work unfolds. Virtual observing 
agency makes musical narration possible because indexicality (deixis) frees music of its 
immediacy of representation, providing the required distance between the agent and the 
indexed object. This permits music to talk about things, rather than just perform actions. 
Stated simply, (non-indexical) virtual agents can represent “this” in music, but virtual 
observing agents can talk about “that.” Indexicality strengthens the connection among 
theories of musical gesture, virtual agency, and narrativity. This dissertation has only 
begun to scratch the surface; a more thorough study of agency and narrative that invokes 
musical indexicality and indexical gesture would pay significant interpretive dividends.  
Virtual agents not only perform human actions, they express human emotions. 
Because emotion is tightly bound together with human movement and posture, the 
identification of agential gesture suggests the presence of agential emotion. In Chapter 4, 
I noted that the indexical aspect of the virtual observing agent may modulate this emotion 
because it creates an empathic distance between the expressive agent with which we 
identify and another agent that it observes. Our virtual observing agent may augment or 
diminish the emotional expression that it observes in another agent. We can speculate that 
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emotional divergence is also possible. Parody and satire are achieved through a 
difference in overt expression and a more covert underlying meaning. It would be 
interesting to explore the intersection of these theories.  
Many of the analyses that I have conducted isolate gestures within the confines of 
a few measures. This has allowed us to scrutinize their shapes and energetic profiles; 
however, it has often come at the expense of neglecting the persistence and development 
of the virtual observing agent throughout a work. Our examination of Beethoven’s Op. 
101, i, (Chapter 3) has revealed that the expressions of yearning and yielding that exist in 
the cadential failures of the structural foreground are also present in the background. I 
have demonstrated that the ascending Urlinie mimics the indexical reaching gesture that 
the agent performs while striving for a tonic goal. This has provided us with a better 
picture of the agent and the manner in which its gestures are manifest within the 
movement. From this, it appears that additional studies that track the trajectory of a 
virtual observing agent through entire movements could be productive. 
A study of repertoire beyond the common practice period is another logical step 
forward for the theory of indexical gesture. While most indexical human gestures are 
universal and unchanging over time, their manifestation in music differs according to 
style. Certainly, gestures in serialism do not unfold across consonant triads, such as found 
in Chopin’s Prelude in B Minor, yet some probably take on the same melodic shapes and 
rhythmic profiles to imitate human movement. We may also find a new gestural 
vocabulary in the twentieth century. For example, in mining Messiaen’s Vingt regards 
sur l'enfant-Jésus for gestures, we do not seem to find the same physical mimesis that 
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occurs in Beethoven or Schumann. Perhaps these gazing gestures are buried deeper in the 
music, requiring a better understanding of their stylistic encoding. 
 
With a theory of virtual agency and indexical gesture in mind, it is appropriate to 
point our gaze forward, toward the future of interpretation. Beyond this study lie 
inconceivable possibilities for engaging with music and revealing the meaning that it 
holds. Human empathy, however, offers us one guarantee—if we dig deep enough into 





Abbate, Carolyn. 1991. Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth 
Century.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Adams, Ansel. 1960. Redwoods, Bull Creek Flat, California. 
Agawu, V. Kofi. 1991. Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Almén, Byron. 2008. A Theory of Musical Narrative. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bacon, Francis. 1969. Three Studies of Lucian Freud. Oil on canvas, in three parts. 78 in. 
x 58 in., each canvas. Private collection. 
BaileyShea, Matthew L. 2012. “Musical Forces and Interpretation: Some Thoughts on a 
Measure in Mahler.” Music Theory Online 18, no. 3. 
http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.12.18.3/mto.12.18.3.baileyshea.php 
Battistella, Edwin L. 1990. Markedness: The Evaluative Superstructure of Language. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Buchler, Michael. 2014. “What Goes Up.” Paper delivered to the University of Texas 
Music Theory Symposium, Austin.   
Cadwallader, Allen and David Gagné. 1998. Analysis of Tonal Music: A Schenkerian 
Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clater, Michelle J. 2009. “Interposed between God and Man: Agency in the Requiems of 
Berlioz and Fauré.” Ph.D. diss., Indiana University. 
Clevenger, John R. 2002. “The Origins of Debussy’s Style.” Ph.D. diss., University of 
Rochester. 
Cocteau, Jean. 1921. Cock and Harlequin: Notes Concerning Music. Trans. Rollo H. 
Myers. London: Egoist Press. 
Cone, Edward T. 1968. Musical Form and Musical Performance. New York: Norton. 
 
194 
_____. 1974. The Composer’s Voice. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Copland, Aaron. 1957 [1939]. What to Listen for in Music. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Cox, Arnie. 1999. “The Metaphoric Logic of Musical Motion and Space.” Ph.D. diss., 
University of Oregon. 
_____. 2001. “The Mimetic Hypothesis and Embodied Musical Meaning.” Musicae 
Scientiae 5, no. 2: 195-209. 
_____. 2011. “Embodying Music: Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis.” Music Theory 
Online 17, no. 2. http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.11.17.2/mto.11.17.2.cox.html 
Culler, Jonathan. 1981. The Pursuit of Signs: Semantics, Literature, Deconstruction. 
Ithaca: Cornel University Press. 
Cumming, Naomi. 2000. The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Signification. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
de Vignemont, Frederique, and Tania Singer. 2006. “The Empathic Brain: How, When 
and Why?” Trends in Cognitive Science 10, no. 10: 435-41. 
Dickensheets, Janice. 2012. “The Topical Vocabulary of the Nineteenth Century.” 
Journal of Musicological Research 31: 97-137. 
Diderot, Denis. 1771. Oeuvres de Théâtre de M. Diderot, avec un Discours sur la Poésie 
Dramatique. Amsterdam: M. M. Rey. 
Eco, Umberto. 1976. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Ekman, Paul. 1994. “Moods, Emotions, and Traits.” In The Nature of Emotion: 
Fundamental Questions, ed. Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, 56-58. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Ericourt, Daniel. 1978. Masterclasses in Debussy: The Piano Music, ed. Daniel Ericourt 
and Robert P. Erickson, Chapel Hill, N.C.: Hinshaw Music. 
Frijda, Nico. 1994. “Emotions Require Cognitions, Even If Simple Ones.” In The Nature 
of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, ed. Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, 
197-202. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Greenberg, Joseph. 1966. Language Universals. The Hague: Mouton and Company. 
Guck, Marion A. 1981. “Metaphors in Musical Discourse: The Contribution of Imagery 
to Analysis.” Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan. 
 
195 
_____. 1991. “Two Types of Metaphoric Transfer.” In Metaphor: A Musical Dimension, 
ed. J. C. Kassler, 1-12. Sydney: Currency Press. 
Hamburger, Käte. 1973 [1957]. The Logic of Literature. Trans. Marilynn Rose. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hatten, Robert S. 1994. Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and 
Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
_____. 1997. “Music and Tense.” In Semiotics around the World: Synthesis in Diversity. 
Proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the International Association for Semiotic 
Studies, Berkeley 1994, ed. Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carl. 627-30. Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter.  
_____. 2004. Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, 
Schubert. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
_____. 2010. “Aesthetically Warranted Emotion and Composed Expressive Trajectories 
in Music.” Music Analysis 29, nos. 1-3: 83-101.   
_____. 2012. “Musical Forces and Agential Energies: An Expansion of Steve Larson’s 
Model.” Music Theory Online 15, no. 2. 
http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.12.18.3/mto.12.18.3.hatten.php 
Hepokoski, James, and Warren Darcy. 2006. Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, 
and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth Century Sonata. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Huron, David. 1996. “The Melodic Arch in Western Folksongs.” Computing in 
Musicology 10: 3-23. 
_____. 2006. Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Iacoboni, Marco, Istvan Molnar-Szakacs, Vittorio Gallese, Giovanni Buccino, John C. 
Mazziotta, and Giocomo Rizzolatti. 2015. “Grasping the Intentions of Others with 
One’s Own Mirror Neuron System.” PLOS Biology 3, no. 3: 529-535. 
James, William. 1884. “What is an Emotion?” Mind 9, no. 35: 188-205. 
Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, 
and Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Johnson, Mark, and Steve Larson. 2003. “‘Something in the Way She Moves’—
Metaphors of Musical Motion.” Metaphor and Symbol 18, no. 2: 63-84. 
 
196 
Kinderman, William. 1995. Beethoven. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kopp, David. 2014. “On Performing Chopin’s Barcarolle.” Music Theory Online 20, 
no. 4. http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.14.20.4/mto.14.20.4.kopp.html 
Korsyn, Kevin E. 1983. “Integration in the Works of Beethoven’s Final Period.” Ph.D. 
diss., Yale University. 
Kramer, Lawrence. 1988. “Expressive Doubling: Beethoven’s Two-Movement Piano 
Sonatas and Romantic Literature.” Studies in Romanticism 27, no. 2: 175-201. 
_____. 1990. Music as Cultural Practice: 1800-1900. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Laird, James D. 1974. “Self-attribution of Emotion: The Effects of Expressive Behavior 
on the Quality of Emotional Experience.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 29, no. 4: 475-86. 
Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal 
about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
_____. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western 
Thought. New York: Basic Books. 
Larson, Steve. 1997-98. “Music Forces and Melodic Patterns.” Theory and Practice 22-
23: 55-71. 
_____. 2002. “Musical Forces, Melodic Expectation, and Jazz Melody.” Music 
Perception 19, no. 3: 351-85.  
_____. 2004. “Musical Forces and Melodic Expectations: Comparing Computer Models 
and Experimental Results.” Music Perception 21, no. 4: 457-498. 
_____. 2012. Musical Forces: Motion, Metaphor, and Meaning in Music. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Lazarus, Richard. S. 1991. Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. 




_____. 1996. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life. 
New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Lerdahl, Fred, and Ray Jackendoff. 1983. A Generative. Theory of Tonal Music. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Lidov, David. 1987. “Mind and Body in Music.” Semiotica 66, no. 1/3: 69-97. 
_____. 2005. Is Language a Music? Writings on Musical Form and Signification. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Liszka, James Jakób. 1989. The Semiotic of Myth: A Critical Study of the Symbol. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Liszt, Franz. 1895. Letters of Franz Liszt: From Rome to the End, vol. 2. Trans. 
Constance Bach, ed. La Mara. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
Littlefield, Richard C. 1996. “The Silence of the Frames.” Music Theory Online 2, no. 1. 
http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.96.2.1/mto.96.2.1.littlefield.html 
Maus, Fred Everett. 1988. “Music as Drama.” Music Theory Spectrum 10: 56-73.  
_____. 1991. “Music as Narrative.” Indiana Theory Review 12: 1-34. 
Meyer, Leonard B. 1956. Emotion and Meaning in Music. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
_____. 1973. Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
_____. 1989. Style and Music: Theory, History, and Ideology. Philadelphia. University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Monahan, Seth. 2013. “Action and Agency Revisited.” Journal of Music Theory 57, no. 
2: 321-71. 
Mukamel, Roy, Arne D. Ekstrom, Jonas Kaplan, Marco Iacoboni, and Itzhak Fried. 
“Single-Neuron Responses in Humans during Execution and Observation of 
Actions.” Current Biology 20, no. 8: 750-56. 
Neumeyer, David. 1987. “The Ascending Urlinie.” Journal of Music Theory 31, no. 2: 
275-303. 
Nussbaum, Charles O. 2007. The Musical Representation: Meaning, Ontology, and 
Emotion. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
198 
Panzacchi, Enrico. 1895. Nel Mondo della Music: Impressioni e Ricordi. Florence: G. C. 
Sansoni. 
Pearsall, Edward. 2006. “Anti-Teleological Art: Articulating Meaning through Silence.” 
In Approaches to Meaning in Music, ed. Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall, 41-
61. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Peirce, C. S. 1998 [1904]. “New Elements (Καινα στοιχεια).” In The Essential Peirce: 
Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913), ed. the Peirce Edition 
Project, 300-24. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Pierce, Alexandra. 2007. Deepening Musical Performance through Movement: The 
Theory and Practice of Embodied Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Plato. 1930. Republic. Trans. Paul Shorey. London: William Heinemann. 
Poggioli, Renato. 1969 [1959]. “The Pastoral of the Self.” Daedalus 88 (1959): 686-89. 
Reprinted in Pastoral and Romance: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Eleanor 
Terry Lincoln, 47-60. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 
Ratner, Leonard G. 1980. Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style. New York: 
Schirmer Books. 
Ridley, Aaron. 1995. Value, Music, and the Passions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Rink, John. 1994. “Chopin’s Ballades and the Dialectic: Analysis in Historical 
Perspective.” Music Analysis 13, no. 1: 99-115. 
Robinson, Jenefer. 2005. Deeper than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, 
and Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Robinson, Jenefer, and Robert S. Hatten. 2012. “Emotions in Music.” Music Theory 
Spectrum 34, no. 2: 71-106. 
Saslaw, Janna. 1996. “Forces, Containers, and Paths: The Role of Body-Derived Image 
Schemata in the Conceptualization of Music.” Journal of Music Theory 40, no. 2: 
217-43. 
Schachter, Carl. 1996. “Schoenberg’s Hat and Lewis Carroll’s Trousers.” In Aflame with 
Music: 100 Years of Music at the University of Melbourne, ed. Brenton 
Broadstock, Naomi Cumming, and Denise Erdonmez Grocke, 327-41. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
 
199 
Schenker, Heinrich, ed. 1918-21. L. van Beethoven, Klaviersonaten: Nach den 
Autographen und Erstdrucken rekonstruiert von Heinrich Schenker, vol. I. 
Vienna: Universal Edition. 
 
Schindler, Anton F. 1966 [1840, 1860]. Beethoven as I Knew Him. Trans. Constance S. 
Jolly, ed. Donald W. MacArdle. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
(Biographie von Ludwig van Beethoven. 3rd ed. Münster: Aschendorff, 1860 [1st 
ed. 1840].) 
Schonberg, Harold C. 1963. The Great Pianists: From Mozart to the Present. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
Shelley, Mary. 1818. Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus. London: Lackington, 
Hughes, Harding, Mavor, & Jones. 
van Alphen, Ernst. 1992. Francis Bacon and the Loss of Self. London: Reaktion Books.  
Waugh, Linda. 1982. “Marked and Unmarked: A Choice between Unequals in Semiotic 
Structure.” Semiotica 38: 299-318. 
Zbikowski, Lawrence M. 1997. “Conceptual Models and Cross-Domain Mapping: New 
Perspectives on Theories of Music and Hierarchy.” Journal of Music Theory 41, 
no. 2: 193-225. 
_____. 2002. Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Zuckerkandl, Victor. 1956. Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World. Trans. 








 Ian Gerg grew up in St. Marys, Pennsylvania. In 2008, he received a bachelor’s 
degree in music education from the Pennsylvania State University, where he studied 
trombone with Mark Lusk and was a member of the Schreyer Honors College. Upon 
completing his undergraduate degree, he moved to Austin to attend graduate school, 
earning a master’s degree in music theory from the University of Texas at Austin in 2010. 
He remains active as an educator, researcher, wind conductor, and trombonist. 
 
 











This dissertation was typed by the author. 
